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Abstract
This thesis consists of three independent chapters on development economics and
Chinese economy.
The first chapter examines how centralization affects regional development. I draw
upon plausibly exogenous variations in centralization from a political hierarchy reform
in China to investigate it in a novel sub-provincial setting. I show that centralization
has positive and significant effects on the overall industrial output and urban popu-
lation of regions. To understand the mechanism, I propose a theoretical framework,
where centralization will help to reduce resource misallocation within a region and im-
prove aggregate productivity. Consistent with it, my analysis of industrial firm-level
data reveals a reduction in the dispersion of marginal products after centralization,
and I quantify the productivity gains from centralization in a counterfactual analysis.
In addition to the positive overall effects on regions, the reform also has distributional
effects for the different counties that constitute the region.
The second chapter evaluates a firm-based pollution regulation in China in 2007 to
investigate the relationship between political incentives and effects of environmental
regulations. I show that when a municipality Party secretary has more incentives
to improve the local economy for promotion, measured by his age, adverse impacts
in employment and output on regulated firms will be much larger. At the same
time, loss in regulated firms will be associated with gains in other unregulated firms
in polluting industries, and there is no overall effects in manufacturing activities on
polluting industries. I find that emissions of pollutants in municipalities with high-
incentive leaders experience a significant reduction.
The third chapter estimates the effects of children genders on parents’ time alloca-
tion due to the long-existing son preference in developing countries. Using household
survey data in China from 1989 to 2009, I show that with more sons instead of daugh-
ters, both father’s and mother’s time on housework will rise. At the same time men
will increase their working time on labour markets and women can enjoy more leisure
on the contrary. For possible endogeneity in children’s gender, I exploit exogenous
variations from a law to forbid the use of ultrasound-B to reveal fetus gender.
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Preface
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays that are aimed towards contributing
to the understanding of the role of political incentives and public policies in economic
development. Specifically, I investigate how changes in the political incentives of local
officials and shocks from public policies shape the micro behaviours and finally affect
the aggregate economic performance in the context of China.
During the era of reform beginning in 1978, China experienced enormous economic
growth. In the market based reform, China has changed from a centrally planned
economy to a mixed market economy. Unlike typical market economies, China has a
government which is heavily involved in the economic process. As a result, it offers
a great opportunity to study the relationship between government behaviours and
economic performance.
The first chapter is about the long-standing debate between centralization and
decentralization. In the last few decades, the trend all over the world has been to
decentralize. But theoretical predictions are ambiguous and current empirical evidence
is mixed. The chapter shows a novel benefit from centralization: better allocation of
resources. I use a political hierarchy reform in China starting in 1983 as a natural
experiment to exploit plausibly exogenous variations in centralization. In the reform,
the political decision powers, as well as powers in public finance and administration,
are taken out of the hands of local county governments and given to the regional
prefecture governments.
First, using a difference-in-differences strategy, I show that centralization has posi-
tive causal effects on the overall industrial output and urban population of prefectures.
I conduct a series of tests to secure the identification assumptions. Second, to show
the mechanism, I propose a theoretical framework with heterogeneous firms. Under
decentralization, local county governments subsidize firms using their own fiscal bud-
gets, which produce dispersions in marginal products across counties and then a loss in
aggregate productivity. In contrast, under centralization, the prefectural government
can manage all the fiscal revenues from its component counties together and reallo-
cate them to equalize marginal products between them. In one word, centralization
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can reduce resource misallocation. To empirically identify the mechanism, I use a
comprehensive firm-level dataset and show that the dispersion of marginal products,
a measurement of resource misallocation, was reduced after the centralization reform.
Moreover, I quantify the productivity gains from centralization in a counterfactual
analysis.
Meanwhile, besides the overall benefits, the centralization reform also produces
distributional effects in the counties within a prefecture. After centralization, the
production of specific industrial goods tends to be concentrated in fewer counties than
before. Specifically, the capital county of the prefecture will gain a great deal more from
this concentration than the others do. I show that this is because capital’s comparative
advantage is in industrial production, but not the preference or favouritism.
The second chapter evaluates a set of firm-based environmental regulations in Chi-
na in 2007 to investigate the relationship between the political incentives of local of-
ficials and the effects of environmental regulations. The environmental regulations in
question are set by the Ministry of Environmental Protection targeting high-polluting
firms which account for 65% of the emissions of sulfur dioxide, smoke and industrial
dust.
In recent years, policies on the environment and pollution have been among the
most controversial topics in both public and academic discussion. Recent research ac-
cepts that the regulations are associated with improvements in environmental quality
and reductions in the manufacturing activities of regulated firms and industries. In the
second chapter, I investigate whether the political incentives of local officials will play
a role in the consequences brought by environmental regulations. To show this empiri-
cally, I use municipality secretaries’ ages as a measurement of political incentives. Due
to the retirement age limit and the minimum tenure requirement by the Chinese Com-
munist Party, the possibility of a municipality Party Secretary’s promotion decreases
sharply after he reaches 57 years old. I link a dataset of municipality Party Secretaries
to the nationwide manufacturing enterprise survey, containing information of both
regulated and unregulated firms subject to the 2007 firm-based pollution regulations.
Using a triple differences model, I show that when a municipality Party Secretary
has more incentives to improve the local economy in order to gain promotion, the
firm-based regulations will have larger adverse impacts in employment and output
on regulated firms. At the same time, unregulated firms in polluting industries are
found to absorb the loss of employment from the regulations, and there is no overall
reduction in manufacturing activities on polluting industries. I find that emissions
of pollutants in municipalities with high-incentive leaders are significantly reduced,
suggesting that the reallocation of economic activities from regulated to unregulated
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firms is associated with cleaner production.
To interpret the empirical results better, I present a simple career-concerns model.
I find that the political incentives of local officials can explain the responses in different
firms and industries. Following Jia (2014), I argue that political incentives act as a
complement to economic performance with regard to the promotion rule. I extend
the model from Jia (2014) to include the substitution of clean for dirty inputs, and
then interpret how regulating the dirty input will induce local officials with different
political incentives to choose different levels of input. Highly incentivized officials will
enforce the regulations more strictly and reduce output in the regulated firms more
drastically. At the same time, their incentives will encourage them to put more effort
into reallocating resources from the regulated firms to the unregulated ones.
In the third chapter I focus mainly on a law aiming to forbid the use of ultrasound-B
to reveal the gender of fetuses. In developing countries, preference for sons is a long-
standing tradition. The existence of such a preference induces pre-birth selection and
post-birth discrimination. I exploit exogenous variations from the law to estimate the
effects of children’s genders on parents’ time allocation after births. Using household
survey data in China from 1989 to 2009, I show that the forbidding of ultrasound-B
reduces the male-biased sex ratio at birth. Using the law as an instrumental variable,
I find that with more sons instead of daughters, the time spent on housework by both
fathers and mothers rises. At the same time fathers have to increase their work time in
the labour market and women can reduce theirs to enjoy more leisure. To secure the
identification assumption on exclusion restrictions, I perform a placebo test making use
of a sample of adults who are childless. These results are consistent with theoretical
predictions founded on a utility-based son preference model.
The implications we get from the analysis in this thesis are not specific to China,
a country where government is deeply involved in the economy. It can contribute
to the general knowlege in development economics in many ways. For example, my
first chapter finds that decentralization can be inefficient due to the misallocation of
resources by local governments. In democracies, though classical theories like Tiebout
(1956) set the efficiency of decentralization as a benchmark, more recent studies em-
phasize its shortcomings. For example, Boffa et al. (2015) argues that voters may not
monitor decentralized local governments well due to information asymmetry, so decen-
tralization in democracies can produce a similar misallocation pattern as in my first
chapter. Chapter 2 of my thesis finds that the promotion incentives of local officials
in China will produce heterogeneity in the effects of environmental regulations. This
rationale and logic of the political economy of environmental regulations also apply to
politicians facing electoral incentives (List and Sturm, 2006). My last chapter seeks to
x
reveal the essence of son preference, which is common in most developing countries.
Rose (2000) investigates the same topic using data from India. These examples and
implications make me believe that my thesis can exploit the unique settings from Chi-
na to shed light on the broader contexts of other countries in the world and contribute
to knowledge in general economics.
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Chapter 1
The Value of Centralization:
Evidence from a Political Hierarchy
Reform in China
How does centralization or decentralization at government affect regional developmen-
t? This paper draws upon a natural experiment in China’s political hierarchy from the
1980s to investigate the effects of centralization in a novel sub-provincial setting. Us-
ing a difference-in-differences approach, I show that centralization has positive causal
effects on the overall industrial output and urban population of regions. To under-
stand the mechanism, I propose a theoretical framework, where centralization will help
to reduce resource misallocation within a region and improve aggregate productivity.
Consistent with the mechanism of a more efficient allocation of resources, my analysis
of industrial firm-level data reveals a reduction after centralization in the dispersion of
marginal products. I quantify the loss in productivity under decentralization by hy-
pothetically reallocating inputs to equalize marginal products to the extent observed
in conditions of centralization. In addition to the positive overall effects on regions,
the reform also has distributional effects for the different counties that constitute the
region. After the reform, industrial production tends to concentrate in counties which
are the capitals of their regions.
1.1 Introduction
The debate between centralization and decentralization has long been of interest to
economists and policy makers. In the last three decades, many countries in the de-
veloping world, in particular transition economies in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin
America, have implemented decentralization reforms (World Bank, 2000; Gadenne
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and Singhal, 2014). Decentralization in practice consists of the devolution of various
decision-making powers, including fiscal, administrative and political, to small-scale
entities at the local level. However, while the degree of centralization is considered
one of the most important dimensions of policy making, in the economics literature it
remains an open question. In theory, although Tiebout (1956) first raised the efficien-
cy of decentralization realized by voting with one’s feet, most recent work provides
ambiguous predictions on its effects. For example, Besley and Coate (2003) model the
debate as a trade-off between conflicts of interests under centralization and externality
problems under decentralization; Boffa et al. (2015) argue that a centralized govern-
ment cannot differentiate policies for voters with heterogeneous tastes but, under a
decentralized government, voters with less information may not monitor local govern-
ments well. In terms of the related empirical literature, evidence is mixed and most
of the existing papers fail to establish a causal relationship (Bardhan, 2002; Mookher-
jee, 2015). In addition, most of them are based on decentralization reforms and few
directly evaluate the effects of centralization. Moreover, most empirical papers do not
identify any clear mechanisms that might make either centralization or decentraliza-
tion beneficial. In general, there is no clear answer, either theoretically or empirically,
about the extent to which a government should be centralized.
In the context of China, decentralization from central to local governments is con-
sidered one of the main sources of economic growth in the last thirty years (Xu, 2011).
Most economists argue that the competition between local governments preserves their
incentives to adopt policies promoting growth. However, Young (2000) argues against
decentralization. Under the partial reform in China, local governments retain the in-
centives and powers to distort the economy. On the one hand, faced with rent-seeking
opportunities, local governments have the incentive to maintain and even increase
distortions for high-margin industries. On the other, decentralization releases powers
to local governments and enables them to extract rents. They have various ways of
distorting the economy, including subsidies for specific industries, expropriating lands
for industrial use or setting trade barriers. As a result, decentralization fragments
the domestic market and leads production away from patterns of comparative advan-
tage. Young (2000) observes two simple trends as suggestive evidence of his view.
One concerns the convergence in compositions of production across provinces over the
last few decades and the other the divergence in prices, labor productivity and factor
allocations. The combination of these two trends forms a picture of market fragmen-
tation and production distortion. His paper motivates such research as Poncet (2003)
and Cai and Treisman (2006) on the potential caveats to decentralization in China.
However, to the best of my knowledge, no single paper offers causal evidence on it.
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This paper aims to help fill this gap in the literature by providing a quantitative
evaluation of the causal effects of centralization stemming from a political hierarchy
reform in China. This hierarchy reform, first launched in 1983 and lasting until 2003,
centralized decision powers from a lower “local” county level to a higher “regional”
prefecture level. Figure 1.1 provides a simple illustration of the reform. Before it
took place, county governments in a prefecture could decide on economic projects,
public finance and personnel administration in their own counties. The central gov-
ernment realized the problem of such excessive decentralization: “within a region, too
many local governments exist; their works and policies contradict and offset each oth-
er, producing fragmentation; it is harmful for social and economic coordination and
development” (Central Committee of the Party and the State Council, 1983). In its
response, the central government designed the 1983 reform to transform prefectures,
which were more decentralized, to more centralized “prefecture-level municipalities”.
Decision rights on county governance were therefore centralized to the prefecture-level
municipalities. I exploit variations in centralization induced by this reform to ex-
amine its outcomes for regional development, mainly those in industrialization and
urbanization.
To guide the empirical analysis, I present a heterogeneous firm model based on
Hopenhayn (2014). Before the centralization reform, county governments could decide
on their own subsidies to local industrial firms. After the reform, each prefecture-level
government managed the funds from all its component counties and decided how to
allocate them. I show that the prefecture as a whole benefited from this centralization
reform, while at the same time the component counties experienced differentiated
distributional effects. On the one hand, better coordination through the centralized
prefecture-level municipality government could help equalize the marginal products;
the aggregate total factor productivity and total output in the whole area, would
both be improved. On the other hand, since some resources were reallocated from
counties with low marginal product firms to those with high marginal product firms,
it produced differential outcomes in different counties.
To test the model predictions on the overall and the distributional effects of the
centralization reform, I use the variations in the reform timings of different prefectures
to conduct a difference-in-differences regression as the baseline empirical model. Us-
ing prefecture-level data from 1983 to 2003, I find from the baseline regression that,
after the reform, prefectures as a whole experienced increases in industrial output and
urban population. Several checks on the identification assumptions are performed to
allow a causal interpretation of these effects. At the same time, I find that the reform
is associated with improvements in aggregate productivity. To show its mechanism, I
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apply the methodology of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to measure resource misallocation
using dispersions of “revenue productivity” (TFPR). With a widely used firm level
dataset, I show that the centralization reform could reduce misallocation within pre-
fectures and quantify the loss in aggregate productivity due to decentralization. This
suggests that the increase in industrial output was due not only to increasing labour
input, but also to the improvement in productivity. This demonstrates the mechanism
through which centralization may benefit economic performance.
Second, with regard to the predicted distributional effects, I find from county-
level data that the capital counties where prefecture-level governments were located
benefited from the centralization reform, while other counties suffered a slight loss
from the baseline regression. Meanwhile, production in the industrial sectors became
more concentrated in fewer counties. I show that such concentration is not due to
preference or favouritism but to advantages in productivity: firms in counties with
higher sector-specific productivity produced more after the reform. This offers support
to the aggregate implications of the distributional effects.
This paper therefore provides a novel insight into the potential gains from central-
ization. Although decentralization is well accepted by most policy makers, in this paper
I provide an important piece of evidence that excessive decentralization is harmful and
clearly identify a novel mechanism: resource misallocation. There is a large theoretical
body of literature proposing various theories on the trade-offs between centralized and
decentralized institutions. The classical approach formalized by Oates (1972) assumes
that centralization can internalize the spillovers across districts, but the accompany-
ing uniformity will produce inefficiency, since preferences are heterogeneous. Recent
work has laid greater emphasis on the political process. For example, decentralization
can avoid conflicts of interest (Besley and Coate, 2003) and the accountability prob-
lem (Seabright, 1996), while it may induce a race-to-the-bottom competition between
local governments (Keen and Marchand, 1997) and corrode the state capacity by lo-
cally shielding firms from central regulations and tax collectors (Cai and Treisman,
2004). In this paper, I argue that decentralization can bring resource misallocation, a
mechanism which has not been formally studied before.
I identify this mechanism by showing that the centralization reform is associated
with less resource misallocation and gains in aggregate productivity. In a decentralized
institution, county governments collect tax revenues and locally subsidize industrial
development. When input factors are imperfectly mobile, as in China, the marginal
revenues brought by government spending may be different in different counties, which
produces resource misallocation within a region. However, when the power of gover-
nance is centralized at a higher, prefecture level, the prefecture-level government can
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manage the taxes from counties and allocate them efficiently, resulting in equalized
marginal products across counties. In recent years increasing numbers of papers have
emphasized the great role of resource misallocation in explaining the disparities in
aggregate productivity across countries (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and K-
lenow, 2009; Bartelsman et al., 2013), but few of them quantify the contribution made
by different sources of misallocation. The present paper explicitly illustrates how far
decentralization causes misallocation and reduces aggregate productivity.
Furthermore, my paper features a sub-provincial centralization experiment to en-
rich the existing literature. First, due to data availability, previous literature most-
ly concentrated on “central - provincial” relations, referred to as “fiscal federalism”
(Qian and Weingast, 1997). For example, since 1978, China’s economic miracle has
been widely attributed by numerous papers to decentralization from the central gov-
ernment to provincial governments (see, for example, Maskin et al. (2000) and Jin
et al. (2005); see also a survey by Xu (2011)). Unlike them, I focus on the evolution of
political powers between two sub-provincial governments. They represent governance
entities in China but are left as black boxes in the literature without theoretical or em-
pirical analysis. Among very few “regional - local” papers, Zhuravskaya (2000) studies
a similar setting in Russia. Second, given the popularity of decentralization policies,
most of the existing literature draws on decentralization reforms. My paper is based
on a unique centralization reform in China and can therefore provide direct evidence
for the effects of centralization. Third, previous studies focus most on the provision
of public goods; however in many developing countries, the function of government
is relatively straightforward to foster economic development and growth. Instead of
common outcomes in the form of public goods, this paper directly investigates eco-
nomic performance.
This paper also contributes to the literature on urbanization and regional devel-
opment. Urban economists have confirmed the importance of political institutions
in determining urbanization and urban primacy (Henderson and Becker, 2000). For
example, Henderson and Wang (2007) and Ades and Glaeser (1995) have shown that
democratization helps to limit the ability of a national ruling class to concentrate re-
sources in the national capital. This paper contributes by offering sub-national causal
evidence on these topics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 documents key
features in the context of China relevant to my paper. Section 1.3, as a guide to
the empirical analysis, develops a conceptual framework on industrial production in
counties under different distortion conditions. Section 1.4 introduces the data. Section
1.5 introduces the basic empirical strategy used in the paper. Section 1.6 documents
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how the centralization reform affects industrial developments in overall prefectures
and quantifies the improvement in within-prefecture resource allocation. Section 1.7
examines the distributional effects on component counties. Section 1.8 checks the
robustness of the presented empirical results. Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Political Hierarchy and Jurisdictions in China after 1978
In China, there are four levels in sub-national jurisdictions: province, prefecture, coun-
ty and township level. Figure 1.2 provides some basic information.1 The average size
of a province in China is about 300,000 km2, similar to the sizes of Italy or Arizona.
As a result, it is difficult for provincial governments to make policies according to local
heterogeneity. They have to rely on lower level governments, that is, prefecture- and
county-level governments, to implement policies locally. Counties are the basic units
in China’s local government hierarchy, comparable to counties in the United States.
Nevertheless, it is not easy find a comparable counterpart to prefecture-level jurisdic-
tions in the United States. We can use Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) to form
a rough analogy, though MSAs are not legal administrative units. Similar to an MSA,
in China a prefecture-level jurisdiction combines several counties. Its average size is
about 28,000 km2, similar to the size of the Chicago metropolitan area, a combina-
tion of fourteen counties. In terms of population, its average population is about 4.1
million by 2010, similar to the San Francisco metropolitan area, a combination of five
counties.
As prefecture- and county-level governments play an essential part in China’s polit-
ical and economic processes, how governance responsibilities and powers are divided is
critical in understanding local governments in China. This paper concentrates on the
relations between prefecture- and county-level governments. Figure 1.3 sketches the
basic political hierarchy in China. A province is composed of several prefecture-level
units, and a prefecture-level unit is composed of several county-level units. Prefecture-
level governments play an intermediate role between a province and its component
counties. There are two types of prefecture-level units: prefecture (diqu) or prefecture-
level municipality (or prefecture-level city, dijishi). It is necessary to emphasize that
both prefectures and prefecture-level municipalities are at the same level (prefecture
level) in China’s political hierarchy. My analysis will base on the transition from
prefectures to prefecture-level municipalities at this same level.
1Township governments do not possess many decision rights in most economic matters, so will not
be discussed in this paper that will analyse the evolution of decision powers between local governments.
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A key difference between a prefecture and a prefecture-level municipality lies in
their relations with the counties belonging to them: in a prefecture; political, fiscal
and administrative powers are decentralized to county-level governments, and in a
prefecture-level municipality these powers are centralized to the prefecture-level gov-
ernment.
In a prefecture, all counties are almost autonomous and the county governments
have decision rights over the development of their own counties. The prefecture gov-
ernment possesses no power over the counties, since in legal terms it is only a provincial
government’s “resident agency” (paichu jigou) in its prefecture’s territory. In other
words, it does not constitute an official layer of local administration (Chung and Lam,
2004). Leaders in the prefecture government cannot enact economic policies on their
own; instead, they convey decisions by the provincial government to their component
counties and oversee them. Moreover, because provinces in China are so large, many
policy choices are left to the lower level of the counties. As a result, counties under
any prefecture can make independent decisions on their own affairs, including those
of an economic and political nature. For example, they can decide where public funds
shall be spent and what public goods will be offered; on local taxes and subsidies; on
the location of newly opened state-owned enterprises, among other areas. In general,
in a prefecture, counties enjoy considerable autonomy.
In contrast, in a prefecture-level municipality, county governments lose their deci-
sion rights. The prefecture-level municipality government located in the capital county
can administer the development of all of the prefecture-level municipality’s counties.
The reason for this difference is that the prefecture-level municipality government
is not a province government’s “resident agency’, but an essential intermediate lev-
el of government between a province and a county. Legally, its component counties
are under the supervision of the prefecture-level municipality government itself, not
of the province government. In this situation, county governments are manipulated
by the prefecture-level municipality government: their leaders are nominated by the
prefecture-level municipality government; their fiscal revenue and expenditure are not
only supervised but also managed; they are not allowed to set up new state-owned
enterprises freely and the choice of location is coordinated by the prefecture-level mu-
nicipality government. Counties in prefecture-level municipalities therefore are not as
autonomous as in prefectures. The prefecture-level municipality officials can give a
range of orders to any given county.
In general, three types of decision rights are transferred to prefecture-level munic-
ipality governments (Shi et al., 2009). First come administrative powers in regard to
social and economic projects. A prefecture-level municipality government has hundred-
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s of administrative rights over developments in its constituent counties. For example,
the setting up of a state owned enterprise can no longer be decided by the county
in which it is located. Since the reform, this decision must be approved by the cor-
responding prefecture-level municipality government. Second are powers over public
finance revenue and expenditure. Prefecture-level municipalities are a formal inde-
pendent fiscal regime, while prefectures are not. On the revenue side, prefecture-level
municipality governments now take part in sharing counties’ tax revenue and the coun-
ties have to rely more on transfer payments from upper levels of government. On the
expenditure side, prefecture-level municipality governments take more responsibility
for public expenditure. Third come the powers to appoint local officers. These powers
in three areas of decentralization are similar to those summarized by Bardhan (2002)
and World Bank (2000): administrative, fiscal and political. The combination of these
powers is important. Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) show political centralization is a
key complement to fiscal federalism.
An example documented by a local officer in Wuhu, Anhui Province provides a
vivid illustration on the function of prefecture-level municipality governments. In
his book, Han (1986), describes how Wuhu prefecture-level municipality government
managed its component counties: “Due to huge resource of duck down in Wuhu, every
county wanted to build a down coat factory. But the prefecture-level municipality
government only approved one factory in the capital county to avoid a waste, which
could not happen under previous prefecture setting.” We can see from this story that
a prefecture-level municipality government can manage public finance funding and
decide on several economic projects on component counties, which is impossible for
prefecture governments.
It is noteworthy to distinguish two types of component counties in prefectures or
prefecture-level municipalities: capital counties (or urban districts, shiqu) and pe-
ripheral counties (xian). A capital county is where the prefecture or prefecture-level
municipality government is located. Historically, a capital county was the central and
the most developed part in a prefecture or prefecture-level municipality, and its iden-
tity as the location of the prefecture-level government is mostly confirmed in history
and remains unchanged. The pre-determined differences between capital and periph-
eral counties allows the present research to explore possible distributional effects on
component counties.
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1.2.2 The 1983 Reform: “Turning Prefectures into Prefecture-
level Municipalities”
The reform starting in 1983 aimed to abolish prefectures and subject counties to the
rule of prefecture-level municipalities (Central Committee of the Party and the S-
tate Council, 1983). The primary goal of the reform was to accelerate urbanization
and industrialization by the better coordination of resources and help the component
counties: “The shortcomings of prefecture institution is obvious: within a region, too
many local governments exist; their works and policies contradict and offset each other,
producing fragmentation; it is harmful for social and economic coordination and devel-
opment · · · The main solution is to gradually transform prefectures to prefecture-level
municipalities and let prefecture-level municipalities lead belonging counties” (Cen-
tral Committee of the Party and the State Council, 1983). The central government
supposed that after a prefecture had been changed into a prefecture-level municipali-
ty, the prefecture-level municipality government could better manage and coordinate
component counties. The central government expected this prefecture-level munici-
pality setting to increase the efficiency of both capital counties and peripheral counties
under the coordination of the prefecture-level municipality governments.
The timings of the reform were mainly made by the central government (Chung and
Lam, 2004). The central government also stated some conditions to be met on which
kind of prefectures could be reformed. It included requirements on the non-agricultural
population (150,000) and industrial output in capital counties (400 million) (Central
Committee of the Party and the State Council, 1983). Nevertheless, these conditions
were not binding in the actual process. The process of this reform is illustrated in
Figure 1.4. Starting from 1983, the number of prefecture-level municipalities increased
rapidly and the number of prefectures decreased at a similar rate. Until 2003, except
for a few special minority residences, almost all prefectures were turned into prefecture-
level municipalities. Moreover, as the pattern of the number of total prefecture level
jurisdictions suggests, such a reform was basically a one-on-one transition between a
prefecture-level municipality and a prefecture. Figure 1.5 presents an example of the
reform.
I will make use of the variations of this reform across space and time to explore the
heterogeneous development outcomes of the centralization of governance. As described
above, in a prefecture, the powers of governance are devolved to county governments
and all counties behave independently; under a prefecture-level municipality, the pow-
ers are centralized to prefecture-level municipality government. The “Turning pre-
fectures into prefecture-level municipalities” reform exhibited great many variations
in the extent of centralization. Figure 1.6 depicts the variations of the reform across
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space. In my empirical analysis, I do not include five provinces: Tibet, Inner Mon-
golia, Xinjiang, Qinghai and Hainan, since their prefectures did not undergo reform
during the time period examined, so there are no within-province variations. The
reason for this is low population densities and some special policies such as the ethnic
autonomous institution in the first three of them. Furthermore, I exclude those which
had already been prefecture-level municipalities before 1983. I also exclude them as
they are not a part of the 1983 reform and may not be comparable to those treated
during the reform (Chung and Lam, 2004). Most of them are capitals of provinces and
much larger than those in the sample. Finally, I exclude four province-level munici-
palities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing) as well as Hongkong, Macau and
Taiwan, whom the reform did not apply to. At last, the policy affected about 60%
population in the whole country.
1.3 Conceptual Framework
In this section I develop a simple framework to guide the empirical analysis. The
frame is based on the model in Hopenhayn (2014). He adopts a simplified model of
firm heterogeneity in perfect competition as in Lucas (1978) and Hopenhayn (1992) to
illustrate the relationship between resource misallocation and aggregate productivity.
I combine this with the behaviours of local governments in this framework, validating a
possible source of distortions faced by firms in developing countries raised by Hsieh and
Klenow (2009). In my model, under decentralization, county governments subsidize
firms subject to their own budget constraints, producing heterogeneous distortion
rates and therefore resource misallocation. Under centralization, the prefecture-level
municipality government manage component counties’ budgets and reallocate them to
reduce misallocation.
There are N counties in a prefecture. I assume that all counties produce a homo-
geneous output in a perfect competition market and that the production function for
county i is given by a Cobb-Douglas function of its representative firm
Yi = AiL
η
i , (1.1)
where Ai and Li are total factor productivity and labour in each county i’s industrial
sector. Production displays decreasing returns in the only input labour (η < 1).2
2Here I adopt a diminishing returns to scale production function. In the productivity literature it
is a common practice to assume diminishing returns in production, such as Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). In contrast, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) assume diminishing
returns are in the demand side where monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) is used,
instead of the production side in this paper. Actually the two flavours of modelling are equivalent
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Different from Hopenhayn (2014), I assume labour in the industrial sector is supplied
with infinite elasticity under an exogenous wage w. It is based on Lewis (1954)’s
classical theory where the industrial sector can absorb labour from the agricultural
sector with a fixed wage, which is the case throughout the present study period in
China. In that sense, w is equalling to the subsistence wage in the agricultural sector.
To promote industrial growth, county government i subsidises output with a dis-
tortion rate τi. It can be interpreted as support for county governments to offer firms,
which are more general than a cash subsidy, such as tax deduction. The revenues of
the representative firms are (1 + τi)PYi. Then each county’s workers and output in
the industrial sector is determined as
Li = [
PηAi(1 + τi)
w
]
1
1−η (1.2)
Yi = Ai[
PηAi(1 + τi)
w
]
η
1−η (1.3)
The total output Y and workers L in the prefecture is an aggregate of those in the
component counties:
L =
∑
[
PηAi(1 + τi)
w
]
1
1−η (1.4)
Y =
∑
Ai[
PηAi(1 + τi)
w
]
η
1−η (1.5)
We can see from the above equations that the output and the labour depend on
the distortion rates they face as well as their productivity. As counties aim to foster
as much industrial growth as possible, the distortion rates will depend on their budget
constrains. The budget constraints will differ in decentralization and centralization
settings.
First, I discuss the decentralization situation, that is, prior to the 1983 reform.
Here, each county government faced a constant budget constraint:
τiPYi ≤ Ti. (1.6)
Ti measures the total resource constraint county i can use to support industrial ac-
tivities. For simplicity I assume it is exogenous to every county. The assumption is
not unrealistic considering the fact that in China amounts of fiscal revenue of local
governments largely depend on their endowments of land which can be sold for real
estate development.
In this model, I assume that the only preference of local governments is to maxi-
and isomorphic when guiding the counterfactual analysis. I will show this in Section 1.8.7.
11
mize industrial output by subsidizing subject to their own budget constraint. Under
decentralization, each county could make decisions about how to use its own funding
to subsidize industry. It is straightforward to see each county will simply run out of
its endowment Ti to subsidize industrial production. The distortion rate τi, pinned
down by i’s own budget constraint, differed between counties due to heterogeneous
productivity Ai and endowment Ti. It results in differences in the marginal prod-
ucts of labour. There exists potential inefficiency from such resource misallocation.
I denote the decentralization equilibrium as {τˆi, Lˆi, Yˆi}. τˆi is determined by budget
constraint 1.6.
Now I turn to the situation after the reform. In this case, the prefecture have
been turned into prefecture-level municipality and its component counties lost their
decision rights. The prefecture-level municipality government was now put in charge of
all counties. It could determine how much to spend on each county to maximize output
in the whole area. The prefecture-level municipality government’s budget constraint
was: ∑
τiPYi ≤
∑
Ti. (1.7)
I denote the equilibrium as {τ˜i, L˜i, Y˜i}. Taking the derivative of Equation 1.5 subject
to the above budget constraint, we can find that the first order condition is
τ˜1 = τ˜2 = · · · = τ˜N = τ˜ (1.8)
The comparison between two equilibrium outputs can be written as
Yˆ =
∑
Ai[
PηAi(1 + τˆi)
w
]
η
1−η ≤ (1 + τ˜) η1−η
∑
Ai[
PηAi
w
]
η
1−η = Y˜ (1.9)
Lˆ =
∑
[
PηAi(1 + τˆi)
w
]
1
1−η ≤ (1 + τ˜) 11−η
∑
[
PηAi
w
]
1
1−η = L˜ (1.10)
Intuitively, before centralization, each county spend its own revenue subject to
the budget constraint to subsidize industrial production. Due to heterogeneous pro-
ductivities, marginal products of their revenue are different across counties. After
centralization, the prefecture-level municipality government could take available rev-
enues from all counties together and reallocate across counties to equalize the marginal
products. With a more efficient allocation of revenues, total output and workers in
the whole area would be improved. From the expressions of Yˆi and Y˜i above, the
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predictions for empirical tests can be shown:
Yˆ ≤ Y˜ (1.11)
Lˆ ≤ L˜ (1.12)
This framework is mainly based on Hopenhayn (2014). In Hopenhayn (2014) and
other misallocation literature, they often conclude models by showing the dispersion
in distortion rates τi will bring loss in aggregate productivity. In my model I take
a step further, trying to raise a possible source of the dispersion. I introduce local
governments who will spend a fix amount of revenues on subsidizing firms. Due to
the heterogeneity in productivity across counties, firms in different counties will be
subsidized in a different rate. That is the source of the dispersion in τi in my model.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Aggregate Data on Population and Production
The main outcomes of interest relate to the industrial and urban development in China.
To this end, I collect and digitize data on output and population both on prefecture
level and county level. Output variables can be broken into agricultural and industrial.
Population variables can be broken into agricultural and non-agricultural. They are
reported by the National Bureau of Statistics in published statistical yearbooks and
local gazetteers.
The study period in this paper is from 1983 to 2003; prior to 1983, data is scarce.
After 2003, the central government stopped the reform and began to re-decentralize
powers to some developed counties under various prefecture-level municipalities, which
may contaminate the estimated effects of the centralization reform.
The sample in the empirical part includes all prefectures not transformed in to
prefecture-level municipalities by 1983. Although the central government did not en-
courage it, a small number of prefectures were reformed to prefecture-level municipal-
ities by provincial governments. It would be a concern that those prefectures treated
prior to the reform period were not comparable to those whose treatment were required
by the central government after it announced the reform. Therefore, I only include
those that remained as prefectures until at least 1983.
Panel A of Table 1.1 provides summary statistics of the population and output
aggregates. We can see that capital counties were more urbanized and industrialized
than peripheral counties, and even showed higher productivity in industrial production.
Their output made up the most part in prefectures.
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1.4.2 Aggregate Data on Public Finance
Besides the outcomes of population and production, the variables associated with pub-
lic finance are also significant for confirming that the centralization actually occurred.
The public finance data is from “The Prefecture, City and County Public Finance S-
tatistics Yearbook”, reported by the Ministry of Finance in China. It documents fiscal
revenue and expenditure at both county and prefecture level annually from 1993. I
bring in the data for 1993 - 2003.
Summary statistics of the main public finance variables are presented in Panel B
of Table 1.1.
1.4.3 Firm-level Statistics
To explore more implications of the effects on industrial sectors and on enterprise,
I use firm-level data from Chinas Annual Survey of Industrial Production, a survey
also conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics. It is an annual census from 1998
containing all non-state industrial firms with sales more than 5 million Yuan (about
0.6 million dollars in 1998), plus all state-owned firms. It is the most widely used micro
data when studying industrial production in China (for example, Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) and Song et al. (2011)).
To fit into the study period of the aggregate level analysis, I use firm level data
from 1998 to 2003. It consists of over 100,000 firms in 1998 and nearly 200,000 in 2003.
I use unique IDs to link firms over years to construct the panel. In some special cases,
such as mergers and acquisitions, firms change their IDs. To provide a more precise
matching, I follow Brandt et al. (2012) to link firms over time using their Chinese
name, address and telephone number in addition to unique IDs.3
The information I use from this firm level dataset includes the firm’s industry code,
location, ownership, outputs, value-added, wage payments and capital stock.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
1.5.1 Baseline Model
To empirically evaluate the impact of the centralization, I use a difference-in-differences
method as the baseline model:
Yjpt = βTreatjpt−1 + φwjpt + αj + δpt + jpt (1.13)
3The details can be found on the authors’ website (www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/n07057/china)
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where Yjpt is an outcome variable in prefecture j, province p and year t; Treatjpt−1 is
the main independent variable, indicating whether prefecture j in province p received
treatment by year t − 1;4 αj is a prefecture fixed effect; δpt is a year×province fixed
effect; wjpt are control variables including some simultaneous administrative changes;
for example, whether prefecture j becomes a special economic zone, a coastal open
city or a deputy-provincial city. I cluster the standard errors at the prefecture level.
Thus β provides the overall effects of the centralization reform on outcomes of interest
in prefectures as a whole.
The inclusion of prefecture fixed effects αj captures any time invariant character-
istics of prefectures, such as culture and geography. Province-by-year fixed effects δpt
pick up province specific shocks, for example, policies implemented by provinces or
the central government, price fluctuations and changes in central-local relations. Con-
trolling for these fixed effects, I identify the effects of the centralization reform using
within-province variations.
Variations of the main independent variable Treatjpt−1 come from different reform
timings in the sample. Thus, a natural challenge to the validity of the baseline empiri-
cal strategy is the non-randomness of the reforms across prefectures. If there were some
unobservable factors that were simultaneously correlated with timings and outcomes of
being reformed, the coefficient of interest β would be biased. For example, it could be
the earlier selection of those prefectures with more growth potential as prefecture-level
municipalities. More formally, the identification assumption of the baseline regression
is a standard parallel trend assumption, as in any difference-in-differences specifica-
tion: in the absence of reform, the growth in the outcomes of interest would be the
same across any prefectures within a province.
1.5.2 Checks on the Identification Assumption
I provide several pieces of evidence in support of the identification assumption. The
first one is to show that there are no differential trends prior the reform across pre-
fectures by estimating the baseline difference-in-differences model with flexible coeffi-
cients. Then I will use a “de-jure” reform in Zhejiang province as a placebo test. At
last I do some robustness checks such as controlling for prefecture specific time trends.
First, I propose a flexible difference-in-differences model to show the trends of the
treatment effects before and after the reform year. To be specific, I test the identifica-
tion assumption by estimating a set of twelve yearly treatment effects beginning five
4Most prefectures underwent reform in the middle of the treatment years, so I use a one-year lag
to capture the treatment effect more precisely. The results are robust to imposing different lags. I
include one of these practices in the robustness section.
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years prior to the reform event and continuing for five years thereafter. This enables
me to check pre-trends in these yearly treatment effects to secure the rightness of the
identification assumption. It is a more flexible form of the baseline regression to allow
the effect to vary by year in relation to the reform. The specification can be written
as follows:
Yjpt =
5∑
τ=−5
βτI(Y earsSinceTreatjt = τ) + φwijpt + αj + δpt + jpt (1.14)
where I(·) is an indicator function and Y earsSinceTreatjt counts the years at time t
since prefecture j was treated. Then Y earsSinceTreatjt takes negative values counting
the years before the treatment, positive values after the treatment and zero when t
is the year it was treated. If the parallel trend assumption holds prior to the reform,
βτ = 0 when τ < 0.
Second, I estimate the “placebo” treatment effects in Zhejiang province. Reform
did occur in Zhejiang Province, where all prefectures were turned into prefecture-level
municipalities during 1983 and 2003. However, the decision rights of county gov-
ernments in Zhejiang were never actually transferred to prefecture-level municipality
governments as a result of agreements between the Zhejiang provincial government
and the central government. One main reason is that Zhejiang is a frontier of nation-
al defence. The central government was reluctant to make efforts on agglomeration
of manufacturing factories in a few places in this province. They preferred a more
dispersed economy. Another reason is the small size of the province. The provincial
government considered it unnecessary to set the essential intermediate level between
the province and counties (Wu, 2004). As a result, the central government and the
provincial government agreed on the arrangement that the decision powers would not
be taken from county-level governments in Zhejiang, while prefectures should still
follow the steps of the nationwide reform to be transformed to prefecture-level munici-
palities. The county governments could maintain their powers over public finance and
implementing economic policy in their own territories. The de facto independence of
some counties has been confirmed by the province government since the start of the
1983 reform (The People’s Government of Zhejiang Province, 1983). If the treatment
effects estimated in the baseline model are driven by any unobservable factor corre-
lated with the centralization reform, they would still appear in the placebo test. If no
effects were found, it implies that it is centralization but not any other factors that
drives my baseline results.
Third, I show that my results are robust to controlling for prefecture specific
time trends and many pre-existing geographic and economic conditions. Including
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prefecture-specific trends in regressions can control for differential linear trends in the
growth rates by prefecture. Though pre-existing geographic and economic conditions
are time invariant, controlling for interactions between them and year dummies and
can address any concerns that initial conditions may determine developmental paths.
1.6 Overall Impacts on Prefectures
In this section I evaluate the overall impact on economic developments using aggregate
and firm level data. To begin with, I confirm that centralization did occur at prefecture
level after the 1983 reform with data on public finance, as the premise of my whole sto-
ry. Then I use prefecture-level data on population and outputs to perform the baseline
difference-in-differences regression, with various checks on its causal interpretation. I
next show that the centralization reform is associated with geographic concentration in
industrial production within prefectures. Finally, I quantify reductions in resource mis-
allocation and resulted gains in productivity as an important channel through which
centralization can be beneficial. In general, the results presented in this section reveal
that the centralization reform caused increases in the non-agricultural population and
the industrial output associated with a better resource allocation within prefectures,
together with sizeable gains in productivity. The findings are in accord with Young
(2000)’s observation that decentralization in China induces market fragmentation and
divergence in prices and productivity, which are signs of distortions in production and
resource allocation.
1.6.1 Evidence on Centralization
Before I present my baseline results, I first confirm that the reform since 1983 did
bring more centralization at prefecture level. It is necessary to show that after the
reform prefecture-level municipality governments manage more powers, funding and
responsibilities than before. The data to test this are from the Public Finance Statis-
tics Yearbooks as introduced in Section 1.4.2. I run regressions using the baseline
model and outcomes measuring the size and powers of various governments, including
the log value of government employment, the log value of government administrative
expenditure, the share of fiscal revenue in the whole prefecture, and the share of fiscal
expenditure in the whole prefecture, respectively on prefecture level and county level.
We expect the 1983 reform to be associated with increases in the size and powers of
prefecture level governments, at the expense of county level governments. In addition
to those variables measuring centralization, I also check the effects on the transfer
payments received from upper-level governments to check if the reform is associated
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with more favouritism from the central and provincial governments. The results are
listed in Table 1.2.
Looking across column (1) to column (4) in Panel A, when a prefecture government
is transformed to a prefecture-level municipality government, it will, as expected,
become a “bigger” government. The number of its government employees will increase
by 19% and administrative expenditure will increase by 34.2%. Its responsibilities for
fiscal revenue and expenditure also rise significantly. At the same time, the decreases
in the size of county-level governments are small and not significant, which reflects the
difficultly in laying off public-sector employees in China. The share of expenditure and
revenue by prefecture-level municipality governments in the whole region also increases
significantly by 4.9% and 2.3% respectively, while the corresponding shares by county
governments decrease. These results support the centralization process and lay a solid
basis of the whole story. In column (5), we find that the prefecture-level municipality
governments do not receive more transfer payments than the prefecture governments.
It helps to get rid of an alternative story that the treated regions become better just
because they get more resources from upper-level governments. It increases our faith
that the centralization reform raises the efficiency inside each boundary, and they are
not simply getting more help from outside. With these results in hand, I am going
to use the reform dummy as the proxy of centralization to analyze whether and how
centralization can benefit prefectures’ development.
1.6.2 Baseline Results and Identification
As shown above, the 1983 reform centralized the powers of counties into prefecture-
level governments. According to the conceptual framework, centralization may in-
crease industrial output and the numbers of employees. In this subsection, I employ
the baseline difference-in-differences model (Equation 2.20) to show that this is indeed
the case, using prefecture-level data on population and output. Next, I carry out sev-
eral checks on the identification assumption of the baseline model to ensure that we
can interpret the baseline results as causal effects.
The outcomes of interest here are the non-agricultural population.5 Table 1.3
presents estimates of the baseline model 2.20. I also report changes in the urbanization
rate (I define it as the ratio of non-agricultural population to total population) and
5The categories of agricultural and non-agricultural population are based on each citizen’s regis-
tered status in the “Hukou”, the system of household registration in China. One may be concerned
whether a citizen’s registered status as agricultural/non-agricultural actually represents his working
in the agricultural/non-agricultural sector. To address the concern, I use records of industrial output
and occupational status in China’s population census as a robustness check. See Section 1.8.1 for
details and results.
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industrialization rate (I define it as the ratio of industrial output to total outputs).
The outcome variable in column (1) is the log value of the non-agricultural pop-
ulation. After a prefecture becomes a prefecture-level municipality, its increase in
non-agricultural population is 3.9% more than those remaining as prefectures. Col-
umn (2) reports the effects on the urbanization rate, a positive effect at 1.0% and
significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level. It reveals that more agricul-
tural population have became non-agricultural in prefecture-level municipalities. As
regards to industrial production, the reform is associated with a 6.5% more increase
in industrial output. This estimation is significant at the 5 percent level. It can be
either due to increases in labour inputs as column (1) shows, or to improvements in
efficiency. I will analyze it in Section 1.6.4. The industrialization rate will increase
by 1.6% but is with large standard error, which can be a sign of large noise in output
data.
These results are reasonable in the light of previous theoretical expectations. When
a prefecture is turned into a prefecture-level municipality, its powers of decision are
taken into the hands of the prefecture-level municipality government. The centraliza-
tion of governance helps to improve industrial development within prefectures.
While the above results are in accord with predictions from both theory and intu-
ition, they leave a significant concern unmet: the possible endogeneity of the treatment
dummy. The above results can not be interpreted as causal effects if the identification
assumption does not hold. For example, if prefectures were selected into the reform by
their unobserved characteristics, such as growth potential, the difference-in-differences
strategy could be failed. The strategy holds when different prefectures followed the
same pre-reform trend. According to the quotation from Central Committee of the
Party and the State Council (1983), the central government selected prefectures into
the reform according to its capital county’s non-agricultural population and output,
but not to its overall growing trend. Therefore, such selection rule ensures the right-
ness of the identification assumption of the difference-in-differences strategy. To test
the assumption formally, as introduce in Section 1.5.2, I will use three different ways
to validate my identification assumption.
First, by estimating a flexible difference-in-differences model that allows coeffi-
cients to vary year by year, we can observe possible differential growth in the outcome
variables and check the parallel trend assumption. Figure 1.7 plots these dynamic
coefficients along the relative years to the reform event, as well as the associated 95%
confidence intervals, estimated from Equation 1.14.
The coefficients plotted in Figure 1.7 are from the flexible difference-in-differences
specification on non-agricultural population and industrial output in prefectures re-
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spectively, which according to government papers, are most suspect for endogeneity
during policy-making. There are no significant pre-existing differential trends in the
growth of the non-agricultural population and industrial output: the coefficients be-
fore reform are all insignificant and close to zero. Thus, prefectures treated earlier
or later in calendar years followed a similar trend in the non-agricultural population
and industrial output before the reform. In other words, the absence of evidence on
differential pre-trends suggests that the central or provincial level government did not
choose the targets of the reform by the growth rate of the non-agricultural popula-
tion or industrial output. Therefore, the positive effects in the baseline regressions,
reported in Table 1.3, can be interpreted causally with confidence.
A placebo test can offer further confirmation of the causal interpretation of the
baseline results. As introduced in Section 1.5.2, the reform in Zhejiang was only a
de jure experiment due to agreements between the provincial government and the
central government. The decision rights of the county governments in Zhejiang were
never transferred to prefecture-level municipality governments. It provides me an
opportunity to run a placebo test to see whether the results found in the baseline
regressions reflect the effects through the centralization reform itself. If it was not
the centralization that was responsible for baseline results, but instead some other
unobservable characteristics or changes in the reform, we could also observe similar
effects in the “placebo” reform in Zhejiang. Otherwise, such effects would not appear.
For example, if those prefectures with better growth potential were selected into the
reform earlier, the positive effects on urban and industrial developments would also
appear in Zhejiang Province. To be specific, I estimate the baseline model 2.20 but
use only the data in Zhejiang Province. The results are reported in Table 1.4.
From the results it can be found that the “placebo” reform in Zhejiang does not
exert any significant effects on non-agricultural population, industrial output, urban-
ization rate or the industrialization rate. The magnitude and signs of the estimated
coefficients are not similar as in the baseline regressions. This makes it unlikely that
omitted variables associated with selection into treatments were responsible for the
change in urban and industrial developments. It strongly supports the story of cen-
tralization as a way of explaining the effects found in previous sections and denies
the possibility that prefectures are selected for different treatments on the basis of
unobservable characteristics correlated with their outcome variables.
As summarized in Section 1.5.2, besides the checks on the parallel trend and the
placebo test, I check the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of prefecture-specific
linear trends and pre-existing economic and geographic characteristics. The inclusion
of prefecture-specific time trends can control for the prefectures’ linear trends in the
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growth rates of the outcomes of interest. The inclusion of interactions between year
dummies and initial conditions address the concern that differentiated pre-existing
characteristics may have persistent and dynamic impacts on a prefecture’s development
afterwards. For brevity, the results of these two checks are shown in Appendix 1.8.2
and 1.8.4. None of the coefficients are sensitive to these robustness checks. These
increase the faith in the causal interpretation of the baseline results.
The combination of results on the parallel trend, the placebo test and robust-
ness address the concerns about the endogeneity of the treatment variable. After
these checks on the identification assumption, it is credible that the treatment effects
estimated in the baseline regressions reflect a causal relationship between the central-
ization reform and urban and industrial development, and not a mere correlation.
1.6.3 Concentration
Young (2000) documents a fact that provinces in China converge to produce simi-
lar goods when they got powers decentralized from the central government. Poncet
(2003) shows that local protectionism under decentralization slowed down industrial
concentration and agglomeration after 1980. A natural implication of centralization
is that with a better coordination, a specific industrial sector may become more con-
centrated geographically. We can expect that after the prefecture-level municipality
government took over the power of decision from the county governments local pro-
tectionism would be mitigated and it is not necessary for every county to own every
sector. Hence, a specific sector will be concentrated in fewer places. To examine the
concentration of industrial production, I make use of the γ index developed by Ellison
and Glaeser (1997) to measure the geographic concentration of a specific sector within
a prefecture. In their paper, the authors construct a model-based index of the geo-
graphic concentration of economic activities, the γ index. Lu and Tao (2009) calculate
the γ index in a nationwide study and document the general trend of concentration in
China. Here I revise the γ index to fit into my county-prefecture scenario as follows:
γsj =
Gsj − (1−
∑
i∈j x
2
i )Hsj
(1−∑i∈j x2i )(1−Hsj) (1.15)
where γsj is the Ellison-Glaeser index calculated for each sector-prefecture pair sj;
Gsj =
∑
i∈j(xi−ssi)2 is the spatial Gini coefficient, where i is any county belonging to
a prefecture j, xi is i’s share of total employment or output of all industries in j, ssi is
sector s’s share of employment or output for region r in county i; Hsj is the Herfindahl
index of sector s. The greater the EllisonGlaeser index, the higher the geographic
concentration. It equals zero if all the firms randomly pick their location. In this part,
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I calculate the Ellison-Glaeser index γsjt for every combination of year, sector and
prefecture or prefecture-level municipality, and regress them on the treatment variable
Treatjt−1 as in the baseline model:
γsjt = βTreatjt−1 + αj + δpt + θst + jst (1.16)
where γsjt is the Ellison-Glaeser index in prefecture j, sector s and year t; αj is
prefecture fix effects; δpt is year×province fixed effects; θst is sector×province fixed
effects. Results are given in Table 1.5
The first column shows the result of the Ellison-Glaeser Index measured in outputs
and the second shows the result measured in employment. From the results we find
that after the centralization reform, the extent of industrial concentration increased
significantly. It suggests that when a prefecture is centralized, goods in a given sector
tend to be produced in fewer counties than in the past. The findings in this section
endorse another well-known observation in Young (2000): decentralization in China
induced convergence in the composition of outputs.
1.6.4 Misallocation and Aggregate Productivity
The baseline results provide empirical evidence on the main predictions from the con-
ceptual framework. The centralization reform increases industrial output and popu-
lation of prefectures as a whole. However, the increases in industrial output can be a
result of more inputs. The fact that industrial production becomes more concentrated
than dispersed across counties suggests possible gains in aggregate productivity by
allocating resource for more efficiency and specification. In Table 1.6, I show how this
centralization reform improves productivity in the sense of the aggregate level. I use
per capita output as a rough measurement of productivity. Table 1.6 begins by esti-
mating the baseline equations with per capita industrial output and per capita total
output as outcome variables. I find that the per capita industrial output increases
by 10.5% and the per capita total output increases by 7.2% if a prefecture is turned
into a prefecture-level municipality. It also provides the effects of the reform on total
population and total output as an addition to the main results in Table 1.3.
The results imply that the increases in industrial output should be associated with
increases in efficiency. In the conceptual framework, I argue that centralization can
bring better coordination and allocation of resource, therefore aggregate productivity
will be improved. The reduced misallocation and rises in aggregate productivity are
the main channel how centralization will benefit in this paper. Table 1.3 depicts a
rough picture about that. In this subsection, I will provide more precise evidence
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using TFP derived from firm-level data to identify the existence of this mechanism.
The problem of resource misallocation in developing countries has attracted grow-
ing attention in recent years. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) provides a methodology for
evaluating the contribution of misallocation in explaining low aggregate output per
worker and total factor productivity (TFP) in developing countries. In the paper,
the authors document the dispersion of “revenue productivity” (TFPR) as a proxy of
resource misallocation, and then measure how much aggregate manufacturing output
in China and India could benefit if the marginal products of labour and capital were
equalized to the extent observed in the United States. They also show briefly that the
extent of misallocation can be affected by varied policy distortions such as licensing
and size restrictions. More recent literature (Bartelsman et al., 2013; Midrigan and
Xu, 2014) provides more evidence on the role of misallocation in explaining the TFP
gap in a similar framework.
However, when calculating how misallocation can account for the TFP gap, the
previous literature has placed less emphasize on its sources and possible remedies, al-
though they all agree that institutions and policies may be responsible for distortions
and misallocation (see a survey by Hopenhayn (2014)). In this part, I investigate
whether the problem of misallocation is mitigated by more centralized institutions.
Intuitively, the decentralized institutions before the reform would seem to encourage
county governments to subsidize and protect local enterprises. This would have re-
sulted in distortions in efficient resource allocation within a prefecture. Young (2000)
attributed the divergences in price and productivity, a sign of resource misallocation,
to the excessive decentralization to local governments in China. If it is the case that
decentralization is responsible for misallocation, as my conceptual framework and pre-
vious work predicts, we should expect that after a centralizing reform, the prefecture-
level municipality government reduces misallocation by reallocating resources and then
promoting the efficiency in the whole region. To make a more realistic analysis, I drop
the assumption in the conceptual framework that each county has one representative
firm and allow for heterogeneous firms in the empirical part.
To measure the misallocation, I borrow the methodology of Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) to calculate dispersions of “revenue productivity” (TFPR) as a measurement.
To make my calculation close to reality, first I extend my simplified version in the
conceptual framework to a multi-input and multi-sector model. I assume each firm u
in sector s has a diminishing returns production function:
Yus = Aus(K
αs
usL
1−αs
us )
η, (1.17)
where Aus is the total factor productivity of the firm u, αs is the share of capital in
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sector s and η is the degree of decreasing returns. The final product is a Cobb-Douglas
aggregate of products in different sectors. Next I define TFPR of each firm u in sector
s as Hsieh and Klenow (2009):
TFPRus =
PsYus
KαsusL
1−αs
us
(1.18)
The essence of TFPR can be regarded as a measurement of marginal products or
distortions faced by firms:
TFPRus ∝MRPKαsusMRPL1−αsus ∝ (1 + τus)−1 (1.19)
So a high firm TFPR implies that this firm faces a relatively low subsidy or barriers
that raise its marginal products, suggesting the firm is smaller than its optimum
size. To see how the dispersion of TFPR can proxy for resource misallocation and be
responsible for a loss in aggregate TFP, I write the aggregate TFP in prefecture j and
sector s as within the monopolistic competition framework, as in my theoretical part:
TFPjs = [
∑
u
(Aus
TFPRjs
TFPRujs
)
1
1−η ]1−η/(KαsL1−αs)η (1.20)
Following from Jensen’s inequality, if and only if marginal products are equalized
across firms, or if there is no dispersion in distortion rate or TFPR, aggregate TFP
can reach its optimum. That is the same condition under which industrial output is
optimized in my conceptual framework.
In practice, I calculate TFPR following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), which also use
China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Production. The capital share αs in each sector
s is set to be the same in the corresponding industry in the United States, which
is taken from the NBER Productivity Database. I trim the 1% tails of distribution
of TFPR across industries. The setting of the degree of decreasing returns η needs
further consideration. As introduced in the conceptual framework, unlike this paper,
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) assumes the diminishing returns occur in demand side with
the monopolistic competition model. As a result, in their paper the parameter playing
the role of η is the elasticity of substitution σ. These two model are isomorphic and
1
1−η = σ − 1. Thus their choice of σ = 3 implies η = 0.5. Actually 0.5 is quite a low
value for diminishing returns. Hopenhayn (2014) suggests a more common choice of
η = 0.85. I will follow this choice here, but turn back to Hsieh and Klenow (2009)’s
monopolistic competition model and set σ = 3 in Section 1.8.7 as a robustness check.
According to the conceptual framework, under centralization, the prefecture-level
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municipality government can reallocate funds across counties and help to reduce the
extent of dispersion of distortion rates. From Equation 1.19, we can see when the
distortion rates τus faced by different firms become less dispersed, dispersions of TFPR
will also be reduced. Therefore the aggregate TFP within a prefecture will improve
according to Equation 1.20.
To illustrate that the centralization can reduce misallocation, I plots distributions
of TFPR in Ningde Prefecture before and after the centralization reform in Figure
A.1, as an example. We can see that after the centralization reform, the distribution
of TFPR in Ningde is clearly less dispersed.
To give a formal analysis, I propose three different methods to show how misallo-
cation and aggregate TFP is associated with the centrlized reform.
To begin with, I use my baseline regression model to check any potential changes
in misallocation associated with the centralization reform:
Misallocatejt = βTreatjt−1 + αj + δpt + jst (1.21)
where Misallocatejst is the dispersion in TFPR within prefecture j and year t; αj is
prefecture fixed effects; δpt is year×province fixed effects. Here I use standard devia-
tions, ratios of the 75th to 25th percentiles and ratios of the 90th to 10th percentiles
in TFPR within any prefecture as measurements of the dispersion in TFPR, as Hsieh
and Klenow (2009) do. All of these outcome variables are standardized. Regression
results are in Table 1.7.
From the above results we find that all three measurements of the dispersion of TF-
PR are significantly reduced after the reform. The results suggest that the centraliza-
tion reform can mitigate resource misallocation within a prefecture, as the theoretical
framework suggests.
I repeat the same practice on a county level regression by aggregating dispersions
of TFPR within each county instead of prefecture. From both the theoretical model
and intuitions, the reform in the prefecture level can improve the allocation across
counties but not within counties. So coefficients of treatment variable in county-level
regressions are not expected to be significantly negative, as shown in Table 1.8.
Looking across column (1) to column (3), we cannot see any significantly negative
effects on the dispersion of TFPR within counties. No stable and robust relationship
can be found between the centralization reform and misallocation in the within-county
analysis. This regression can be regarded as a “placebo” as opposed to the actual effect
on misallocation across counties. Such results tend to confirm that the centralization
reform did improve allocation efficiency but that this was not due to other spurious
correlations to reduce misallocation measurements.
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Second, I conduct a counterfactual analysis similar to Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
With Equation 1.20 in mind, I can calculate the efficient aggregate TFP. In that case,
marginal products are equalized across firms in a given sector within a prefecture:
TFPjs,EFF = [
∑
u
(Aus)
1
1−η ]1−η/(KαsL1−αs)η (1.22)
Then I take the ratio of actual TFP to this efficient level of TFP to measure the
counterfactual gains from reducing misallocation:
TFPjs
TFPjs,EFF
= [
∑
u
(
Aus
TFPjs,EFF
TFPRjs
TFPRujs
)
1
1−η ]1−η, (1.23)
and aggregate it using a Cobb-Douglas aggregator across sectors within the prefecture:
TFPj
TFPj,EFF
=
∏
s
∑
u
(
Aus
TFPjs,EFF
TFPRjs
TFPRujs
)
1
1−η ]θs(1−η), (1.24)
The percent gains in the prefecture are defined as
Gainsj = 100(
TFPj,EFF
TFPj
− 1) (1.25)
Equation 1.25 offers a way to calculate the counterfactual gains when dispersions
of TFPR were reduced. Table 1.9 provides the results of two counterfactual practices.
Panel A of Table 1.9 assumes that marginal products are equalized across all firms
within each prefecture and sector. By this calculation, aggregate TFP in prefectures
before they were treated can be raised by 90.6% in 1998 and 97.1% in 2000 without
misallocation within each prefecture. This practice is not quite realistic, as it is hard
to believe that the centralization reform can get rid of all misallocation within a
prefecture. For example, the results in Table 1.8 show that the reform can do nothing
about the misallocation within counties. To calculate a more realistic counterfactual
gain, I take a conservative stance to hypothetically suppose the dispersions in the
decentralized prefectures equal to the dispersion level in centralized prefecture-level
municipalities, instead of the fully efficient level as above. These results are listed in
Panel B of Table 1.9. Such counterfactual allocation will lead to a gain of 16.1% in
TFP in 1998 and 18.1% in 2000.
Collectively, all results in this subsection paint a consistent picture. The cen-
tralization reform can reduce resource misallocation due to better coordination and
reallocation. This improvement has a sizeable effect on aggregate productivity.
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1.7 Distributional Effects on Counties
In the last section, I demonstrate that the centralization reform since 1983 was associ-
ated with increases in non-agricultural population and industrial output. Meanwhile,
resource misallocation within prefectures was mitigated and aggregate productivity
improved, implying better coordination under centralization. Besides these overall
effects on prefectures as a whole, we can expect there to be distributional effects on
different types of county. From the conceptual framework, when centralized prefecture-
level municipality governments reallocate funds, some counties get more than before
while others get less. In this section, I explore in turn the heterogeneous responses of
different counties to the reform. To avoid endogeneity, I start by examining different
response between two types of counties, capital and peripheral. A county’s identity
as capital or peripheral is determined in history and hardly changed in the last few
decades. I will first show capital counties receive more benefits in the centralization
reform. Then I will confirm that such distributional effects between capital and pe-
ripheral counties are driven by productivity advantages in capital counties, not by
preference or favouritism. The organization of this section is similar to that of the
last: to begin with, I use data on public finance to show that capital counties actually
get more resources from upper-level governments. I then estimate the baseline model
on a county level to show that capital counties benefit more than peripheral counties
using aggregate data on population and outputs, and justify the corresponding identi-
fication assumption for the causal interpretation. Lastly, I make use of the richness of
the firm level dataset to reveal that firms in capital counties growing faster is a result
from their advantages in productivity.
1.7.1 Transfer Payments and Expenditures in Counties
As in Section 1.6.1, in this subsection I explore the heterogeneous response in govern-
ment behaviours in capital and peripheral counties. In the first column of Table 1.10, I
report the results for the percentage of transfer payments in a county’s total revenues,
as a measurement of dependency of county’s revenues on transfer payments from up-
per level governments. The results suggest that after the centralization reform, both
capital and peripheral counties have to rely more on upper level governments’ help on
revenue. In the last three columns, I report results on a county’s shares of transfer
payments, tax revenues and expenditure in the total amounts of those in prefectures.
We can observe that after the centralization reform, peripheral counties, unlike capital
counties, share much lower transfer payments than before. Similar patterns appear in
total expenditure shares. Regarding tax revenue, both capital and peripheral counties’
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share remain unchanged after the reform. Those three results imply that after the cen-
tralization reform, although shares of counties’ tax revenue are similar as before, the
transfer payments they get from upper level governments diverge. Capital counties
get much more than peripheral counties, which enable them to shave more expendi-
tures. This picture is in line with the conceptual framework that after centralization,
prefecture-level municipalities can manage funds from counties together and reallocate
them from peripheral counties to capital counties.
1.7.2 Baseline Results at County Level and Identification
I start by estimating the baseline model at county level. Here, to explore the different
responses to the reform from capital and peripheral counties, I add an interaction
between the treatment variable and a dummy variable Capitali taking the value of
one when i is a capital county (location of a prefecture-level government). To be
specific, the baseline specification on county level is:
Yijpt = βTreatjpt−1 + γTreatjpt−1×Capitali + φwijpt + αi + δpt + δpt×Capitali + ijpt
(1.26)
where Yijpt is an outcome variable in county i, prefecture j, province p and year
t; Treatjpt−1 is the main independent variable, indicating whether prefecture j in
province p received treatment by year t− 1; Capitali is a dummy variable indicating
whether this county i is a capital county or not; αi is a county fixed effect; δpt is a
year×province fixed effect; wijpt are control variables.
The baseline regression results are presented in Table 1.11. The outcome variables
are exactly the same as in the prefecture-level regressions (non-agricultural population,
urbanization rate, industrial output and industrialization rate)
The first two columns report the effects of the reform on the outcomes related to
urbanization. Column (1) reports the effects of the reform on the non-agricultural
population. It suggests that when a prefecture is converted to a prefecture-level mu-
nicipality, its capital county will experience a 14.6% increase in non-agricultural pop-
ulation relative to those capital counties remaining in prefectures. However, the effect
on peripheral counties is negative but not significant at 0.5%. Columns (2) reports
the effects on the urbanization rate. The positive effect on the urbanization rate is
similar. For capital counties the urbanization rate is 3.2% more in prefecture-level
municipalities than in prefectures. For peripheral counties, the impact are small and
not significant.
Turning now to industrial production, Columns (3) and (4) show the results for
the log value of industrial outputs and industrialization rate. In column (3), we can
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see that the reform increases industrial outputs in capital counties by 17.0% while it
decreases in peripheral counties by 6.9%. Both effects are significantly different from
zero at the 5 per cent level. The industrialization rate does not appear to be correlated
with the reform either in the capital or the peripheral counties.
Furthermore, besides the four outcome variables as in the prefecture-level regres-
sions, I construct two more variables on county development to reflect a possible het-
erogeneous response in different counties: capital counties’ share of non-agricultural
population in prefecture and capital counties’ share of industrial output in prefecture.
We can find from Table 1.12 that a capital county shares a larger portion of urban
population and indstrial output after the reform. It suggests that the reform produce
distributional effects biased in favour of capital counties.
These findings on capital and peripheral counties are in accord with my conceptual
framework. The capital county absorbs more resources after the centralization and
grows faster since it always accommodates firms with high productivity, as I will
show below. At the same time, the peripheral counties may be negatively affected
by the outflow of resources, so we observe slightly negative effects on urbanization
and industrialization in peripheral counties. Combining these results with those for
prefectures as a whole, it can be seen that the magnitude of the coefficients in Table
1.3 is smaller than the estimated positive effects for capital counties. It is another
sign that the distributional effects in different counties may offset each other but as a
whole the prefectures experience a growth in urbanization and industrialization after
the reform.
Since the reform is conducted in prefectures, the county level regressions will not
suffer a serious problem of endogeneity. To interpret the gap between the benefits
from the centralization in the capital and peripheral counties as a causal effect, the
identification assumption to be met is that, in the absence of the reform, two types
of county would have evolved in parallel. Following the strategy described earlier,
I continue to apply the flexible difference-in-differences, the placebo test and some
robustness checks to ensure that the identification assumption holds.
I start by estimating the flexible difference-in-differences model on the non-agricultural
population and industrial output in county-level regressions. There are two ways to
check the parallel trend assumption. One way is to check that the flexible coefficients of
the interaction between the treatment and the capital county dummy are not different
from zero in years prior to the reform, as I did in the prefecture level regression. Fig-
ure 1.8 plots the coefficients and the confidential intervals estimated from the flexible
difference-in-differences regressions on the non-agricultural population and industrial
output. We can confirm that the gaps between capital and peripheral counties in the
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pre-reform years are all insignificant and close to zero; there is no obvious trend before
the reform. Thus, the coefficients of the interaction in the baseline county-level regres-
sions (Table 1.11) can be interpreted as causal effects. The second way to think about
this is to individually consider the trends of the capital and peripheral counties. If
their pre-existing trends are parallel, then the identification assumption holds. To do
this, I plot the two trends in Figure A.2. We can observe that the outcomes in capital
counties diverge significantly from their pre-existing trends and that, in contrast, the
trends in the peripheral counties are almost flat. These two graphs largely increase
our confidence in the identification assumption and validate the causal interpretation
of the distributional effects.
As with the prefecture-level regressions, I use here the example of Zhejiang Province
to perform a placebo test. As introduced previously, the reform in Zhejiang never
actually centralized the decision powers of counties to prefecture-level municipality
governments. So the distributional effects across different counties should not be
expected to appear in the Zhejiang sample. Following this logic exactly as in the
prefecture-level placebo test, Table 1.13 presents the county-level results.
As expected, the “placebo” reform in Zhejiang did not produce any significant dis-
tributional effects on counties, on possible outcomes considered in the baseline model.
The magnitude and signs of the coefficients with regard to different counties are not
similar, as in the baseline county-level regressions. This greatly supports the causal
interpretation of the distributional effects found above.
Similarly, I check the robustness of the county-level results to include county-
specific trends and counties’ pre-existing conditions, besides the checks on the parallel
trend and the placebo test. They control for counties’ linear trends in the growth rates
of outcomes of interest and dynamic impacts of differentiated pre-existing characteris-
tics in counties. The results of these two robustness checks are also to be found in the
Appendix 1.8.4 and 1.8.2. Looking across these tables, we find that the coefficients are
not sensitive to the inclusion of county-specific trends and pre-existing characteristics.
This is enough to validate the causal interpretation of the baseline county-level results.
The same practice in the parallel trend, the placebo test and the robustness as
was followed in the prefecture-level regressions, which confirms the validity of the
identification assumption. We can be quite sure that the distributional effects reflect
a causal relationship between the increasing gap in urban and industrial development
between the capital and peripheral counties and the centralization reform.
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1.7.3 Pattern of the Distributional Effects
Although we have already observed that industrial sectors become more concentrated
within a prefecture using the Ellison-Glaeser Index as a measurement, it is still not
clear what the concentration patterns look like, or more specifically, what kinds of
county a sector will be concentrated in. If the centralization reallocates resources to
more productive counties, then firms will agglomerate in places with an advantage in
productivity. More formally, I next test whether firms in a high average sector-specific
TFP will produce more under centralization, relative to the decentralization case. I
run a firm-level regression:
Yuijst = β1Treatjt−1 + β2Treatjt−1 × TFPis + ηu + δpt + θst + uijst (1.27)
where Yuijst is log output of firm u in sector s, county i, prefecture j and year t; TFPis
is the average TFP in sector s and county i. TFPis is standardized by subtracting
the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. To avoid endogeneity, I use the
average TFP in the first available year (1998). If a sector agglomerates in a relatively
high-productive place, we should expect the coefficient of the interaction between the
treatment variable and the average county-sector TFP to be positive. The results are
in Table 1.14.
In Column (1) of Table 1.14, we see that firms in counties with higher sector-specific
productivity will produce more after the reform. This suggests that the centralization
reform will help to reshuﬄe resources into firms located in places with advantages in
productivity. Column (2) shows that such effects do not differ between capital and
peripheral counties. The interaction between the treatment dummy, the capital county
dummy and the average sector TFP is not significantly different from zero. At the same
time, other coefficients and the R-square of the regression almost remain the same.
This suggests that when sector productivity is given, firms in capital counties will
not gain more than those in peripheral counties. Therefore, the distributional effects
from the aggregate data that capital counties benefit more than peripheral counties
from the centralization shown in Table 1.11 may be derived from the fact that capital
counties own more productive firms and sectors, but not from any special favouritism
that allocates too many resources to capital counties. Concerning the magnitudes of
the estimated coefficients, results in Column (2) suggest that one standard deviation
increase in a county’s average TFP will bring 19% more output for its firms after the
reform. At the same time, a status of capital counties can give their firms a 13.2%
increase in output after the reform, which is not a significant estimation. A case
of Ningde Prefecture, which has been introduced in Section 1.6.4, can interpret the
31
relative size of those two coefficients. Firms in the capital county of Ningde Prefecture
on average owned a productivity nearly a half standard deviation higher than firms
in peripheral counties. The results in Column (2) predict that the reform can bring a
9.5% increase in output for firms in the capital county of Ningde due to productivity
advantage and a 13.2% increase due to the political status as a capital county. Though
the size of the latter effect is not ignorable, it is not significantly different from zero
and the relative magnitude can not dominate the productivity effect.
Figure 1.9 presents the TFP distribution of firms in peripheral counties relative
to firms in capital counties. It is clear that the productivity of the peripheral county
firms is much lower than that of capital county firms. The results here suggest that the
centralization reform helped to reallocate the resources across counties more efficiently
according to the counties’ productivity advantages. Capital counties gain more because
they have more competent firms. However, the alternative explanation that capital
counties benefit from preference or favouritism can be eliminated.
Column (3) to Column (6) repeat the practice separating state-own firms and
private-own firms. We can clearly that changes in state-own firms mainly drive previ-
ous results, while private-own firms receive no effects. It consistent with the story that
government planning on allocating resources play the main role in the centralization
reform. It helps to rule out a major alternative explanation that agglomeration is the
channel through with centralization benefits. If agglomeration were the main mecha-
nism, both state-own firms and private-own firms should equally get benefits from the
reform.
1.8 Robustness
In this subsection, I am going to run various robustness checks towards the baseline
model.
1.8.1 Evidence from Census Data
The data that I use in baseline regressions are reported in the National Bureau of
Statistics in provincial statistics yearbooks. The population-related variables are
based on the Household Registration (“hukou”) system. There is some concern about
whether the use of such variables measures the economic activity of a resident. It
is possible that an agricultural resident and a non-agricultural resident differ only in
their literal hukou status. Then the increases in non-agricultural population after the
reform that we find may be due to changes in the definition of hukou and do not re-
flect any improvements in the urbanization process. To address this concern, I use the
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population census data containing information on agricultural and non-agricultural
employment in order to carry out a similar analysis to the baseline regressions.
There are three waves in the population census data that are suitable for my
analysis: 1982, 1990 and 2000. The aggregate data from the population census reports
population employed in different sectors aggregated to county level. It allows me to
examine the changes in employment in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, which
is a more precise measurement of population engaged in rural and urban economic
activities. The results are presented in Table A.1.
Table A.1 reveals all the evidence involving population variables in the baseline
regressions. Both the overall effects on prefectures as a whole and the distributional
effects on the component counties can be found even using census data. This suggests
that the limitations of using population data based on the “Hukou” system are not of
major concern in this research.
1.8.2 Initial Conditions
Pre-existing economic and geographic conditions are believed to have a huge influence
on developments. Although in my baseline regressions all the time-invariant impacts
brought by heterogeneous geographic conditions are absorbed by the individual fixed
effects, it is still possible that they relate to regional developments at different times.
Specifically, they may affect the timing of the reform. From Figure 1.6, some obvious
patterns of the reform timings are noted. For example, it is easy to see that the coastal
areas, which were typically developed before the reform, received the treatment earlier
than inland areas. So it is necessary to check the robustness when we control for the
impact of initial conditions and make them flexible for different years. Empirically, I
include the interactions between economic or geographic conditions and year dummies
in the baseline model. For proxies of geographic conditions, I calculate a prefecture
or a county’s distance from the nearest river and coast line and the corresponding
provincial capital city. To take account of the initial economic conditions, I include
total population, the urbanization rate and the per capita output from the 1982 census.
These variables are exogenous measurements of many important aspects such as initial
development, transportation and political connections. Table A.2 lists the prefecture-
level regression results and Table A.3 lists the county-level regression results.
We can see that the results remain almost the same as in the baseline regressions.
Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of initial conditions are insignificant in most
years; for simplicity they are not reported in the table. The above results suggest
that the possible caveats accompanying the initial conditions are unnecessary and this
helps to strengthen the causal arguments from my results.
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The results can also address concerns by Cai and Treisman (2005). They propose a
theoretical model to show that units with different initial endowments yields different
performance under decentralization. In the setting of this paper, if initial endowments
in counties determined their performance and then the entering to centralization, the
baseline results would be biased. However, the robust results in this part address this
concern.
1.8.3 Using Other Lags of the Main Independent Variable
Another robustness check is related to the definition of our independent variable of
interest. In the baseline regression, I use the one-period lagged treatment status
Treatjpt−1 as the main independent variable. Here I replace it with the treatment
status in the current period Treatjpt to check robustness. Since reforms often took
effect in the middle of a year, I use the proportion of treated months as the value
of Treatjpt if it is the year when the reform took place in county i and prefecture
j. For example, if county i in prefecture j was treated in September of year T, then
TreatjpT = 0.75. The results are shown in Table A.4 and Table A.5.
Almost all the estimated coefficients are similar in magnitude, while some of the
significances drop due to an increase standard errors. Furthermore, the results will
not change much by choosing other lags. For conciseness, I do not list the results.
1.8.4 Individual-specific Time Trends
In this part, I add individual-specific time trends to the baseline regression. The
individual-specific time trends in a fixed-effect model will allow treatment and control
groups to follow different trends. If the estimated coefficients do not change much, it
will greatly support the identification strategy of the baseline model. The results are
presented in Table A.6 and Table A.7. The magnitudes of the coefficients are quite
similar while some significances are gone, which may be partly due to the reduction
in the degree of freedom. The fact that all coefficients in these regressions lie in the
confidence intervals in the baseline estimations is encouraging for the validity of the
baseline model.
1.8.5 Possible Heterogeneity Across Different Periods
There are some reasons to believe that the effect of the centralization reform would be
heterogeneous in different periods. I divide the examined time period into two: from
1983-1993 and from 1994-2003, and run the baseline regression based on each in turn.
One of the main reasons to do this is that in 1994, China initiated a significant fiscal
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centralization reform from local governments to the central government. The results
can be found in Table A.8 and Table A.9. Although there is no evidence that the
reform interacted with the political hierarchy reform between different levels of local
governments discussed in the present paper, it is possible that the effect that I found
became smaller after 1993 due to the limitations on fiscal capacity in local governments.
Meanwhile, changes in population mobility over time may also be responsible for the
possible heterogeneity.
1.8.6 Using a Small Sample of the Firm-level Dataset
There is a sampling concern about the empirical results using firm-level data. The
observations in those empirical analyses contain firms in prefectures that were not
centralized until 1983, which are the same prefectures in baseline regressions using
aggregate data; however, the firm dataset became available in 1998. It could be a
concern that regressions using the firm-level dataset should adopt the same sampling
principle as before. Here, I conduct robustness checks only using prefectures central-
ized from the first available year (1998). The prefectures in these robustness checks
are about one third of the previous. Table A.10 repeats the estimation on effects on
dispersions of TFPR within prefectures only using this small sample. We find that
the magnitude of coefficients are similar to the full sample, but the standard errors
increase; nevertheless, the effects are on the margin of significance. This implies that
the only change when using the small sample is a reduction in the preciseness of the
estimates as the sample size shrinks. Table A.11 lists the results on dispersions of
TFPR within counties. The magnitude is also similar as in the full sample while the
standard errors increase. For brevity I do not report results of other checks on re-
gressions using firm-level data. In general, using the small sample will not produce
different estimates on coefficients.
1.8.7 Model and Counterfactual Analysis with Constant Re-
turns in Production
As introduced in the conceptual framework, some papers use models with constant re-
turns in production and a monopolistic competition market. Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
is the most well-known among them. They assume diminishing returns are in the de-
mand side where monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) is used; these two
flavours of modelling are equivalent, indeed, Hopenhayn (2014) and Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) show the two models are equivalent. When guiding the counterfactual analysis,
they are theoretically isomorphic but with a subtle difference in parameter settings.
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Here I briefly show a model with diminishing returns in production and calculate the
counterfactual gains with a new choice of parameter.
I assume that each county produces a differentiated good and that the total output
Y in the prefecture is a CES aggregate of all the differentiated goods in the component
counties:
Y = (
N∑
i=1
Y
σ−1
σ
i )
σ
σ−1 , (1.28)
where Yi is the industrial output in county i; σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between goods produced in different counties. The production function for county i is
given by a Cobb-Douglas function of its representative firm:
Yi = AiK
α
i L
1−α
i , (1.29)
where Ai, Ki and Li are total factor productivity, capital and labour in each county
i. To promote industrial growth, county government i subsidizes τi on output. The
revenues of the representative firm are (1 + τi)PiYi, where Pi is derived in Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) to be a fixed markup over the marginal cost from profit maximization
of firms in the monopolistic competition market:
Pi =
σ
σ − 1(
R
α
)α(
w
1− α)
1−α 1
Ai(1 + τi)
. (1.30)
With the same definition of TFPR, the aggregate productivity in prefecture j can be
written as:
TFPjs = [
∑
u
(Aus
TFPRjs
TFPRujs
)σ−1]
1
σ−1 (1.31)
We can see the similarity of the above expression to Equation 1.20, the aggregate
productivity under constant returns to scale as in my conceptual framework. Here,
the elasticity of substitution σ plays the same role as the degree of diminishing returns
in production θ as previous. Thus the two models are isomorphic.
The corresponding counterfactual analysis now requires an arbitrary value of σ
instead of θ. In Hsieh and Klenow (2009), σ = 3, implying θ = 0.5. It is lower than
the usual value in the literature. I follow their setting. The counterfactual gains in
aggregate TFP under σ = 3 can be found in Table A.12. By this calculation, aggregate
TFP in prefectures, before they were treated, can be raised by 45.1% in 1998 and 49.1%
in 2000 without misallocation within each prefecture. Results of the more conservative
practice to hypothetically move the dispersions in the decentralized prefectures to the
centralized level are listed in Panel B of Table A.12. Such counterfactual allocation
will lead to a gain of 13.6% in TFP in 1998 and 19.5% in 2000.
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1.9 Conclusion
Decentralization has been one of the most popular policy experiments in the recent
decades. Particularly in developing countries trying to promote government account-
ability, policy makers draw on decentralization in various designs. However, there is
not a concensus among economists on whether decentralization should be promoted
unconditionally. Both classical (Oates, 1972) and the most recent papers (Boffa et al.,
2015) emphasize that the theoretical predictions on the trade-off between centraliza-
tion and decentralization are ambiguous. The empirical evidence on this is also mixed
(Bardhan, 2002). For example, literature on fiscal federalism find that decentralization
from central to provincial governments can provide incentives to protect markets and
such findings have been fruitfully applied to Latin America and transition economies
(Qian and Weingast, 1997). Yet, problems such as mismanagement and corruption in
local governments are found meanwhile. In the context of China, Young (2000) criti-
cizes decentralization as it induces local protectionism and a distortion of production.
Consistent with Young (2000), this paper finds that decentralization distorts produc-
tion and induces misallocation; centralization at a regional level can in turn reallocate
the resource better and increase efficiency.
In this paper, I investigate a political hierarchy reform that changed the relation-
s between sub-provincial governments in China. In this reform starting from 1983,
prefectures in China were reformed into prefecture-level municipalities; this made the
component counties less autonomous and decision powers at county level were cen-
tralized to prefecture level. After the reform, the prefecture-level municipality gov-
ernments were responsible for economic policies and developments in their component
counties. Using a difference-in-differences model, I show that this centralization reform
had positive causal effects on non-agricultural population and industrial output with-
in prefectures. It was also associated with gains in productivity through reallocating
resource and equalizing the marginal products of inputs across counties. Drawing on
the misallocation methodology developed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I quantify such
gains with a comprehensive firm-level dataset. Except for the positive overall effect on
the whole prefectures, the centralization also produced distributional effects on com-
ponent counties. Counties which are capitals of prefectures got more resources from
reallocation by municipality governments, compared with other peripheral counties. I
show this distributional effect was mainly due to productivity advantages, and not to
favouritism. Patterns in fiscal behaviours of local governments confirm the existence
of centralization and the reallocation of resources. These results are in consistent
with a heterogeneous firm model emphasizing that centralization helps to mitigate
misallocation and improve aggregate productivity.
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My findings have important policy implications. From the ambiguous theoretical
predictions and mixed empirical evidence, it is accepted that the effects of decentral-
ization differ case by case and through specific contexts, and designs matter a great
deal (World Bank, 2000). This paper raises the potential value of centralization when
we design policies in developing countries with a federal structure such as China. In a
context where local governments have the power and incentives to distort, this paper
shows the inefficiencies that may arise from decentralization. It is therefore in line
with Young (2000)’s observations. I show that in this setting the centralization to a
regional level mitigates misallocation problems with better coordination. In classical
works, the most popular reason for preferring decentralization is that it ensures bet-
ter accountability from local governments since they compete with each other, while
centralization may be problematic if central governments act as monopolists and are
lack of accountability. However, in the setting of the present paper, centralization
affected regions (prefectures), not central government. Prefecture-level municipality
government leaders also had to compete for promotion as county leaders. As a result,
in this arrangement centralization at a regional level can avoid traditional problems
in the political economy while still delivering the benefits from better coordination.
Admittedly, this setting would not be a first-best arrangement, compared with the
perfect decentralized equilibrium in Tiebout (1956). Nevertheless, in a real world with
imperfect markets, distortion powers and incentives of local governments, this paper
suggests centralization at a regional level be a second-best choice.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Sketch of the centralization reform
Note: This figure plots a simple illustration of the 1983 centralization reform in China. Dashed lines around the
“prefecture” before the reform denote prefectures have no powers on component counties and counties are autonomous;
Solid lines around the “prefecture-level municipality” after the reform denotes powers of counties are centralized to the
prefecture-level municipality.
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Figure 1.2: Basic information of different levels of jurisdictions in China (2003)
Note: This figure provides some basic information of different levels of jurisdictions in 2003, including numbers of
jurisdictions, average sizes, average population and average GDP. The province-level units do not include Hongkong,
Macau and Taiwan.
Figure 1.3: Hierarchy of local governments in China
Note: This figure graphs the basic structure of local governance in China. Dashed lines between different levels of
local governments suggest that upper level governments do not have administrative powers on lower level governments’
jurisdictions. Solid lines suggest that upper level governments have administrative powers on lowers’ jurisdictions.
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Figure 1.4: Changes in the number of prefecture level jurisdictions
Note: This figure plots the numbers of various types of prefecture-level jurisdictions in China over years.
Figure 1.5: An example of the Reform
Note: This figure visualizes an example of the reform. The blue and the red regions are Sanming Prefecture and
Quanzhou Prefecutre. Before the reform, they are both prefectures. In the reform the blue treated and turned to a
prefecture-level municipality. The red prefecture is not treated and remains prefecture status. The dark-color zones
are capital counties and the light-color zones are peripheral counties.
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Figure 1.6: Timing of the reform across space
Note: This figure graphs the nationwide reform timing . The darker the colour is, the later the treatment happens.
The white zones are those excluded in the sample.
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(a) Dynamic treatment effects on log non-agricultural population
(b) Dynamic treatment effects on log industrial output
Figure 1.7: Dynamic treatment effects on outcomes in prefectures
Note: This figure reports estimates of the dynamic effect of the “Turning prefectures into prefecture-level municipalities”
reform on developments in prefectures derived from a flexible difference-in-differences specification. Estimates are
constructed by regressing the log of non-agricultural (a) or the log of industrial output (b) on a series of dummy
variables indicating whether the year of observation falls in a given relative year as measured from the year of the
reform happened. Relative year -6 is the omitted category so that all estimates should be interpreted as relative to the
sixth year prior to the reform. All years beyond the relative year 4 are grouped into the effects of relative 5. The solid
line plots the estimate and the dashed lines plot the 95 percent confidence interval for the relative year main effects.
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(a) Dynamic treatment effects on log non-agricultural population
(b) Dynamic treatment effects on log industrial output
Figure 1.8: Dynamic treatment effects on outcomes in counties
Note: This figure reports estimates of the dynamic effect of the “Turning prefectures into prefecture-level municipalities”
reform on developments in the gaps between capital and peripheral counties derived from a flexible difference-in-
differences specification. Estimates are constructed by regressing the log of non-agricultural (a) or the log of industrial
output (b) on interactions between the capital county dummy and a series of dummy variables indicating whether the
year of observation falls in a given relative year as measured from the year of the reform happened and their interactions
with a dummy variable indicating whether a county is a capital county or not. Relative year -6 is the omitted category
so that all estimates should be interpreted as relative to the sixth year prior to the reform. All years beyond the relative
year 4 are grouped into the effects of relative 5. The solid line plots the estimate and the dashed lines plot the 95
percent confidence interval for the relative year coefficients of the gap between two types of counties.
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Figure 1.9: TFP distribution in peripheral counties relative to capital counties
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Table 1.2: Evidence on Centralization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES log(gov emp) log(admin exp) exp share rev share log(transfer pay)
Panel A: Prefecture-level Government
treat 0.190** 0.342*** 0.049*** 0.023** -0.062
(0.089) (0.046) (0.017) (0.011) (0.227)
Prefecture FE X X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X X
Observations 1,692 1,714 1,714 1,723 1,582
R-squared 0.462 0.803 0.312 0.518 0.733
# of prefectures 175 175 175 175 175
Panel B: County-level Government
treat -0.013 -0.003 -0.003* -0.000 0.008***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
County FE X X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X X
Observations 12,972 15,536 15,536 16,012 15,283
R-squared 0.898 0.921 0.120 0.061 0.382
# of counties 1,738 1,738 1,738 1,738 1,738
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(numbers of government employees), log(administrative expenditure), percentage of ex-
penditure in total expenditure of the prefecture, percentage of revenue in total revenue of the
prefecture and log(transfer payment). Main independent variable is whether this prefecture
is treated to a prefecture-level municipality. Individual fixed effects and year×province fixed
effects are controlled. Standard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
47
Table 1.3: Baseline Model: Overall Effects on Prefectures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(non-agri pop) urbanization log(industrial out) industrialization
treat 0.039*** 0.010*** 0.065** 0.016
(0.013) (0.003) (0.032) (0.031)
Prefecture FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 2,564 2,564 2,401 2,245
R-squared 0.726 0.603 0.834 0.307
# of prefectures 178 178 178 178
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(non-agricultural population), urbanization rate, log(industrial output) and industrializa-
tion rate. Main independent variable is whether this prefecture is treated to a prefecture-level
municipality. Prefecture fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are controlled. Stan-
dard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
Table 1.4: Placebo Test Using Sample from Zhejiang Province
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(non-agri pop) urbanization log(industrial out) industrialization
treat -0.015 -0.013 0.046 -0.010
(0.009) (0.011) (0.129) (0.025)
Prefecture FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Observations 156 156 156 156
R-squared 0.969 0.676 0.970 0.582
# of prefectures 6 6 6 6
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables
are log(non-agricultural population), urbanization rate, log(industrial output) and indus-
trialization rate. Main independent variable is whether this prefecture is treated to a
prefecture-level municipality. Prefecture fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled.
Standard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
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Table 1.5: Geographic Concentration
(1) (2)
VARIABLES EG Index-output EG Index-employment
treat 0.029*** 0.042***
(0.008) (0.008)
Prefecture×sector FE X X
Year×province FE X X
Year×sector FE X X
Observations 45,286 45,286
R-squared 0.019 0.337
# of prefecture-sector pairs 9,445 9,445
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Out-
comes variables are the Ellison-Glaeser Index respectively measured in
outputs and employment. Main independent variable is whether this
prefecture is treated to a prefecture-level municipality. Prefecture fixed
effects, year×sector fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are
controlled. Standard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
Table 1.6: Baseline Model: Overall Effects on Aggregate Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log indus. out. PC log total output PC log total pop. log total out.
treat 0.035** 0.042* 0.028*** 0.075**
(0.016) (0.025) (0.010) (0.034)
Prefecture FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 2,397 2,283 2,621 2,291
R-squared 0.737 0.767 0.473 0.816
# of prefectures 178 178 178 178
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(industrial output per capita), log(total output per capita), log(total population) and
log(total output). Main independent variable is whether this prefecture is treated to a
prefecture-level municipality. Prefecture fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are
controlled. Standard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
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Table 1.7: Results on Misallocation at Prefecture Level
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES TFPR SD TFPR 75-25 TFPR 90-10
treat -0.219** -0.411** -0.164**
(0.111) (0.207) (0.083)
Prefecture FE X X X
Year×province FE X X X
Observations 969 969 969
R-squared 0.459 0.345 0.398
# of prefectures 168 168 168
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and *
at 0.1. Outcomes variables are measurements on dispersions
of TFPR. Main independent variable is whether this prefec-
ture is treated to a prefecture-level municipality. Prefecture
fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are controlled.
Standard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
Table 1.8: Results on Misallocation at County Level
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES TFPR SD TFPR 75-25 TFPR 90-10
treat -0.004 0.010 -0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.018)
County FE X X X
Year×province FE X X X
Observations 6,564 7,254 7,254
R-squared 0.114 0.085 0.098
# of counties 2,764 2,764 2,764
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at
0.1. Outcomes variables are measurements on dispersions of
TFPR. Main independent variable is whether this county is
treated (component county of a prefecture-level municipali-
ty). County fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are
controlled. Standard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
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Table 1.9: Counterfactual TFP Gains
(1) (2) (3)
Year 1998 1999 2000
Panel A: Equalizing TFPR within prefectures
% 90.6 97.1 102.0
Panel B: Relative to 1998 prefecture-level municipality gains
% 16.1 18.1 23.1
† Notes: Panel A reports counterfactual gains from equaliz-
ing TFPR within prefectures and sectors. Panel B reports
counterfactual gains from moving the dispersions in decen-
tralized prefectures to the relative efficient level in central-
ized prefecture-level municipalities.
Table 1.10: Results on Fiscal Expenditure Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES dependency transfer pay. share rev. share exp. share
treat 0.007*** -0.006*** -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
treat×capital 0.007 0.011*** 0.003 0.009*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Observations 14,312 15,682 15,665 15,642
R-squared 0.380 0.217 0.063 0.083
# of counties 1,735 1,742 1,738 1,738
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes
variables are percentage of transfer payments in county’s total revenue,
county’s share of transfer payments in prefecture or prefecture-level mu-
nicipality, county’s share of tax revenue in prefecture or prefecture-level
municipality, county’s share of expenditure in prefecture or prefecture-
level municipality. The main independent variables are whether this
county is treated (component county of a prefecture-level municipality)
and the interaction with whether it is a capital county. County fixed ef-
fects and year×province fixed effects are controlled. Standard errors are
clustered on prefecture level.
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Table 1.11: Baseline Regression Results: Distributional Effects on Counties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(non-agri pop) urbanization log(industrial out) industrialization
treat -0.005 -0.002 -0.069*** -0.002
(0.006) (0.004) (0.029) (0.006)
treat×capital 0.146*** 0.034* 0.170** 0.027
(0.046) (0.018) (0.075) (0.018)
County FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 21,061 20,968 15,970 14,894
R-squared 0.443 0.073 0.805 0.017
# of counties 1,744 1,745 1,610 1,610
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(non-agricultural population), urbanization rate, log(industrial output) and industrializa-
tion rate. The main independent variables are whether this county is treated (component
county of a prefecture-level municipality) and the interaction with whether it is a capital
county. County fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are controlled. Standard errors
are clustered on prefecture level.
Table 1.12: Capital Counties’ Shares in the Whole Prefectures/Municipalities
(1) (2)
VARIABLES non-agri pop share industrial share
treat 0.042** 0.022*
(0.016) (0.012)
County FE X X
Year×province FE X X
Observations 1,592 1,214
R-squared 0.385 0.309
# of counties 171 171
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and
* at 0.1. Outcomes variables are county’s share of non-
agricultural population in prefecture or prefecture-level
municipality and county’s share of industrial outputs in
prefecture or prefecture-level municipality. The main in-
dependent variables are whether this county is treated
(component county of a prefecture-level municipality).
County fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are
controlled. Standard errors are clustered on prefecture
level.
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Table 1.13: Placebo Test Using Sample from Zhejiang Province
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(non-agri pop) urbanization log(industrial out) industrialization
treat 0.099 0.010 0.193 0.040
(0.054) (0.007) (0.154) (0.027)
treat×capital -0.113 0.003 -0.367 -0.030
(0.068) (0.015) (0.204) (0.033)
County FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Observations 982 982 798 987
R-squared 0.811 0.625 0.970 0.779
# of counties 38 38 38 38
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(non-agricultural population), urbanization rate, log(industrial output) and indus-
trialization rate. Main independent variable is whether this prefecture is treated to a
prefecture-level municipality. County fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled.
Standard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
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Appendix Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: Distribution of TFPR in Ningde in 1998 and 2003
Note: This figure plots dispersions of TFPR in Ningde, Fujian Province, in 1998 and 2003. Ningde prefecture received
the treatment to become a prefecture-level municipality in 1999. Distributions are for deviations of log(TFPR) from
sector means. TFPR is calculated as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
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(a) Dynamic treatment effects on log non-agricultural population
(b) Dynamic treatment effects on log industrial output
Figure A.2: Dynamic treatment effects on outcomes in counties
Note: This figure reports estimates of the dynamic effect of the “Turning prefectures into prefecture-level municipalities”
reform on developments of capital and peripheral counties respectively derived from a flexible difference-in-differences
specification. Estimates are constructed by regressing the log of non-agricultural (a) or the log of industrial output (b)
on a series of dummy variables indicating whether the year of observation falls in a given relative year as measured
from the year of the reform happened and their interactions with a dummy variable indicating whether a county is a
capital county or not. Relative year -6 is the omitted category so that all estimates should be interpreted as relative
to the sixth year prior to the reform. All years beyond the relative year 4 are grouped into the effects of relative 5.
The series in red triangles plots the coefficient estimates of the relative year main effects, representing the trend among
peripheral counties. The series in blue circle plots the estimate for the sum of the relative year main effects and the
interaction with the capital county indicator, representing the trend among capital counties.
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Table A.1: Robustness: Regression Using Employment Statistics from Census Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prefecture level County level
VARIABLES log(non-agri emp) urbanization log(non-agri emp) urbanization
treat 0.149** 0.045*** -0.005 -0.001
(0.075) (0.014) (0.013) (0.003)
treat×capital 0.124** 0.043
(0.059) (0.027)
Prefecture FE X X
County FE X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 491 491 4,259 4,259
R-squared 0.973 0.699 0.996 0.391
# of FE 165 165 1,738 1,738
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(non-agricultural employment) and urbanization rate measured by the share of non-
agricultural employment in total employment. Main independent variable is whether
this prefecture is treated to a prefecture-level municipality. Prefecture or county fixed
effects and year×province fixed effects are controlled. Standard errors are clustered on
prefecture level.
Table A.2: Robustness: Controlling for Pre-existing Conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(non-agri pop) urbanization log(industrial out) industrialization
treat 0.044*** 0.013*** 0.071** 0.020
(0.016) (0.005) (0.034) (0.029)
Prefecture FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 2,564 2,564 2,401 2,245
R-squared 0.692 0.734 0.837 0.204
# of prefectures 178 178 178 178
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(non-agricultural population), urbanization rate, log(industrial output) and industrializa-
tion rate. Main independent variable is whether this prefecture is treated to a prefecture-level
municipality. Prefecture fixed effects, year×province fixed effects and interactions between
pre-existing conditions and year dummies are controlled. Standard errors are clustered on
prefecture level.
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Table A.3: Robustness: Controlling for Pre-Existing Conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(nonagri pop) urbanization log(indus out) industrialization
treat -0.007 -0.001 -0.050* -0.016***
(0.013) (0.003) (0.027) (0.006)
treat×capital 0.143*** 0.024 0.188*** 0.037*
(0.047) (0.015) (0.077) (0.020)
County FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 21,061 20,968 15,970 14,894
R-squared 0.443 0.235 0.805 0.379
# of counties 1,744 1,744 1,610 1,608
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables
are log(non-agricultural population), urbanization rate, log(industrial output) and in-
dustrialization rate. The main independent variables are whether this county is treated
(component county of a prefecture-level municipality) and the interaction with whether
it is a capital county. County fixed effects, year×province fixed effects and interactions
between pre-existing conditions and year dummies are controlled. Standard errors are
clustered on prefecture level.
Table A.4: Robustness: Prefecture-level Regressions on Treatment in Period t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(non-agri pop) urbanization log(industrial out) industrialization
treat 0.030* 0.012*** 0.083*** 0.004
(0.016) (0.004) (0.034) (0.023)
Prefecture FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 2,564 2,564 2,401 2,245
R-squared 0.784 0.672 0.823 0.240
# of prefectures 178 178 178 178
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(non-agricultural population), urbanization rate, log(industrial output) and industrializa-
tion rate. Main independent variable is whether this prefecture is treated to a prefecture-level
municipality. Prefecture fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are controlled. Stan-
dard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
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Table A.5: Robustness: County-level Regressions on Treatment in Period t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(non-agri pop) urbanization log(industrial out) industrialization
treat -0.006 -0.001 -0.023 -0.004
(0.012) (0.003) (0.027) (0.006)
treat×capital 0.206*** 0.031* 0.081 0.014
(0.048) (0.017)) (0.095) (0.023)
County FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 21,061 20,968 15,970 14,894
R-squared 0.412 0.235 0.805 0.379
# of counties 1,744 1,745 1,610 1,610
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(non-agricultural population), urbanization rate, log(industrial output) and industrializa-
tion rate. The main independent variables are whether this county is treated (component
county of a prefecture-level municipality) and the interaction with whether it is a capital
county. County fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are controlled. Standard errors
are clustered on prefecture level.
Table A.6: Robustness: Controlling for Prefecture-specific Time Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(non-agri pop) urbanization log(industrial out) industrialization
treat 0.034* 0.002 0.057* 0.035
(0.020) (0.004) (0.033) (0.049)
Prefecture FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Prefecture trends X X X X
Observations 2,564 2,564 2,401 2,245
R-squared 0.736 0.681 0.858 0.315
# of prefectures 178 178 178 178
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(non-agricultural population), urbanization rate, log(industrial output) and industrializa-
tion rate. Main independent variable is whether this prefecture is treated to a prefecture-
level municipality. Prefecture fixed effects year×province fixed effects, interactions between
pre-existing conditions and year dummies and prefecture-specific time trend are controlled.
Standard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
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Table A.7: Robustness: Controlling for County-specific Time Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(non-agri pop) urbanization log(industrial out) industrialization
treat -0.002 0.001 -0.061** -0.019**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.030) (0.009)
treat×capital 0.073* 0.006 0.102 0.012
(0.039) (0.015) (0.067) (0.021)
County FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
County trends X X X X
Observations 21,061 20,968 15,970 14,894
R-squared 0.615 0.526 0.861 0.542
# of counties 1,744 1,745 1,610 1,610
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(non-agricultural population), urbanization rate, log(industrial output) and industrializa-
tion rate. The main independent variables are whether this county is treated (component
county of a prefecture-level municipality) and the interaction with whether it is a capital
county. County fixed effects, year×province fixed effects, interactions between pre-existing
conditions and year dummies and county-specific time trend are controlled. Standard errors
are clustered on prefecture level.
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Table A.8: Robustness: Possible Heterogeneity across Different Periods on Prefectures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(non-agri pop) urbanization log(industrial out) industrialization
Panel A: 1983-1993
treat 0.046* 0.016 0.085** 0.020
(0.027) (0.039) (0.041) (0.025)
Prefecture FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 1034 1034 1121 1052
R-squared 0.769 0.795 0.831 0.745
# of prefectures 178 178 178 178
Panel B: 1994-2003
treat 0.0035*** 0.009* 0.076 0.012
(0.014) (0.005) (0.059) (0.010)
Prefecture FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 1,530 1,530 1,280 1,193
R-squared 0.490 0.628 0.482 0.255
# of prefectures 178 178 178 178
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(non-agricultural population), urbanization rate, log(industrial output) and industrializa-
tion rate. Main independent variable is whether this prefecture is treated to a prefecture-level
municipality. Prefecture fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are controlled. Stan-
dard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
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Table A.9: Robustness: Possible Heterogeneity across Different Periods on Counties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(non-agri pop) urbanization log(industrial out) industrialization
Panel A: 1983-1993
treat -0.025 -0.003 -0.015 0.009
(0.021) (0.004) (0.037) (0.011)
treat×capital 0.170*** 0.037 0.046 0.009
(0.063) (0.026) (0.151) (0.045)
County FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 5,948 5,907 7,025 6,468
R-squared 0.363 0.244 0.717 0.380
# of counties 1,249 1,248 1,314 1,290
Panel B: 1994-2003
treat 0.015 -0.002 -0.004 -0.013*
(0.013) (0.003) (0.035) (0.007)
treat×capital 0.063 0.010 0.033 0.032
(0.042) (0.011) (0.078) (0.027)
County FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 15,113 15,061 8,945 8,426
R-squared 0.313 0.223 0.410 0.290
# of counties 1,726 1,726 1,583 1,579
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
log(non-agricultural population), urbanization rate, log(industrial output) and industrial-
ization rate. The main independent variables are whether this county is treated and the
interaction with whether it is a capital county. County fixed effects and year×province fixed
effects are controlled. Standard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
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Table A.10: Results on Misallocation at Prefecture Level – Small Sample
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES TFPR SD TFPR 75-25 TFPR 90-10
treat -0.206 -0.385 -0.154
(0.149) (0.279) (0.112)
Prefecture FE X X X
Year×province FE X X X
Observations 315 315 315
R-squared 0.442 0.389 0.402
# of prefectures 59 59 59
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at
0.1. Outcomes variables are measurements on dispersions of
TFPR. Main independent variable is whether this prefecture
is treated to a prefecture-level municipality. Prefecture fixed
effects and year×province fixed effects are controlled. Stan-
dard errors are clustered on prefecture level. The sample
only includes prefectures got treated after 1998.
Table A.11: Results on Misallocation at County Level – Small Sample
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES TFPR SD TFPR 75-25 TFPR 90-10
treat -0.001 0.016 -0.035
(0.019) (0.013) (0.034)
County FE X X X
Year×province FE X X X
Observations 1,357 1,520 1,520
R-squared 0.177 0.133 0.173
# of counties 872 872 872
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at
0.1. Outcomes variables are measurements on dispersions of
TFPR. Main independent variable is whether this county is
treated (component county of a prefecture-level municipali-
ty). County fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are
controlled. Standard errors are clustered on prefecture level.
The sample only includes prefectures got treated after 1998.
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Table A.12: Counterfactual TFP Gains – Diminishing Returns in Production
(1) (2) (3)
Year 1998 1999 2000
Panel A: Equalizing TFPR within prefectures
% 45.1 47.5 49.1
Panel B: Relative to 1998 prefecture-level municipality gains
% 13.6 16.5 19.5
† Notes: Panel A reports counterfactual gains from equaliz-
ing TFPR within prefectures and sectors. Panel B reports
counterfactual gains from moving the dispersions in decen-
tralized prefectures to the relative efficient level in central-
ized prefecture-level municipalities. The results are based
on the model with constant returns in production.
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Chapter 2
Environmental Regulations,
Political Incentives and Local
Economic Activities: Evidence
from China
How does nationwide environmental regulations produce heterogeneous impacts on
economic activities of manufacturing firms located in places with differently incen-
tivized local officials? This paper draws upon a set of firm-based pollution regulations
in China from 2007 to investigate the relationship between political incentives and
the effects of environmental regulations. I show that when the Party secretary of a
municipality has more incentives in terms of his job promotion to improve the local
economy, the adverse impacts on employment and the output of regulated firms will
increase. At the same time, the loss in the regulated firms will be associated with
gains in other unregulated firms in polluting industries, and no overall reduction will
be seen in the manufacturing activities of the polluting industries. As for the envi-
ronmental consequences, I find that the emission of pollutants in municipalities with
highly incentivized leaders goes down significantly.
2.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, policies on the environment and pollution have been a-
mong the most frequent and controversial topics in public and academic discussions.
Recent research concentrates on the environmental and the economic consequences
of regulations, for example, the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAAs) in the United
States, the Clean Air Act in the United Kingdom and the Water Framework Direc-
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tive in the European Union. On the one hand, these regulations are found to reduce
the emission of pollutants and improve environmental quality. On the other hand,
though not all the research papers manage to reach a consensus about these legisla-
tions’ economic consequences, most of them accept that the regulations are associated
with reductions in the manufacturing activities of regulated firms and industries (Jaffe
et al., 1995; Henderson, 1996; Levinson, 1996; Becker and Henderson, 2000; Green-
stone, 2002, 2003). At the same time, regulations can also have general equilibrium
effects on other non-directly regulated firms and industries. Evaluating the cost of
unintended consequences on all firms and industries will enable policy makers to con-
sider the adverse effect of well-intentioned regulations and to design welfare programs
that protect workers who lose their jobs or part of their income in consequence, by
providing job training and temporary compensation. It is also helpful if workers in all
firms can learn to expect potential labour market shocks from regulations and make
arrangement in advance.
When discussing the unintended consequences brought by environmental regula-
tions, the role played by political factors should not be ignored. For example, in
democratic developed countries, electoral incentives may affect the nature of environ-
mental policies (List and Sturm, 2006); in developing countries, incentives for rents or
the promotion of local officials may lead to some adverse outcomes for the environ-
ment (Burgess et al., 2012; Jia, 2014). It is necessary to explore how different political
incentives affect the final consequences of environmental regulation, in particular for
policy makers in central government.
This paper uses a set of firm-based environmental regulations in China to compre-
hensively estimate the economic consequences on different types of firms and industries.
The environmental regulations in question were proposed by the Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection in China and took effect at the beginning of 2007. The target firms
are called Key Monitored Enterprises. These firms accounted for 65% of the emissions
of sulphur dioxide, smoke and industrial dust in China in 2006. The Ministry of En-
vironmental Protection set a much stricter quota on these firms and required them
to be monitored more carefully and often. They had to investigate the emission of
pollutants by the target firms every month, and report the numbers every quarter. In
general, it became much more costly for these firms to over-emit pollutants than ever
before. According to Lin (2013), more inspections from environmental departments
will make it harder for Chinese manufacturing enterprises to hide their pollution and
will raise their self-reported emission of pollutants. The Ministry of Environmental
Protection hoped it could make the targeted firms obey the stricter regulation and
emit less pollutants. I link the list of these primary polluting firms with a variety of
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datasets from different sources to evaluate the impact of the firm-based regulations on
a series of firms and industries.
In this paper, I take local governments into account and find that the political
incentives of local officials can explain the responses in different firms and industries.
Jia (2014) investigates a similar question in China. She finds the highly incentivized
officials will choose more dirty inputs. Similar Jia (2014), I argue that political in-
centives act as a complement to economic performance as regards the promotion rule.
Highly incentivized officials will enforce the regulations more strictly. As a result,
they will cut higher numbers of employees and reduce output more drastically in the
regulated firms. At the same time, their incentives will encourage them to put more
efforts into reallocating resources from the regulated firms to the unregulated ones.
To show this logic formally, I present a simple career-concerns model. I extend her
model to include the substitution of clean for dirty inputs, and then interpret how
regulating the dirty input will induce local officials with different political incentives
to choose different levels of clean and dirty inputs. It will provide more implications on
possible regulations to avoid the pollution problem brought by promotion incentives
as predicted in Jia (2014).
Empirically, I use the plausibly exogenous variations in local officials’ ages to i-
dentify official changes in the promotion incentives for officials. The rationale of this
lies in the regulations covering the compulsory age of retirement and the minimum
tenure required to be promoted. All local officials are obliged to retire at the age of
60. Before being appointed to a new position or retirement, all officials should have
completed at least 3 years in their present positions (Chinese Communist Party, 2002).
The combination of these two rules determines that any official below the age of 57
years old will have a clear incentive to make more effort to earn promotion, because
they will be young enough to complete 3 years in the new position. In contrast, when
a local official is older than 56, he cannot reap the advantages of promotion because
he is too close to the age of 60 and so his incentive may decline (Xi et al., 2015).
I use a triple differences strategy to identify the effects of the 2007 firm-based regu-
lations. The main empirical finding is that the regulations produce significantly higher
adverse effects on regulated firms located in municipalities1 with highly incentivized
local leaders than on those in municipalities with poorly incentivized leaders. At the
same time, the highly incentivized local leaders will be inclined to transfer the pressure
of unemployment in polluting industries from the regulated firms to the unregulated
firms. Overall, the firm-based regulations will not have an adverse impact on the
economic activities of industries as a whole. The results suggest that although the
1In this paper, I use the word municipality as a short for prefecture-level municipality, for simplicity
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regulations will have a negative impact on regulated firms, inputs can be reallocated
to unregulated firms to offset the adverse effect of the regulations. I find that overall
the air quality will be improved.
This paper aims to contribute to several areas of the literature. First, many people
have written about the direct impact of environmental regulations on industries. For
example, Henderson (1996), Becker and Henderson (2000), Greenstone (2002), Green-
stone et al. (2012), Davis et al. (2006) and Walker et al. (2013) all find an adverse effect
of the CAAA on employment, wages, and total factor productivity in the targeted in-
dustries of the United States. Berman and Bui (2001), on the contrary, argue that
a regulation on air quality in Los Angeles has not produced any negative effects on
the regulated industries and firms. However, the previous literature mostly evaluates
the impact on directly targeted firms or industries. Few papers provide insight in-
to the unintended impact of environmental regulations on non-directly targeted firms
and industries. In general equilibrium, environmental regulations will have an impact
on the whole input and output market. There are no reasons to believe that other
non-targeted firms are independent of these general equilibrium effects.
Moreover, few previous papers consider the potential heterogeneous effects in d-
ifferent political settings. The significant role of political factors in environmental
policies and pollution levels in developing countries is confirmed by many papers. For
example, Burgess et al. (2012) find that increases in the number of political jurisdic-
tions in Indonesia had led to increased deforestation and lower timber prices, due to
more intensive competition between local officials. Jia (2014) uses a career-concerns
model to explain why local officials more closely connected to the central government
in China produce more pollution. Cai et al. (2015), Kahn et al. (2015) and Lipscomb
and Mobarak (2015) are all concerned about the incentives of local officials to pol-
lute their neighbours by spreading pollutants down rivers. However, as far as I know,
no recent papers discuss whether different political incentives will induce a uniform
environmental regulation to have heterogeneous effects in different locations.
Third, this paper brings together a variety of comprehensive datasets, contributing
to improve the quality of present studies on environmental issues in China. I digitize
the list of Key Monitored Enterprises in 2007 and link them to the Annual Survey
of Industrial Production, a widely used firm-level dataset in China. This provides
me micro-level variations on regulation status within each industry. Compared to
previous papers on environmental issues in China, all of which can only document
regulations at industry-level or region-level, it can precisely measure each firm’s status
in a regulation. For proxies of political incentives, I use a dataset digitized by Chen
(2015), including backgrounds and some demographic characteristics of every Party
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secretary at municipalities in China from 2000 to 2010. I also digitize their connections
with higher-level officials, including provincial leaders and members of Politburo, as a
complement to the work of Chen (2015). As for the pollution outcomes, I collect two
municipality-level measurements. One is an official record of sulfur dioxide emissions
from the China City Statistics Yearbooks of 1993. Because of the notorious misre-
porting of official pollution data, I also use the Aerosol Optical Thickness (AOT) data
provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), based on
observations from the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS). It
measures the degree to which aerosols prevent the transmission of light by absorption
or scattering of light, so it is closely related to air quality and becomes a possible way
of measuring it.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a career-concerns model to
pin down the relationship between political incentives and the effects of environmental
regulation. Section 2.3 provides an institutional background to the empirical studies.
Section 2.4 introduces the datasets that I will use in this paper. Section 2.5 introduces
the empirical strategies. Section 2.6 and Section 2.7 present main and robust results
respectively. Section 2.8 sums up the themes in the paper.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
To illustrate how promotion incentives will affect the economic activities in regulated
and unregulated firms, this section presents a model based on the theory of career
concerns (Holmstrom, 1982). Jia (2014) uses an application of Holmstrom (1982) to
model how local officials in China are motivated by career concerns to choose different
levels of pollution. The basic structure of my model draws heavily on Jia (2014). In
this section, I follow her to assume that a local official responds to career concerns
by making two decisions: one is to do with his effort to increase the total resources
or budget he can devote to production and the other is to do with the way that this
can be allocated among inputs. I extend her model to include substitution of clean
for dirty inputs, and then interpret how a regulation on dirty input will affect local
officials with different political incentives to choose different inputs.
2.2.1 Production
To begin with, I introduce as the basis of the performance and promotion of local
officials the technology used to produce final output. The local official can produce
final output Y with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function,
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aggregating differentiated intermediate input:
Y = (
m∑
i=1
Y ρi )
1/ρ, (2.1)
where 0 < ρ < 1. Each input is produced by one single firm. The budget constraint
of the local official is given by:
m∑
i=1
piYi = e, (2.2)
where pi is a given set of prices exogenously determined by the national market. The
firms producing input are price takers. e is the total available budget or resource.
The local official can increase the total resource e by exerting more costly efforts.
For example, the local official can make efforts to bargain for more transfer payments
from the central government, and then the available budget will be increased by these
additional revenues. As a result, he has more available budget to allocate among firms
but also suffer some cost from the efforts spent on bargaining.
For simplicity, I rewrite the production function in logs:
y =
1
ρ
ln(
m∑
i=1
Y ρi ). (2.3)
Among these firms producing various types of input, I assume for simplicity that
only the first firm emits pollutants. It will create an additional non-monetary cost
b(Y1) to the local official associated with the products besides its monetary cost of p1.
One can imagine the non-monetary cost as physical disgust at a dirty environment or
additional efforts to subject the pollutants to environmental regulations.
Following standard assumptions in the theory of career concerns, I assume that the
final observed output of the local official also depends on his competence θ:
y˜ = θ +
1
ρ
ln(
m∑
i=1
Y ρi ), (2.4)
where θ v N(θ¯, σ2θ). θ can be interpreted as his personal ability to amplify production,
which is his most important characteristic considered by the central government in the
process of deciding promotions. θ cannot be observed directly either by the central
government or by the local official himself.
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2.2.2 Political Incentives
I next describe the promotion rule and associated political incentives of the local offi-
cial. The central government considers two factors in determining whether to promote
local officials. One is the unobserved competence θ introduced above. The other is an
observed personal characteristic C, which I name the “political incentive”. C measures
the probability of being promoted, given one’s competence. Promotion, therefore, is
written as:
E(Cθ) > U¯ , (2.5)
where U¯ is a constant measuring a standard for promotion.
The central government can observe C but not θ. It has to infer θ from the final
observed output y˜. The rule can then be rewritten as:
CE(θ | y˜) > U¯ . (2.6)
Rewrite the expectation term as:
E(θ | y˜) = E(y˜ − y | y˜). (2.7)
The probability of promotion is:
P = Pr[θ > E(y)− y + U¯/C] = 1− Φ(E(y)− y + U¯/C). (2.8)
The local official is going to maximize the expected benefits from promotion minus
the costs:
max f(P )− a(e)− b(Y1), (2.9)
where f(·) and a(·) are utility functions involving the gains from promotion and costs
from efforts. To keep the model simple, I assume f(P ) = P , a(e) = Ae and b(Y1) =
BY1.
2.2.3 Solution and Comparative Statics
The problem of the local official can be written as:
maxP − Ae−BY1, (2.10)
s.t.
m∑
i=1
piYi = e (2.11)
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P = 1− Φ(E(y)− y + U¯/C). (2.12)
The first order conditions are:
φY ρ−11
1∑m
i=1 Y
ρ
i
= Ap1 +B (2.13)
φY ρ−1i
1∑m
i=1 Y
ρ
i
= Api,∀i 6= 1. (2.14)
The solution yields:
Y ρ−11
Y ρ−1i
=
Ap1 +B
Api
, ∀i 6= 1 (2.15)
Y1 =
φ(B + Ap1)
1/ρ−1
(B + Ap1)ρ/ρ−1 + A
∑m
i=2 p
ρ/ρ−1
i
, (2.16)
Yi =
φAp
1/ρ−1
i
(B + Ap1)ρ/ρ−1 + A
∑m
i=2 p
ρ/ρ−1
i
,∀i 6= 1 (2.17)
Next I calculate the comparative statics in the equilibrium conditions for each Yi.
I model the regulations targeted at firm 1 as an increase in B, the cost of emitting
pollutants. One possible explanation is that, since the regulations raise the intensity
of monitoring the emission of pollutants in firm 1, the local official has to spend more
efforts on cutting by-products when he wants to increase the product of a firm. An-
other explanation is that the regulations raise difficulties for those who want pollution
permits and emissions quotas.
The comparative static results yield:
∂2Y1
∂C∂B
< 0, (2.18)
∂2Yj
∂C∂B
> 0, ∀i 6= 1 (2.19)
They suggest that the local official with a higher political incentive is more responsive
to the regulations. When the cost of the dirty input rises, the highly incentivized
official will reduce more dirty input and increase more clean input. In other words, an
environmental regulations aiming to increase costs of pollution will be more effective
in a place with a highly incentivized official. I will use a set of firm-based regulations
in 2007 and local officials’ incentives for promotion in China to test these predictions
empirically.
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2.3 Background
2.3.1 Pollution in China and the 2007 Firm-Based Regulation
In the last three decades, China has experienced a rapid growth in its economy. At
the same time, pollution is the most notorious by-product of the economic miracle to
have emerged in recent years. For example, according to a report by the World Bank
(2007), in 2003 only one percent of urban population in China lived in cities with
annual average PM10 levels below 40 µg/m3, a safety standard raised by the European
Union2; about 25,000 km of Chinese rivers failed to meet the water quality standards
for aquatic life and about 90 percent of the sections of rivers around urban areas were
seriously polluted. The health costs associated with such severe pollution are high.
Chen et al. (2013) estimate that long-term exposure to an additional 100 µg/m3 of
total suspended particles (TSP) reduces life expectancy by about 3 years, using an
arbitrary Chinese heating policy as a quasi experiment. The rapid industrialization is
blamed most often for the pollution. Ebenstein (2012) uses regional variation in the
effective levy rate to show the causal effects of industrial activities and water pollution
on the death rates from cancer. Not surprisingly, the demand for better accountability
on the environment and less pollution for citizens in China is growing. Since 2007,
several demonstrations to protest against paraxylene (PX) plants have been held in
large cities in China, which have greatly worried the government3.
Realizing the enormous costs of pollution and the growing demand for a clean
environment, the Chinese government has put more and more effort into solving these
problems. “Protecting the environment” was listed as one of the five Basic State
Policies4 in China as long ago as the 1990s. Since the start of the Ninth Five-Year Plan
(1996), the environmental consequences of economic development have been taken into
account in the government’s goals. In 1996, the central government identified three
rivers, three lake basins, two control zones, one city and one sea as key regions for
limiting the emission of major pollutants.
However, many studies find that these environmental policies have always failed
to reach their goals. For example, Gao et al. (2009) document many difficulties in
implementing emission policies in the two control zones. Schreifels et al. (2012) find
the national emission of sulfur dioxide was not reduced by 10% as required by the
Tenth Five-Year Plan. Stoerk (2015) finds that, though the political attention to air
2http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/quality/standards.htm
3See http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/aug/14/china-protest-against-px-chemical-
plant for a report.
4The other four are: family planning, reform and opening up, protecting farmland, and rejuvena-
tion through science and education.
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pollution has increased, the 10% reduction in the emission of sulfur dioxide failed
again during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. The role of local governments in these
failures draws much comment. Chen et al. (2012) and Ghanem and Zhang (2014) find
apparent cheating and manipulation of the aggregate environment-related statistics by
local governments. Jia (2014) argues that the promotion incentives of local officials will
cause more pollution. Kahn et al. (2015) confirm the incentives among local officials
to pollute their neighbours.
At the end of 2006, the Ministry of Environmental Protection announced a list
of firms, named Key Monitored Enterprises across the whole country 5. They were
selected in the following way. The Ministry of Environmental Protection listed all the
firms in the country emitting sulfur dioxide, smoke and industrial dust, and ranked
them from highest emission to lowest. The Key Monitored Enterprises were the firms
which accounted for 65% of the total amount of emissions. Following this rule, the
Ministry of Environmental Protection pinned down 3592 firms as the Key Monitored
Enterprises producing air pollution. For simplicity, I focus in this paper only on the
3592 firms emitting air pollutants.
The Ministry of Environmental Protection required its local branches to monitor
these key firms carefully. In the regulations, it raised several main points. The local
branches of the Ministry of Environmental Protection had to investigate the emission
of pollutants by these firms every month, and report the numbers every quarter. The
numbers would be compared with those reported automatically by monitoring instru-
ments, which would perhaps reduce the possibility of misreporting. Local governments
were required to take steps to reduce their emissions, including certificates of their e-
mission quotas, more environmental expenditure on them and more clean technology
to use. In general, the cost to these firms of emitting pollutants would become much
higher than before.
2.3.2 Political Incentives of Local Officials in China
A fundamental institution in China is its decentralized economic governance and cen-
tralized political governance (Xu, 2011). On the one hand, sub-national governments
have taken control of local economic developments since 1978. In spite of this, on the
other hand, political authority is still centralized. Sub-national officials are appointed
by the upper-level government and not elected by citizens. In other words, their ca-
reer paths are totally determined by upper-level officials while they must comply with
controls on resources and on the freedom of local policies to increase the likelihood
of being promoted. As a result, how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appoints
5http://gcs.mep.gov.cn/zhxx/200801/t20080115 116297.htm
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and promotes officials has become one of the most basic questions in the research on
Chinese politics.
The CCP has built a system, similar to the “nomenklatura” in the Soviet Union,
to manage all its cadres. In this system, the appointment, promotion, transfer and
dismissal of central and local officials are all evaluated and put into action by the CCP.
During and after the reform era that began in 1978, the cadre management system
became less subjective and several procedures and standards were revealed (Chinese
Communist Party, 2002). Before a decision (for example, promotion or appointment
to a new position) about an official is made, some upper-level government officials will
rate his performance, talk with him in person and collect comments from his colleagues.
Nevertheless, the specific rules upon which the evaluations are made remain unclear.
Many papers try to deduce the rules for promoting local officials in China. A widely
accepted determinant in promotion decisions on local officials is economic performance
within their region (see Xu (2011) for a survey). For example, Li and Zhou (2005)
find that better economic performance raises the likelihood of promotion for provincial
leaders. Competition in economic performance between local officials resulting from
such a promotion mechanism is then regarded as the key explanatory point for China’s
economic miracle.
While economic performance plays a vital role in promotion, it is not the only
factor. Jia et al. (2015) show that connections act as a complement to economic
performance. After collecting comprehensive data on the backgrounds of local officials
from county to provincial level, Landry et al. (2015) find that economic performance
plays a great role at the county and the prefectural level but no role at all at the
provincial level. Zheng et al. (2014) show that better environmental performance is
associated with an increased probability that a governor will be promoted. Zuo (2015)
finds the municipal governors are often promoted when they give a good performance
in social policies and public welfare.
Besides these performance-based scores, there are some mandatory rules in pro-
motion, such as age, tenure and the political cycles of local officials. In this paper, I
mainly focus on the political incentives brought by age. According to the Regulations
for the Selection and Appointment of Party Leaders and Officials (Chinese Commu-
nist Party, 2002), an official is required to hold the same office for at least three years
before he gets his next assignment or retires, which he must do at the age of 60. As
a result, a local official older than 57 is very unlikely to be promoted, since if he were
he would reach 60 without the full preceding tenure. An official younger than 57 does
not have to worry about this age limit and the effort he puts in to various types of
performance is beyond question useful in evaluating his record for possible promotion
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(Xi et al., 2015).
2.4 Data
To empirically evaluate the impact of the firm-based regulations, I employ data from
several different sources. In this section, I introduce them with some basic information.
I combine these datasets and finally construct a municipality-level panel of data from
2004 to 2009.
2.4.1 Firm-level Statistics
I exploit rich firm-level information from Chinas Annual Survey of Industrial Produc-
tion, a survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics. It has been an annual
census since 1998 containing all state-owned firms and the non-state industrial firms
with sales of more than 5 million Yuan. It has been used widely to study industrial
production in China (for example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Song et al. (2011)).
To fit into the period of the environmental regulations, I use a firm level data set
from 2004 to 2009. It consists of over 270,000 firms in 2004 and nearly 320,000 in
2009. I use unique firm IDs to link them over years. In some cases like acquisitions
and mergers, firms IDs may change. I use methods and codes provided by Brandt
et al. (2012) to provide a more precise matching. They link firms over time using their
Chinese name, address and telephone number in addition to their unique IDs6.
To link the 3592 Key Monitored Enterprises to observations in the Annual Survey
of Industrial Production, I first match the Key Monitored Enterprises’ Chinese names
provided by the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Regarding the firms unmatched
by name, I search their addresses manually on the Internet and match them with
observations in the Annual Survey of Industrial Production on addresses. Finally, it
was found that 2816 out of the 3592 Key Monitored Enterprises could be matched to
the sample in the Annual Survey of Industrial Production. These 2816 matched Key
Monitored Enterprises account for 7.8% of the total employment of industrial firms
in 2006. The remaining unmatched firms are mostly small privately-owned plants
judging by their names and other publicly available information, which is not included
in the Annual Survey of Industrial Production, because the survey investigated only
non-state firms with sales of more than 5 million Yuan and all state-owned firms.
6 www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/n07057/china
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2.4.2 Aggregate-level Pollution Outcomes
I collected aggregate level data on pollution from two different sources. The first is an
official data set from the China City Statistics Yearbooks. These Yearbooks provide a
series of environmental variables in every municipality in China from 1993, including
investment in pollution abatement covering industrial emissions of pollutants in water,
sulfur dioxide and industrial dust.
To avoid manually misreported pollution outcomes (Chen et al., 2012; Ghanem and
Zhang, 2014), I turn to satellite data for robustness checks. The National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) has provided data on Aerosol Optical Thickness
(AOT) from 2000, based on observations from the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spec-
troradiometer (MODIS). AOT is the degree to which aerosols prevent the transmission
of light by absorption or scattering of light. It is closely related to air quality. For
example, Wang and Christopher (2003) calculate the correlation between AOT and
PM 2.5/Air Quality Index to be higher than 0.7. Jia (2014) uses these data as proxies
for air quality in China.
2.4.3 Data on Local officials
The information on local officials is extracted from Chen (2015). In his paper, he
digitizes resumes of municipality Party secretaries, from 2000 to 2010, which mention
989 individual leaders, from 333 prefectural-level cities (municipalities) in 27 provinces.
The distribution of the leaders ages is plotted in Figure 2.4.
It should be noted that any jurisdiction in China has two local leaders: a local
governor and a local Party secretary. The governor is the head of the local government
and the Party secretary is the head of the local branch of the Communist Party. In the
present paper I focus on the latter. Although governors are executive officers in local
governments, Party secretaries rank by law higher than governors and governors should
act under the guidance of Party secretaries. Therefore in practice Party secretaries
hold the power of final decision in local economic development.
Figure 2.1 presents different levels of jurisdiction in China. Municipalities are major
types of prefectural-level jurisdiction. According to Bo (2016), in the “turning pre-
fectures to prefecture-level municipalities” reform, decision rights in local governance,
including fiscal, political and administrative power, were centralized from counties to
municipalities. After the reform, instead of Party secretaries in component counties,
municipal Party secretaries became the most important local leaders in their munic-
ipality. The reform completed in 2003, so in this paper I start examining the period
from 2004 to ensure that municipal Party secretaries were the ones responsible for the
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economy in their own jurisdiction.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
The empirical model follows the strategy in Greenstone (2002, 2003). The main em-
pirical specification in this paper is the following triple differences equation:
%∆Yit = β1Regulatei × Incentivemt × Post07t + β2Regulatei × Post07t
+β3Regulatei × Incentivemt +
09∑
τ=04
β4τI(t = τ)Incentivemt +Xit + δpt + θst + it
(2.20)
Here i indexes a plant, belonging to municipality m and province p, I(·) is an indicator
function. The term %∆Yit is the outcome variable (employees and outputs in most
cases) measured as the percentage change between year t and year t− 1. It is defined
as:
%∆Yit =
Yi,t+1 − Yit
(Yi,t+1 + Yit)/2
(2.21)
This is an alternative to the difference between the logarithms of year t+ 1 and those
of year t. It is a second-order approximation of the log difference, ranging from -2 to
+2. Expansions and contractions are portrayed symmetrically. The largest benefit of
taking this measurement is that it can allow the entry and exit of firms. For example,
the value of %∆Yit of an exiter i operating in year t but not in year t + 1 is equal to
-2.
The key independent variable is the triple interaction Regulatei × Incentivemt ×
Post07t, whose effect on outcome variables is captured by the coefficient β1. Regulatei
denotes the regulatory status of firm i at year t. Its definition changes in different
regressions, depending on context. It is explained in detail in the following sections.
Incentivemt denotes whether promotion is a powerful incentive for the local leader in
municipality m in year t. In the baseline model, I use Y oungmt, whether the Party
secretary’s age is less than 57, as the proxy for the incentive of promotion. As noted
above, due to the strict requirement of retiring at the age of 60, municipal Party
secretaries older than 57 are almost impossible to promote. As a result, they have
low promotion incentives compared to those younger than 57, who may still be able
to complete a 3-year tenure in a new position. I will also use the connectivity of local
officials as a robustness check.
For a formal triple differences model, besides the interactionRegulatei×Incentivemt×
Post07t, we still need to addRegulatei×Post07t, Regulatei×Incentivemt, Incentivemt×
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Post07t, Incentivemt, Post07t and Regulatei in the model. I control for Regulatei ×
Post07t and Regulatei × Incentivemt in the regression. Incentivemt × Post07t and
Incentivemt are contained in a more flexible specification
∑09
τ=04 β4τI(t = τ)Incentivemt,
but the results do not change if use Incentivemt × Post07t and Incentivemt instead.
Post07t is absorbed by province by year fixed effects δpt. Regulatei is eliminated in
the first difference transformation.
In the regression, I control for officials’ tenure and age, year by province fixed ef-
fects and year by sector fixed effects. As an official can be the leaders of different
municipality leaders, I can also control for officials’ individual fixed effects. I also con-
trol for the interactions between firms’ ownership and year dummies. Time-invariant
firm characteristics will be eliminated in the percentage changes setting. Thus, the
coefficient β2 alone captures the effect on the regulated firms relative to unregulated,
in municipalities with poorly incentivized leaders; β3 captures the pre-existing gap
between regulated and unregulated firms in municipalities with highly incentivized
leaders, relative to municipalities with poorly incentivized leaders.
β3 gives a level difference between regulated and unregulated firms under highly
incentivized leaders relative to poorly incentivized leaders before the regulations were
put into effect. We still need an extension of the baseline model to estimate the relative
trend of the above difference for identification, as well as the level difference captured
by β3. The identification assumption requires that the relative trend between regulated
and unregulated firms would be the same in a municipality with a highly incentivized
local leader or a poorly incentivized one, in the absence of these regulations. I check
this by estimating a flexible triple difference model:
%∆Yit =
09∑
τ=04
β1τI(t = τ)Regulatei × Incentivemt +
09∑
τ=04
β2τI(t = τ)Regulatei
+
09∑
τ=04
β4τI(t = τ)Incentivemt +Xit + δpt + θst + it.
(2.22)
This regression model allows the treatment effect to vary by calendar years. The key
interested coefficients are β1τ . I expect β1τ have the same sign as β1 in the baseline
model 2.20 when τ > 2007, while take the opposite sign or equal to zero when τ ≤ 2007.
If it is the case, then the results of the baseline model 2.20 are not due to the pre-
existing trends but can be interpreted as casual effects from the 2007 regulation.
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2.6 Main Results
2.6.1 Impact on Regulated Firms
First, I evaluate the direct effects of the regulations on the targeted firms. The regres-
sion model is:
%∆Yit = β1Regulatedi × Y oungmt × Post07t + β2Regulatedi × Post07t
+β3Regulatedi × Y oungmt +
09∑
τ=04
β4τI(t = τ)Y oungmt +Xit + δpt + θst + it (2.23)
where %∆Yit is the employees or output of firm i measured as the percentage changes
between year t and year t − 1, Regulatedi denotes whether firm i is listed as one
of the Key Monitored Enterprises and is subject to the strict regulations, Y oungmt
denotes whether the Party secretary is young (aged below 57) and promotion is a
powerful incentive, Post07t is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 since 2007. The
coefficient we are interested in is β1, the coefficient of the triple interactionRegulatedi×
Y oungmt × Post07t.
The results are presented in Table 2.2. Column (1) presents the coefficients on
percentage changes in employees. We can see that the regulations produce signifi-
cantly higher adverse effects on regulated firms located in municipalities with highly
incentivized local leaders, compared with those in municipalities with poorly incen-
tivized leaders. To be specific, the effects on regulated firms with poorly incentivized
municipality Party secretaries are statistically no different from zero. In contrast, the
regulation will reduce 34.4% of the employees in regulated firms in municipalities with
highly incentivized leaders. Similar results appear in Column (2), showing the regres-
sion of firms’ outputs. The negative impact on the outputs of regulated firms is 31.6%
larger in municipalities with highly incentivized leaders.
It is not surprising that the stricter environmental regulations have adverse effects
on regulated firms and industries. However, it is interesting to find that a higher
promotion incentive will amplify such negative effects. Jia (2014) shows that highly
incentivized officials will resort to more polluted inputs. In a similar framework, I
find in this section that when we put strict regulation on polluted firms, highly incen-
tivized officials will also cut their economic activities more. We see that the firm-based
regulations can cut more employees and output in those places where the local lead-
ers have a greater possibility of being promoted. Combined with the results in Jia
(2014), the present results suggest that local officials with more political incentive are
more responsive to the changes in relative cost of polluting inputs, whether positive or
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negative as price shocks. This confirms that political incentives serve to complement
economic performance in the promotion of local officials as suggested by the theoretical
model.
The significantly positive β3, the coefficient of Regulatedi×Y oungmt, indicates that
before the regulations, young leaders tended more than old leaders to favour regulated
firms over unregulated firms. This is reasonable because the first order conditions in
the theoretical model predict that highly incentivized leaders will use more polluted
inputs than poorly incentivized leaders, which is also the main conclusion in Jia (2014).
She argues that higher promotion incentives will induce officials to choose a higher level
of pollution. A positive β3 in this paper suggests the similar conclusion: without the
existence of the environment regulations, in equilibrium young leaders prefer those
dirty firms.
To extend the estimation of the pre-existing difference to the relative trend, I
estimate the dynamic impact of the regulations:
%∆Yit =
09∑
τ=04
β1τI(t = τ)Regulatedi × Y oungmt +
09∑
τ=04
β2τI(t = τ)Regulatedi
+
09∑
τ=04
β4τI(t = τ)Y oungmt +Xit + δpt + θst + it. (2.24)
The results are shown as a graph in Figure 2.5. We can see that without the 2007
regulations, the gap between regulated and unregulated firms becomes larger in highly
incentivized municipalities than in poorly incentivized municipalities. The regulations
significantly reverse the enlarging gap. This suggests that the estimated coefficient β1τ
is not naturally inherited from some negative pre-existing trend, but induced by the
2007 regulations.
2.6.2 Impact on Unregulated Firms in Polluting Industries
Next, I evaluate the indirect effects of the regulations on firms without regulation in
polluting industries. I define the polluting industries based on Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection (2010) as the following two-digit industries: production and supply
of electric power and hot power, non-metal minerals products, smelting and pressing of
ferrous metals, raw chemical materials and chemical products, smelting and pressing of
non-ferrous metals, petroleum, coking and nuclear fuel processing, papermaking and
paper products agricultural and sideline products, and timber processing, bamboo,
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cane, palm fiber and straw products. The regression model is:
%∆Yit = β1RegExposem × Y oungmt × Post07t + β2Regulatei × Post07t
+β3RegExposem × Y oungmt +
09∑
τ=04
β4τI(t = τ)Y oungmt +Xit + δpt + θst + it
(2.25)
where Y oungmt denotes whether the Party secretary is young (age is smaller than 57)
and promotion is a powerful incentive for him, Post07t is a dummy variable taking val-
ue of 1 since 2007. Since the sample is limited to those firms which were not regulated,
we need to extend the regulatory status Regulatedi to some other variables measuring
the shock of the regulations on unregulated firms. Therefore, I use RegExposem, which
denotes municipality m’s exposure to the regulations at year t. I calculate the number
of employees in regulated firms in each municipality or the number of regulated firms
in each municipality as proxies for the intensity of the regulation an unregulated firm
is exposed to. The intuition related to the “exposure” measurement is that, when
more firms in a region receive regulation, the input markets and the output market
will be affected more, then in the general equilibrium the unregulated firms will get
more affected by changes in equilibrium price and quantities of inputs and output.
The DDD estimator β1 is still the interested coefficient. We can see from Table 2.3
that when a local leader with more incentives to be promote, he will incline to trans-
fer the pressure of unemployment from regulated firms to other unregulated firms in
polluting industries. No matter measured in the number of employees in regulated
firms or the number of regulated firms in the same municipality, increases in munic-
ipalities’ exposure to the regulation will induce a more positive impact in those with
highly incentivized Party secretaries. A 1% increase in the number of employees in
regulated firms has no significant effects on unregulated firms in a municipality with
low promotion incentives, while it will increase 0.5% in employees and 0.3% in outputs
on unregulated firms if this municipality has a highly incentivized leader. The corre-
sponding effects brought by one more regulated firms are 0.4% in employees and 0.3%
in outputs in a municipality with high promotion incentives. In this regression, the
sample is all unregulated firms in polluting industries, since they may be more likely
to receive the spillover effects from the regulation. I also perform the same regression
using the sample of all unregulated firms, both in polluting industries and clean in-
dustries as a robustness check. The dynamic impact by allowing flexible coefficients
are presented in Figure 2.6. There does not exist any upward trend before 2007 which
can threaten the validity of the identification assumption.
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2.6.3 Overall Impact on Aggregate Economic Activities
Previous firm-level results suggest that environmental regulation will produce a het-
erogeneous impact on places with local leaders who have different levels of political
incentives. When the municipality Party secretary is young, i.e. more incentives to
improve the local economy for promotion, the loss in employment and output in reg-
ulated firms will be associated with gains in other unregulated firms. The prediction
about the impact of the firm-based regulations on the whole polluting industries is
ambiguous, since the negative effects on the regulated firms may be offset by the in-
creases brought by those unregulated ones. In this subsection, I am going to estimate
the overall impact on the polluting industries overall at aggregated municipality level
using the following specification:
Ymt = β1RegExposem × Y oungmt × Post07t + β2RegExposem × Post07t
+β3RegExposem × Y oungmt +
09∑
τ=04
β4τI(t = τ)Y oungmt +Xit + δpt + αm + it
(2.26)
From Table 2.4 we cannot find any robust evidence about a clear positive or nega-
tive effects on the whole polluting industries. This suggests that the adverse shock on
regulated firms brought by the regulations will be totally offset. The firm-based regu-
lations do not harm the economic activities of polluting industries as a whole. Inputs
and outputs from the regulated firms are reallocated to other unregulated firms.
2.6.4 Impact on Air Pollution
Another interesting outcome to measure is air quality. I have shown that, in polluting
industries, the economic activities of regulated firms are almost fully reallocated to
unregulated firms in polluting industries. It is interesting to check whether such a
reallocation can bring a better environment. There are two possibilities. If the un-
regulated firms adopt cleaner technology, the reallocation will improve the air quality.
However, if the Key Monitored Firms are regulated only because they are large firms
and emit more sulfur dioxide and dust with the same or even cleaner technology than
unregulated firms do, the environmental quality will not be improved. To check this,
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I evaluate the following specification:
Ymt = β1RegExposem × Y oungmt × Post07t + β2RegExposem × Post07t
+β3RegExposem × Y oungmt +
09∑
τ=04
β4τI(t = τ)Y oungmt +Xit + δpt + αm + it
(2.27)
where Ymt is a certain air quality measurement. Here I use the municipality-level
emission of sulfur dioxide and industrial dust as the outcome variable, digitized from
China City Statistics Yearbook. Table 2.5 presents the results. We can see that, after
the regulations, municipalities with highly incentivized officials emit less sulfur dioxide
and industrial dust than those with poorly incentivized officials. Combined with the
results from the previous sections that municipalities with highly incentivized officials
reallocate more inputs in polluting industries from regulated firms to unregulated
firms, Table 2.5 suggests that unregulated firms have cleaner technology.
2.7 Robustness
2.7.1 Measurement of Local officials’ Political Incentives
There are several concerns about using the age of 57 years as a threshold of high or
low political incentives. First, given the rule about tenure and retirement, age 57 is
not an arbitrary number, but one may still worry about how robust it would be to
use a different number as a threshold. To check the robustness, I repeat here the
baseline regression using age 55 as the threshold. Intuition would suggest that, as age
increases, the political incentive of an official to be promoted will decline. The results
are presented in Table 2.6. We can see that results are similar but slightly smaller
than the baseline estimates.
Second, it is possible that after 2007 the upper-level government appointed some
old local officials to posts in highly-polluted areas to ensure that the environmental
regulations would be implemented well. For this reason, I limit the sample in the
baseline regression to those municipalities which had no new appointments around
2007. Two-thirds of all municipalities did not change their Party secretaries in 2006
and 2007. I extend the sample to years with the same Party secretaries as in 2006
and 2007 in these municipalities. This yields a sub-sample with about 30% of the
number of observations in the whole sample. Here I use as an indicator of political
incentives whether the Party secretary was younger than 54 on his appointment. The
rationale is that he had to finish a 3-year tenure before he could be considered for
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promotion. If he was older than 54 upon appointment, then, given the 60-year-old
retirement restriction, he would have been older than 57 after a 3-year tenure and
thus hard to consider for promotion and a fresh 3-year tenure in the new position. As
the individual’s age on his appointment is time-invariant, the regression can be written
as:
%∆Yit = β1Regulatedi × Y oungm × Post07t + β2Regulatedi × Post07t
+β3Regulatedi × Y oungm +
09∑
τ=04
β4τI(t = τ)Y oungm +Xit + δpt + θst + it (2.28)
The results are presented in Table 2.7. We can see that the magnitudes and the
significance of most coefficients are not changed much when using the time-invariant
appointment age as the proxy for political incentives. The regulated firms under
highly incentivized local officials have to reduce their employees and output more
than those under poor incentivized ones. It is worth noting that β3, the coefficient
of Regulatedi × Y oungm is significantly negative in Column (1) and (2), while in the
baseline results it is positive. β3 measures the gap in economic activities of regulated
firms between municipalities with highly and poor incentivized local officials prior to
2007. The significantly positive estimate in the baseline results is consistent with
theoretical predictions and previous literature (Jia, 2014): local officials with higher
promotion incentives will choose more dirty input without regulation. However, in
this robustness checks we find that local officials appointed before 54 years old tend to
choose a lower level of the dirty input. An explanation for this is that incentives may
vary with time, so the time-invariant appointment age may capture officials’ incentives
incompletely. For example, for a Party secretary who got his position at 55 years old
in 2005, though by rule he had to stay at least three years in the position and then
became too old for promotion, practically he still had some chances to be promoted
before finishing the 3-year tenure if he had some extraordinary performance. As a
result he may work hard (for example increase investments in polluting firms) in 2005
and 2006 trying to “take the last chance” to be promoted before he reaches 57 years
old. Nearly 20% officials once experienced a tenure less than three years in my sample.
If these officials are excluded in this robustness check, the magnitude of β3 will be not
significantly different from zero. For conciseness I do not report this result here. It
suggests that the negative β3 in Column (1) and (2) of Table 2.7 can be explained by
the additional incentives by those appointed after 54 years old but still younger than
57.
In the baseline part I use age to proxy for local officials’ incentives for promotion.
The promotion rule in China is more an empirical than a theoretical question. As
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introduced in the background section, above, connections are regarded as a significant
complement to economic performance in the way that people are promoted (Jia, 2014).
For this reason I digitize information on the connectivity of municipal Party secretaries
as other proxies of political incentive, to check the robustness of the use of age in
the baseline results. Connectivity is a highly complicated question since there are
many possible ways to connect two officials. Normally researchers identify officials as
connected if they are from the same hometown, the same school or have ever worked
in the same place. It is relatively easy to document the connectivity between province-
level and central officials, due to detailed resume information and the limited number of
officials. In my paper, the difficulty of identifying the connectivity between municipal-
level and province-level officials is high. In practice, I identify a municipal leader and
a province or central leader who are from the same hometown or have worked in the
same municipality as connected officials. I use the same empirical strategy as in the
baseline regression. The results are listed in Table 2.8. It can be found that the results
are quite similar to the baseline results. Because my measurement may incompletely
capture the true extent of connectivity, I use the baseline regression in preference,
using age as the proxy for political incentives.
2.7.2 Impact on Unregulated Firms in All Industries
In the baseline results I evaluate the unintended effects of the regulations using the
sample of firms without regulation in polluting industries. Here, I also estimate the
same model using the sample of all unregulated firms, in both polluting industries
and clean industries, as a robustness check. The results are listed in Table 2.9. We
find that the response of unregulated firms in clean industries is similar to that from
unregulated firms in polluting industries.
2.7.3 Measurement of Regulation Exposure of Unregulated
Firms
In the baseline regressions, I use two definitions of regulation exposure on unregulated
firms. One is the number of employees in regulated firms in each municipality and the
other is the number of regulated firms in each municipality, yielding regression results
in Table 2.3 for unregulated firms in polluting industries and Table 2.9 for unregulated
firms in all industries. Here, I check the robustness of alternative measurements of
regulation expose. In Table 2.10, I use the percentage of employment of regulated firms
in the whole municipality as the measurement. The results predict similar patterns
for unregulated firms. When the share of regulated firms’ employment in the whole
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municipality is 1% larger, an unregulated firm in the same municipality can have a
0.143% positive spillover effects on its employment and 0.255% on its output.
2.7.4 Measurement of Pollution
In Table 2.11 I estimate the impact of the firm-based regulations using Aerosol Optical
Thickness (AOT) as the proxy for air quality to avoid the risk of misreporting in
China’s official air quality data (Chen et al., 2012). We see that the results are similar
to those using officially-reported emissions of pollutants.
2.7.5 County Level Exposure
In the baseline regression I control for year by province fixed effects and use the
number of employees in regulated firms in the same municipality or the number of
regulated firms in the same municipality as proxies for the intensity of regulation
that an unregulated firm is exposed to. Here as a robustness check I control for year
by municipality fixed effects. In this case, I have to find variations in exposure to
the regulations at a sub-municipal level. For this reason, I calculate the number of
employees in regulated firms in the same county or the number of regulated firms in
the same county. To be specific, the regression equation is:
%∆Yit = β1RegExposec × Y oungmt × Post07t + β2RegExposec × Post07t
+β3RegExposec × Y oungmt +Xit + δmt + θst + it (2.29)
where RegExposec is exposure to the regulations at a county level, measured by the
number of employees in regulated firms in the same county or the number of regulated
firms in the same county. The results are listed in Table 2.12. We find a similar pattern
to that in the baseline regression. In general, I prefer the baseline specification because
municipalities after 2003 took the place of counties as basic units of local governance.
Migration across counties but within a municipality is relatively easy. The specification
controlling for municipality fixed effects but using county-level exposure may ignore
possible spillovers across counties. Nevertheless, ex post the two specifications yield
similar results.
2.8 Conclusion
Economic consequences are considered to be one of the most significant things to e-
valuate before policy makers make decisions to institute environmental regulations.
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Recent studies normally conclude that the regulations are associated with reductions
in manufacturing activities on regulated firms and industries (Henderson, 1996; Green-
stone, 2002). However, the previous literature rarely evaluates the unintended impact
of environmental regulations on non-directly targeted firms and industries; therefore
there is little evidence of the general equilibrium results on the whole economy.
At the same time, in developing countries, political factors play a significant role
in environmental issues (Burgess et al., 2012; Jia, 2014). It remains unclear whether
different politicians will induce the effects of national environmental regulations to be
heterogeneous in practice.
This paper uses a set of firm-based environmental regulations in China to estimate
the economic consequences on different types of firms and industries. The environ-
mental regulations by the Ministry of Environmental Protection in China, starting
from the beginning of 2007, targeted firms which accounted for 65% of the emission
of sulfur dioxide and industrial dust. I take local governments into account and try to
use the political incentives of local officials to explain the responses in different firms
and industries.
I link the list of these regulated firms with a variety of datasets from different
sources to evaluate the impact of the regulations on different firms and industries. I
use the plausibly exogenous variations in local officials’ ages to identify within-official
changes in promotion as an incentive. The promotion and retirement rules of the CCP
determine that officials younger than 57 years old have a clear incentive to put more
effort into earning promotion. I use a triple differences strategy to identify the effects
of the 2007 firm-based regulations.
The triple differences specification finds that the regulations produce significantly
higher adverse effects on regulated firms located in municipalities with highly incen-
tivized local leaders than in those with poorly incentivized leaders. At the same time,
the highly incentivized local leaders will be inclined to transfer the pressure of unem-
ployment created thereby from regulated firms to other unregulated firms in polluting
industries. Overall, the firm-based regulations will not have an adverse impact on the
economic activities of the industries as a whole. The results suggest that although
regulation will have a negative impact on regulated firms, inputs can be reallocated to
unregulated firms to offset the adverse effects of the regulations. I find that the overall
air quality will be improved. In general, when promotion is a powerful incentive for
local officials, the firm-based regulations can improve environment quality without a
significant cost in economic activities.
Evaluating the cost of unintended consequences on all industries will inform the
policy makers about ways to design employment transition assistance programs that
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provide job training and temporary compensation for the job losses that result from
unintended adverse effect of the regulations. This paper suggests that making use
of the political incentives of local officials to enforce environmental regulations on
targeted firms using dirty technology is a good strategy for improving environmental
quality without sacrificing economic development.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Hierarchy of jurisdictions in China
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Figure 2.2: Number of regulated firms by municipality
Figure 2.3: Trends of employees of firms in different industries
Note: Normalized to 2004 level.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of ages of Party secretaries
Figure 2.5: Dynamic impacts on employees in regulated firms
Note: coefficients normalized to 2004 level.
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Figure 2.6: Dynamic impacts on employees in unregulated firms in polluting industries
Note: coefficients normalized to 2004 level.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008
Panel A: Regulated firms
Employees 1975.43 2010.80 2026.05 2007.08
(7042.78) (7307.01) (7270.71) (7352.99)
Outputs 1168.71 1776.42 1797.47 2150.60
(4554.34) (10440.15) (6852.12) (8338.32)
Panel B: Unregulated firms
Employees 205.44 220.29 226.60 236.65
(952.33) (940.17) (957.33) (899.88)
Outputs 636.09 798.71 1074.41 1346.76
(622.04) (778.19) (2614.45) (4176.77)
† Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. Output is mea-
sured in 1 million Yuan.
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Table 2.2: Impacts on Regulated Firms
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ∆ employees ∆ output
young×regulated×post07 -0.344*** -0.316***
(0.025) (0.021)
regulated×post07 0.002 -0.005
(0.002) (0.015)
young×regulated 0.302*** 0.290***
(0.010) (0.011)
Year×sector FE X X
Year×province FE X X
Observations 444,529 442,722
R-squared 0.090 0.421
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05,
and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are percentage
changes in employees and outputs. Main indepen-
dent variable is the interaction between whether
the firm is regulated, whether the municipality Par-
ty secretary is younger than 57 years old and the
post-2007 dummy. Year×province fixed effects and
year×sector fixed effects are controlled. Standard
errors are clustered on municipality level.
94
Table 2.3: Impacts on Unregulated Firms in Polluting Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆ employees ∆ output ∆ employees ∆ output
young×regulated emp×post07 0.005*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
regulated emp×post07 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.002)
young×regulated emp 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
young×# of regulated firms×post07 0.004* 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
# of regulated firms ×post07 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
young×# of regulated firms 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Year×sector FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 431,431 429,520 431,431 429,520
R-squared 0.262 0.542 0.261 0.526
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables
are percentage changes in employees and outputs. Main independent variable is the in-
teraction between the intensity of regulation in the same municipality (the number of
employees in regulated firms in the municipality or the number of regulated firms in
the municipality), whether the municipality Party secretary is younger than 57 years old
and the post-2007 dummy. Year×province fixed effects and year×sector fixed effects are
controlled. Standard errors are clustered on municipality level.
95
Table 2.4: Overall Impacts on Pollution Industries – Municipality Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆ employees ∆ output ∆ employees ∆ output
young×regulated emp×post07 -0.019 0.031
(0.015) (0.025)
regulated emp×post07 0.003 -0.057**
(0.015) (0.022)
young×regulated emp 0.003 0.022
(0.016) (0.032)
young×# of regulated firms×post07 -0.024** 0.025
(0.011) (0.027)
# of regulated firms ×post07 0.021** -0.007
(0.010) (0.022)
young×# of regulated firms -0.003 0.008
(0.004) (0.015)
Municipality FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 1,672 1,672 1,672 1,672
R-squared 0.628 0.997 0.632 0.997
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables
are percentage changes in employees and outputs. Main independent variable is the in-
teraction between the intensity of regulation in the same municipality (the number of
employees in regulated firms in the municipality or the number of regulated firms in
the municipality), whether the municipality Party secretary is younger than 57 years old
and the post-2007 dummy. Municipality fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are
controlled. Standard errors are clustered on municipality level.
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Table 2.5: Overall Impacts on Air Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES so2 dust so2 dust
young×regulated emp×post07 -0.063*** 0.055
(0.022) (0.046)
regulated emp×post07 0.001 -0.117**
(0.023) (0.046)
young×regulated emp -0.003 -0.020
(0.018) (0.039)
young×# of regulated firms×post07 -0.025*** -0.004***
(0.008) (0.001)
# of regulated firms×post07 -0.003 -0.007
(0.005) (0.008)
young×# of regulated firms 0.004 0.000
(0.011) (0.008)
Municipality FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 1,596 1,656 1,596 1,656
R-squared 0.366 0.311 0.364 0.270
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes vari-
ables are log value of sulfur dioxide and industrial dust emitted at municipality
level. Main independent variable is the interaction between the intensity of regula-
tion in the same county (the number of employees in regulated firms in the county
or the number of regulated firms in the county), whether the municipality Party
secretary is younger than 57 years old and the post-2007 dummy. Municipality
fixed effects and year×province fixed effects are controlled. Standard errors are
clustered on municipality level.
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Table 2.6: Robustness: Using 55 as the Threshold Age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
regulated vs unregulated unregulated firms
VARIABLES ∆ employees ∆ output ∆ employees ∆ output
young×regulated×post07 -0.306*** -0.297***
(0.021) (0.014)
regulated×post07 0.003 0.000
(0.012) (0.001)
young×regulated 0.284*** 0.276***
(0.008) (0.005)
young×# of regulated firms×post07 0.003*** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.002)
# of regulated firms ×post07 -0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
young×# of regulated firms 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Year×sector FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 444,529 442,722 431,431 429,520
R-squared 0.102 0.575 0.278 0.560
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
percentage changes in employees and outputs. Main independent variable is the interaction
between the intensity of regulation in the same municipality (the number of employees in
regulated firms in the municipality or the number of regulated firms in the municipality),
whether the municipality Party secretary is younger than 55 years old and the post-2007
dummy. Year×province fixed effects and year×sector fixed effects are controlled. Standard
errors are clustered on municipality level.
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Table 2.7: Robustness: Age at Appointment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
regulated vs unregulated unregulated firms
VARIABLES ∆ employees ∆ output ∆ employees ∆ output
young×regulated×post07 -0.279*** -0.251***
(0.039) (0.031)
regulated×post07 0.005 0.000
(0.010) (0.001)
young×regulated -0.213*** -0.178***
(0.005) (0.004)
young×# of regulated firms×post07 0.005** 0.004*
(0.003) (0.003)
# of regulated firms ×post07 0.003* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
young×# of regulated firms -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Year×sector FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 140,615 139,941 136,910 136,127
R-squared 0.091 0.426 0.103 0.401
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
percentage changes in employees and outputs. Main independent variable is the interaction
between the intensity of regulation in the same municipality (the number of employees in
regulated firms in the municipality or the number of regulated firms in the municipality),
whether the municipality Party secretary is younger than 54 years old at appointment
and the post-2007 dummy. Year×province fixed effects and year×sector fixed effects are
controlled. Standard errors are clustered on municipality level.
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Table 2.8: Robustness: Using Connection as Political Incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4)
regulated vs unregulated unregulated firms
VARIABLES ∆ employees ∆ output ∆ employees ∆ output
connect×regulated×post07 -0.415*** -0.307***
(0.045) (0.034)
regulated×post07 -0.012 0.001
(0.010) (0.001)
connect×regulated -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
connect×# of regulated firms×post07 0.007*** 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003)
# of regulated firms ×post07 0.006*** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
connect×# of regulated firms 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Year×sector FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 444,529 442,722 431,431 429,520
R-squared 0.101 0.538 0.159 0.667
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
percentage changes in employees and outputs. Main independent variable is the interaction
between the intensity of regulation in the same municipality (the number of employees in
regulated firms in the municipality or the number of regulated firms in the municipality),
whether the municipality Party secretary has connection with higher level officials and the
post-2007 dummy. Year×province fixed effects and year×sector fixed effects are controlled.
Standard errors are clustered on municipality level.
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Table 2.9: Robustness: Impacts on Unregulated Firms in All Industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆ employees ∆ output ∆ employees ∆ output
young×regulated emp×post07 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
regulated emp×post07 0.005*** 0.002***
(0.002) (0.001)
young×regulated emp -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
young×# of regulated firms×post07 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
# of regulated firms ×post07 0.003*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
young×# of regulated firms 0.000 -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year×sector FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 1,735,061 1,729,470 1,735,061 1,729,470
R-squared 0.141 0.538 0.137 0.512
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables
are percentage changes in employees and outputs. Main independent variable is the in-
teraction between the intensity of regulation in the same municipality (the number of
employees in regulated firms in the municipality or the number of regulated firms in
the municipality), whether the municipality Party secretary is younger than 57 years old
and the post-2007 dummy. Year×province fixed effects and year×sector fixed effects are
controlled. Standard errors are clustered on municipality level.
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Table 2.10: Robustness: Alternative Regulation Exposure Measurement of Unregulat-
ed Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
unreg firms in polluting indus unreg firms in all indus
VARIABLES ∆ employees ∆ output ∆ employees ∆ output
young×% regulated emp×post07 0.143* 0.255*** 0.138*** 0.213***
(0.081) (0.074) (0.059) (0.054)
% regulated emp×post07 -0.046 -0.135 -0.052 -0.109
(0.066) (0.121) (0.049) (0.095)
young×% regulated emp -0.161*** -0.138*** -0.074** -0.060*
(0.046) (0.045) (0.033) (0.033)
Year×sector FE X X X X
Year×province FE X X X X
Observations 431,431 429,520 1,693,271 1,680,894
R-squared 0.206 0.446 0.217 0.503
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
percentage changes in employees and outputs. Main independent variable is the interaction
between the intensity of regulation in the same municipality (the percentage of employment
in regulated firms in the municipality), whether the municipality Party secretary is younger
than 57 years old and the post-2007 dummy. Year×province fixed effects and year×sector
fixed effects are controlled. Standard errors are clustered on municipality level.
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Table 2.11: Rubustness: Overall Impacts on Air Quality – AOT
(1) (2)
VARIABLES log aot log aot
young×regulated emp×post07 -0.034*
(0.019)
regulated emp×post07 -0.009
(0.025)
young×regulated emp -0.003
(0.018)
young×# of regulated firms×post07 -0.002**
(0.001)
# of regulated firms×post07 -0.001
(0.001)
young×# of regulated firms -0.000
(0.004)
Municipality FE X X
Year×province FE X X
Observations 1,401 1,401
R-squared 0.560 0.559
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and *
at 0.1. Outcomes variables are AOT at municipality lev-
el. Main independent variable is the interaction between
the intensity of regulation in the same county (the num-
ber of employees in regulated firms in the county or the
number of regulated firms in the county), whether the
municipality Party secretary is younger than 57 years
old and the post-2007 dummy. Municipality fixed effects
and year×province fixed effects are controlled. Standard
errors are clustered on municipality level.
103
Table 2.12: Robustness: County-level Exposure, Controlling for Year×Municipality
FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆ employees ∆ output ∆ employees ∆ output
young×regulated emp×post07 0.004** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001)
regulated emp×post07 0.005* 0.002
(0.003) (0.002)
young×regulated emp -0.002 -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
young×# of regulated firms×post07 0.004* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
# of regulated firms ×post07 -0.002** 0.003
(0.001) (0.004)
young×# of regulated firms 0.003*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
Year×sector FE X X X X
Year×municipality FE X X X X
Observations 431,431 429,520 431,431 429,520
R-squared 0.268 0.549 0.267 0.535
† Notes: *** denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Outcomes variables are
percentage changes in employees and outputs. Main independent variable is the interac-
tion between the intensity of regulation in the same county (the number of employees in
regulated firms in the county or the number of regulated firms in the county), whether
the municipality Party secretary is younger than 57 years old and the post-2007 dummy.
Year×municipality fixed effects and year×sector fixed effects are controlled. Standard
errors are clustered on municipality level.
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Chapter 3
Son Preference, Children’s Gender
and Parents’ Time Allocation:
Evidence from China
This paper investigates the effects of children’s gender on parents’ time allocation
due to the long-existing son preference in developing countries. A collective model
generates predictions about the impact of the birth of more sons on family behaviours
when son preference is treated as a premium in the father’s utility function. Using
data from China, I show that, with more sons instead of daughters, the time spent by
both men and women on housework rises, while men have to increase their work time
in the labour market and women can reduce theirs. The results are consistent with
theoretical predictions and robust for further tests. For the possible endogeneity of
children’s gender, I treat the law forbidding the use of ultrasound-B to reveal the gender
of a fetus as a natural experiment and use instrumental variables as the identification
strategy.
3.1 Introduction
Sex imbalance is well documented by many demographers and economists, in particu-
lar in the context of developing countries, as the well-known phrase “missing women”
by Sen (1990) encapsulates. The problem is critical for developing countries, not only
because of its immediate ethically negative implications for women, but also for its
many associated economic outcomes and social consequences, which together impede
development. For example, Edlund et al. (2013) attribute a drastic increase in crime
in China to the “surplus” men; Wei and Zhang (2011) argue that the rising sex ra-
tio should be responsible for the country’s recent housing price bubbles. Behind the
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severely male-biased sex imbalance, the persistent preference for sons in the develop-
ing world plays a key role. Son preference not only motivates parents’ desire for a
male-biased family (Edlund, 1999), but also affects their behaviours after the birth of
children. For example, one of the most immediate concerns is discrimination against
girls, since their parents may prefer boys and allocate more resources to them.
In this paper I investigate how the time allocation of parents is influenced by the
gender composition of their children, as a result of preference for sons. This paper
seeks to shed light on supply of working adults and allocation of resources among
children. To guide my empirical analysis, I propose a collective household model,
involving an intra-household decision-making process and resource allocation. In the
model, son preference is modelled as a premium in the father’s utility function. The
model generates predictions for empirical testing about the impact of the birth of sons
instead of daughters on a family’s behaviours.
In the empirical part, I use individual-level household survey data from China
to test the theoretical predictions generated by the collective framework. I divide the
available time allocation of an adult into three parts: time spent on the labour market,
time spent on housework and time for leisure. I exploit plausibly exogenous variations
in children’s gender from a law forbidding the use of Ultrasound-B to test the gender
of a fetus. The main finding is that, with more sons instead of daughters, the time
spent on housework by both men and women rises, while men have to increase their
work time on the labour market and women can reduce theirs. These results are
consistent with theoretical predictions founded on a utility-based son preference. In
order to check the robustness of these results and supply more evidence on the channels
involved, I conduct further empirical tests. To ensure the validity of identification, I
perform a placebo test making use of a sample of adults who are childless.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, most of
the empirical literature related to the son preference confines the outcome variables
to those of fertility, the sex ratio at birth, and the sex-differential survival of children.
This paper contributes by painting a complete picture of the effects of gender on family
life. I mainly consider how the preference for sons affects a couple’s work inside and
outside the family through their different attitudes to boys and girls. To the best of my
knowledge, the only paper with a similar topic is by Rose (2000). She investigates the
effect of an additional child’s gender on the time allocation of rural Indian households.
Second, in studies of the relationship between children’s gender and other house-
hold outcomes, the endogeneity problem arises. As introduced above, the preference
for sons determines the imbalance in children’s gender and also affects parents’ be-
haviours themselves, which implies that using the gender of children as independent
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variable will bias the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Few researchers take
this problem into account. In fact, many papers treat the gender of a baby as randomly
assigned and even take it as an instrumental variable for fertility or other endogenous
variables (Angrist and Evans, 1998). However, in the context of developing countries
the existence of this preference for sons and the emergence of prenatal sex selection
techniques make gender selection possible and even prevalent, which makes the exo-
geneity of children’s genders suspicious. For example, in Rose (2000), if households
can select the specific gender they want Anderson and Ray (2010), her estimates may
be inconsistent. Li and Wu (2011) examine the effects of the gender of the first child
on the mother’s bargaining power, nutrition and health. They argue that the gender
of the first child is exogenous, since Ebenstein (2011) showed that the sex ratio of
first-order births during the 1980s was close to the natural rate. The present paper
addresses this problem by exploiting the exogenous variation brought by a policy in
China to identify the effects of the sex ratio at birth on the mother’s nutrition and
health. In addition, I use the distance between a household’s home and the nearest fa-
cility offering family planning services to construct a multiplier measuring the plausibly
heterogeneous impact of this policy on different families. I instrument the children’s
gender composition with the interaction between the time trend before/after the policy
and the distance and estimate it using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression.
Third, this paper can also offer solid evidence on the essence of the son preference.
Few documents identify how the preference for sons takes effect in the lives of the
household, as a result limiting the responses to the question why sons are preferred
to daughters. Theoretically, there are two leading explanations for it. First, sons may
produce more returns or require less bearing cost than daughters do, a consequence
which prompts what I call a constraint-based preference, since it will affect family
budget constraints. Second, sons and daughters may bring only a systematic bias
in parents’ utility, fathers’ in particular, due to some existing social norms. I call
this consequence a utility-based preference, since it does not change family budget
constraints but only the utility functions themselves. Ben-Porath and Welch (1976)
provide an early discussion of those two possible essences in explanation of the fertility
pattern in the US, which they refer to respectively as the “sex-concern effect” and the
“price effect”. In this paper I want to justify those two explanations in the context
of developing countries and construct a theoretical framework based on a collective
model, which will generate distinct predictions about family outcomes under different
features of the preference for sons. My empirical analysis helps to separate these two
different mechanisms. It will help us to understand what role the preference for sons
play in this area of household decision making.
107
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 lays out a theoretical framework that
generates predictions for the gender effects on time allocation. Section 3.3 introduces
the background. Section 3.4 presents the data and strategy used in the empirical
analysis. Section 3.5 includes the baseline results, as well as further discussions about
the robustness, identification and implications of the empirical results. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
Most economic analysis concerning household behaviours in early stage follow the uni-
tary framework developed by Becker (1973). They view the household as a collection
of individuals who has one set of preferences and behave as if they were in agreemen-
t over the best way to allocate their time and consumption. However, the unitary
framework faces empirical challenges about the welfare of persons within the family
(Haddad et al., 1997) and the model’s failure is mainly due to its assumption that
family members act as a unity. The second generation of household frameworks fea-
tures an intra-household decision-making process and allocation of resources (Manser
and Brown, 1980; Chiappori, 1988). Some empirical works offer credible evidence for
such a collective framework, for example, Thomas (1990), Strauss and Thomas (1995)
and Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003). In the context of China, Chau et al. (2007)
show that the collective model performs better in predicting household labour supply.
I will also justify the collective model using empirical results.
I first consider a collective framework that contains two persons in the family,
husband and wife, who enjoy consumption and leisure. Here I take the son preference
as a kind of utility premium for fathers, considering the patriarchal norms from an
anthropological standpoint. This preference is easy to understand, bearing in mind
that the function of male offspring is to continue the family line, genetically carry
the unique Y chromosome and culturally carry the family name1. To be specific, the
utility functions are:
U = U(C1, L1, pi(β)g(R2)) (3.1)
V = V (C2, L2) (3.2)
where U and V are husband’s and wife’s utility functions respectively, C1 and C2
are their consumption, L1 and L2 are their leisure. pi(β)g(R2) is a term representing
the offspring’s effect on the husband’s utility, where β is the gender indicator of the
1I discuss the constraint-based case after empirically testing the predictions from the constraint-
based model.
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children, which is greater for sons, and R2 is the wife’s household labour time. To
simplify, I exclude the husband’s household labour time from the model. As seen in
the descriptive statistics, the husband’s household labour takes much less time than the
wife’s and is relatively ignorable compared to his work time, which can be explained
by Becker (1985)’s sexual division of the household due to a kind of specialization
effect. Nevertheless, I still test its response in the empirical analysis. pi(·) and g(·)
are both increasing functions, which implies that the husband’s utility increases when
he has a son and not a daughter or when his wife devotes more time to housework,
for example, parenting children. The household chooses consumption and leisure to
maximize a weighted objective function:
maxU(C1, L1, pi(β)g(R2)) + µV (C2, L2) (3.3)
where the sharing rule µ is a function of the husband’s and wife’s bargaining power a1
and a2, decreasing in a1 and increasing in a2:
µ = µ(a1, a2(β)) (3.4)
where the wife’s bargaining power a2 is an increasing and concave function of β, i.e.
when the sex ratio of the children is more male-biased, the wife’s bargaining power a2
becomes greater. This is a key assumption in the model and is supported by many
empirical works in developing countries. For example, Li and Wu (2011) find that a
woman with a first-born son has a 3.9 percentage greater role in household decision-
making than a woman with a first-born daughter. In McElroy (1990)’s analysis, the
exogenous changes in children’s gender composition can be regarded as a shock to
the extra-household environment parameters (EEPs), which induce an impact on the
threat of divorce and thus on the couples’ bargaining power. Suppose a couple with
more sons divorce. The wife will be labelled as “able to give birth to more sons”,
which in the context of China will enable her to get a wealthier husband than another
woman with less sons might get, since the preference for sons prevails there.
The budget constraint for the family is:
C1 + C2 = W1(T − L1) +W2(T − L2 −R2) (3.5)
where W1 and W2 are husband’s and wife’s wage rates respectively, T is the total time
one has, R2 is the wife’s time spent on household labour. The labour supply from each
of them in the labour market are H1 = T − L1 and H2 = T − L2 − R2. After solving
the above maximization problem, we can derive the optimal level of variables about
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household decisions such as consumption and leisure.
To examine the response of the endogenous outcomes corresponding to the chil-
dren’s gender shock, we consider comparative statics towards β. The results are as
follows:
∂L∗1
∂β
< 0 (3.6)
∂L∗2
∂β
Q 0 (3.7)
∂R∗2
∂β
Q 0 (3.8)
so that
∂H∗1
∂β
> 0 (3.9)
∂H∗2
∂β
Q 0 (3.10)
The detailed proof of the results above is given in Appendix 3.7.1. The results
suggest that the husband’s leisure will decrease and his labour supply will increase
when he has more sons instead of daughters. The effects on the wife’s time allocation
are ambiguous. I show the conditions to ensure ∂H∗2/∂β < 0 and ∂R
∗
2/∂β > 0 in the
appendix. Intuitively, a male-biased gender shock will produce a positive effect on the
wife’s leisure, due to the increase in her bargaining power and also a positive effect on
the time she spends on household labour, because the husband values her parenting
behaviours on boys more than on girls. If the latter dominate (for example, when
the marginal effect of children’s gender on the wife’s bargaining power µ2(a1, a2(β)) is
small), she also will have to increase her household labour time. I test these predictions
in the empirical part.
3.3 Background
The son preference has a long history in China. The concept of the dominance of the
husband in a family is embedded in traditional Chinese culture. On the one hand,
the male can carry on the names of family lines (the surname). On the other, in most
cases, the female will move out from her parents family into that of her husband, no
longer providing income or labour for her birth family. Such a preference for sons in
the culture was regarded as harmful feudal tradition, to be brought to an end by the
Chinese Communist Party. As a result, after the founding of the People’s Republic
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of China in 1949, the government started to advocate respect for women, and the
sex ratio at birth was almost balanced until the 1980s (Zeng et al., 1993). However,
due to the national family planning program in 1980, known as the One Child Policy,
since the 1980s sex imbalance has emerged. Since parents under the One Child Policy
cannot ensure the desired number of sons, they have to rely on sex selection, either
prenatally or postnatally, to achieve family continuity (Ebenstein, 2010).
Of the two methods of sex selection, the postnatal one is more traditional; it takes
the form of infanticide or the abandoning of baby girls. However, Coale and Banister
(1994) and Zeng et al. (1993) show that the prenatal method but not the postnatal
one is more probably responsible for the sex imbalance in and after the 1980s. The
technology to identify the gender of a fetus and that to abort are both necessary
for this form of selection. First, abortion is never regarded as illegal or immoral
behaviour in China, partly due to the country’s non-religious culture. Moreover, in
order to facilitate the One Child Policy, abortion equipment which was necessary
for controlling the number of births was provided in hospitals, clinics and the so-
called family planning service stations in communities and villages after 1979. Second,
ultrasound-B examination, a convenient and affordable method of revealing the gender
of the fetus, began to spread across China at much the same time. By observing the
external genitalia of the developing fetus, ultrasound-B examination is much more
accurate than such traditional Chinese methods as feeling the pulse of a pregnant
woman. At the same time, it is more affordable and accessible than other modern
methods such as amniocentesis. In 1979, the year when the One Child Policy was
implemented, China manufactured its first ultrasound-B machine. In 1987, over 13,000
machines were already in use in hospitals. At the same time, imports of foreign-
made ultrasound-B machines also reached their peak. By the beginning of the 1990s,
almost all county and township hospitals and family planning service stations owned
ultrasound-B machines, and such equipment was also available in many private clinics
(Zeng et al., 1993).
With the implementing of the One Child Policy and the combined technology
of ultrasound-B and methods of abortion, the sex ratio for boys at birth in China
experienced an abnormal increase in the 1980s and 1990s. According to the estimates
of Chen et al. (2013), nearly half of the increase in male bias at birth can be attributed
to local access to ultrasound-B examinations. In addition, gaps in mortality and
health investment between boys and girls also enlarged. Many works have documented
this outcome (Arnold and Liu, 1986; Zeng et al., 1993; Chu, 2001; Ebenstein, 2010).
Realizing the possible consequences of prenatal sex selection, the government put some
limits on the use of ultrasound-B. In 1986 and 1989, the Ministry of Health and the
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State Family Planning Commission handed down two notices forbidding prenatal sex
selection except for the purpose of diagnosing hereditary diseases. However, the effects
of the notices were trivial: they lacked the power of laws and gave too few detailed
administrative rules about the use of ultrasound-B. For example, none of them specifies
the penalties for possible violations. During the 1990s, the imbalance became more
serious.
In 2002, the “Law of Population and Family Planning” was enacted. Not only was
the use of ultrasound-B to reveal fetal gender and of abortion for selection purposes
forbidden by law for the first time, but the penalties, including the fines and sentences
for doctors and clinics that violated these rules, were also spelled out. The law came
into effect in September of 2002. Next, the State Family Planning Commission, the
Ministry of Health and the State Food and Drug Administration jointly enacted the
“Regulation on Forbidding Fetal Sex Determination for Non-medical Purposes and on
Abortion for Sex Selection” in November 2002. The regulation gave more details about
implementing the prohibition of ultrasound-B. For example, doctors who helped to test
the gender of a fetus would be fined and their license to practice would be revoked.
3.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
In this section I present my data and empirical strategy for formally testing the effect
of children’s gender on parents’ time allocation, which is predicted by the theoretical
model. The main data source that I use is the China Health and Nutrition Survey. I
start with Ordinary Least Squares estimates on this effect. Due to the possible endo-
geneity of children’s genders because of prenatal selection, I propose an instrumental
variable method using the Law of Population and Family Planning as the main source
of exogenous variation. A formal description of the data and the method is given
below.
3.4.1 Data
The data used in this paper come from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, which
is led by the Population Center at the University of North Carolina. The survey cov-
ers nine provinces (Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu,
Liaoning, and Shandong) in eight waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and
2009). These provinces vary in geographic conditions, social norms and development
levels. Figure 3.1 maps the survey regions. There are about 4400 households in the
survey overall, including over 19,000 individuals. Alongside the ordinary demograph-
ic and economic variables, the survey has well-recorded information about pregnant
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women. It records every pregnancy of each woman, including the results of the preg-
nancy, the date that the pregnancy ended and the gender of the child(ren), etc. Most
variables about pregnancy are not included in the 1989 survey. Therefore, in the em-
pirical part I use the data from 1991 to 2009, seven waves in total. The sample in this
paper includes all families with at least one newly born baby during the period under
scrutiny. The descriptive statistics of the main variables in seven waves are listed in
Table 3.1 for every pregnant woman and Table 3.2 for husbands if identified.
The major dependent variables are the fathers’ and mothers’ work time at home
(the variable housetime) and in the labour market (the variable worktime), with
both variables measured in hours per week. Parents’ time at home and in the labour
market may vary with gender and numbers of children. Figure 3.2 plots parents’ time
allocation before and after the birth of their sons or daughters. It only includes parents
with only one child for simplicity. We can see from Figure 3.2 that a father’s working
time in the labour market increase more after he gives birth to a boy relative to a
girl. A mother’s working time decrease more and her time on housework increase
more facing with a boy instead of a girl. These arguments will be tested formally in
following sections with the whole sample. In addition, from Table 3.2, we may note
that the mean values of the husbands’ household labour time in each wave are much
less than those of wives, which coincides with Becker’s sexual division theory and the
social norms in developing countries. It can justify my simplification in the theoretical
part, which does not incorporate the husbands’ household labour time into the model.
To explore variations in the children’s gender, I construct two measurements as the
key independent variables. The first is the children’s sex ratio in the household (the
variable Ratio), which is defined as (Number of boys)/(Total Number of children).
The other one is the gender-biased score (the variable Score) defined as (Number of
boys)-(Number of girls). The impact of one more child is linear in this measurement,
but non-linear in the previous measurement. The samples of men and women are not
totally matched as husbands and wives, since some married women did not report their
husbands’ line number. In addition to the key characteristics of an individual, includ-
ing whether the family includes parents from the older generation (Old), whether the
individual reaches retirement age (Retire), and the total number of children (Acctotal),
etc.
There are some concerns about the CHNS data that it may form a unbalanced
panel data. In my sample, only less than 30% individuals appear in all seven waves.
If individuals drop out of the sample non-randomly, it may produce caveats for the
empirical analysis. Here I provide two arguments which prevent the unbalanced sample
in this paper from the caveats. First, though the number of households and individuals
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missing at some waves is large, most of the reasons are plausible. One of the reasons
is due to changes in sampled provinces and communities. Some new provinces and
communities were added during the survey to replace those unable to participate.
Then all individuals in those provinces or communities will miss at least one wave of
the survey. However, given the fact that the sample process is random, those who
do not drop out during all available waves in their provinces or communities should
be considered to be parts of the “balance” panel, though they do not appear at all
seven waves. Another reason is that my sample only consists of married adults. Some
individuals were still teenager or unmarried at the first available wave, but became
eligible for my sample during the survey. It is a natural process to grow up for any
individual, so I also take it as a plausible reason to be missing at some waves. Taking
those together with the balance panel, I find they compose nearly 70% of my sample.
Second, I test whether dropping out of the survey is systematically related to my key
outcome variables. T-tests fail to reject the hypothesis that men and women who are
going to be missing at next wave have a different work time in the labour market
for each wave. Both of the arguments add to our confidence that the unbalanced
characteristic will not become a possible caveat for the empirical analysis.
3.4.2 OLS Specifications
I estimate the basic regression model with OLS:
Yit = αi + βpt + γGenderit + θXit + ζtZi + µit (3.11)
where Yit is the time allocated to some specific activity by a parent i. Possible activities
include market labour, household labour and leisure. Genderit is the measurement of
the children’s gender, including Ratioit and Scoreit which were defined in Section 3.4.1.
The gender effect we care about is captured by the coefficient γ. Xit is a series of the
time-varying control variables such as whether there are older parents in the family,
whether the individual reaches retirement age, the total number of children, the age
of the youngest child, etc. Zi is a series of such time-invariant control variables as
education, whether the individual is from a rural area, etc. αi and βpt are individual
and province by year fixed effects; including the province by year fixed effects not
only controls for the variations in the macro economy, but also for the transitions
in institutions and social norms at province level, which may affect the outcomes of
individual time allocations.
As described in Section 3.3, the gender composition can be selected rather than
randomly assigned by the nature of developing countries with the diffusion of prenatal
114
selection technology, which may result in inconsistent estimates. Take the example
of a regression with women’s housework time as the dependent variable. On the one
hand, a family with a strong preference for sons may select a corresponding children’s
sex ratio and require the wife to take on more household responsibility, which will
induce an upward bias for the OLS estimation; on the other, since a family with a
wife who works less in the labour market and contributes more in household work
may be more bound to traditional production and may be less accessible to modern
medical technology, such correlations will bias the OLS estimation towards zero. If
such unobserved factors which affect both the gender results and the time allocation are
time invariant, controlling for individual fixed effects can solve the problem. However,
if they are time variant, other strategies are needed for a consistent estimate.
3.4.3 Intrumental Variables
Due to such potential endogeneity, I propose here an identification strategy using in-
strumental variables. Through the rigorous rules on the use of ultrasound-B, a change
may have ensued in the trend of the sex ratio at birth. To specify, before September
2002, like the diffusion of ultrasound-B, the sex ratio at birth would have presented
an increasing trend. However, after this time, the trend may have been reversed by
legally forbidding such technology. Figure 3.3 draws the gender composition over time
in the sample data.
Furthermore, the treatment effects of the policy may be heterogeneous on different
households. I construct a variable proximityi for household i, which is defined as
[max(distancei,1989) − distancei,1989]/max(distancei,1989), where distancei,1989 is the
distance between the home and the nearest facility offering family planning services,
max(distancei,1989) is the greatest distance between any household within the same
community and the nearest family planning facility. Figure 3.4 depicts the distribution
of the distance. The variable ranges from 0 to 1. The way I construct it makes
sure that it is a linear decreasing function of the distance. The main objective is to
measure accessibility to the technology of gender selection. The proximity variable is
about how close an individual’s house is to the nearest family planning facility. From
intuition, those in closer proximity to a family planning facility will receive greater
treatment effects during the diffusion of its technology and will also be affected more
after the law. In Figure 3.5, I draw the average sex ratio at birth over time separately
for the sample which is further away than 1 kilometer (median of the whole sample)
and for the sample which is not so far. It can be seen that the trend in the longer
distance sample is relatively plain, which offers an intuition about the existence of
heterogeneous trends among different households.
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Alongside the above two graphs, results of the first stage regression can offer a
formal justification for the construction of instrumental variables. But there is some
concern about the exogeneity of our instruments. I address this concern in Section
3.5.2.
To make use of such exogenous variation, a Two Stage Least Squares analysis is
needed formally. Specifically, I will estimate a model for the first stage regression:
Genderit = αi + βt + θXit + ζtZi + δ1proximityi ∗ (birthyearit − 1991)
+ δ2proximityi ∗ (birthyearit − 1991) ∗ P 2002it + δ3proximityi ∗ P 2002it + it
(3.12)
where P 2002it is a dummy variable indicating whether this parent’s child was born after
September 2002. (birthyearit − 1991) is a linear exogenous time trend. Using the
interaction between heterogeneous proximity and the time trends as instruments, I
expect to identify the effect of the sex ratio at birth.
3.5 Results
In this section, I present the results of using empirical strategies, as described above,
to test the collective household framework.
3.5.1 Baseline Results
Table 3.3 reports OLS and 2SLS estimations of model 3.11 on three main outcome
variables: men’s and women’s labour supply in the labour market and women’s house-
work time. The odd numbered columns report the results using the OLS model and
the even numbered columns report the 2SLS model. As the key independent variable
I use two different constructions of gender composition, children’s sex ratio (Ratio)
and the gender-biased score (Score), reported respectively in Panel A and Panel B.
The OLS specification, controlling for variables, individual and province by year
fixed effects, shows that there are no significant effects of the children’s gender com-
position on a husband’s work time in the labour market. The effects on the wife’s
market and household labour time are small but significantly different from zero. One
more son instead of a daughter will reduce the wife’s labour supply by 0.569 hours a
week and increase her housework time by 0.318 hours.
The difference between the OLS and 2SLS models is huge. The 2SLS results in
Panel A suggest that a boy instead of a girl will induce an 6.777-hour increase in a
man’s labour supply per week and a 7.419-hour decrease in a woman’s; at the same
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time, a woman’s weekly housework time will increase by 5.494 hours, which implies
a four hours’ increase in her leisure. The results in Panel B use the sex ratio as
independent variable. If the sex ratio of the children increases by 0.1, men’s labour
supply will increase by 2.482 hours per week and women’s will decrease by 3.214.
Changes in women’s housework time are similar. The final rows in each panel report
the F-stats of the excluded instruments. The F-stats in all the 2SLS specifications
are larger than 10, so the instruments are strong enough. At the same time, all these
2SLS regressions pass the over-identification test.
Such a huge difference suggests the existence of bias in the OLS estimates. On the
one hand, omitted variable bias may exist in the OLS estimates. For example, families
in less developed areas are always bound by traditional culture, preferring husbands
to work more than wives in the labour market and in the grip of traditional medicine
instead of modern medical technology such as ultrasound-B. This can bias the OLS
estimation to zero. On the other hand, the OLS estimates can be biased towards zero
because of the measurement error in reported gender composition. Due to the family
planning policy, a couple in China sometimes have to hide some of their children from
census and survey, which produces a classical measurement error on the gender ratio
of their children. The 2SLS estimates can remedy this problem.
I next consider the first stage regression in the IV strategy. The results of the first
stage model 3.12 are listed in Table 3.4. Columns 1 and 2 present the first stage results
for the husbands’ market labour outcomes, using gender-biased scoring (Score) and the
sex ratio at birth (Ratio) as distinct independent variables. Columns 3 to 6 present
the corresponding first stage results for the time spent by wives on market labour
and household labour. From the results we can find that the instruments predict the
children’s gender composition quite well, both the gender-biased score and the sex ratio
at birth. δ1, the coefficients of the interaction term between the time trends and the
proximity factor birthyearit ∗ proximityi are significantly positive, implying that with
the diffusion of the related technology (in particular the ultrasound-B machines) the
gender bias would grow larger. Such effects were larger in those households which lived
nearer to the family planning facilities. What we care more about are the coefficients
of the triple interaction term P 2002it ∗ (birthyearit − 1991) ∗ proximityi. The negative
significance suggests that the implementation of the 2002 Law did stop the increasing
trend towards gender imbalance.
3.5.2 Exogeneity of the Instruments
The previous 2SLS results are based on the instruments that involves the 2002 law
banning the use of ultrasound-B and the distance between the household and the near-
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est family planning service facility. There are some concerns about their exogeneity,
which may affect the identification. In this section I present some evidence to confirm
that my instruments are exogenous.
The major concern is the exogeneity of the distance to family planning service
facilities. In his famous paper using college proximity as an instrument for education,
Card (1993) raises some possible caveats in assuming such geographic variation to be
endogenous, which may also apply to the context in the present paper. In my setting,
for instance, one may think of the possibility that a less-constrained family would
choose a house which was convenient for receiving family planning services. China’s
family planning policy began in 1980. In the 1989 data, over 97% households had lived
in the same place for over nine years, which means that most households had moved
into their houses before the start of family planning services. So it is unlikely that
endogeneity would come from selecting the households’ distance from family planning
services for unobserved reasons. In the first four columns of Table 3.5, I report the
results from the sample of those who in 1989 had lived in the same place for more
than 9 years. Not surprisingly, the estimation results are similar.
Even if the possibility can be ruled out that a family selected house on the basis of
its distance from family planning facilities, there are still certain other concerns. One
of them is that the location of one’s house will reflect one’s preferences, which may
correlate with labour outcomes. For example, the households where career success is
emphasized tend to live in a crowded area, which has better access to many facilities,
including family planning services. But since almost all families live in the same place
for many years, it is natural to think that the effects brought by their preferences should
be persistent. In a fixed effect regression, such persistent effects will be absorbed in
household or individual fixed effects.
An alternative strategy for avoiding possible endogeneity from information about
distance is to use the time trends alone as the instrument, instead of the interactions
between proximity and time trends. From the last four columns of Table 3.5, it can be
seen that it makes little difference even if we do use the time trends as instruments.
The estimates are statistically significant and similar in magnitude to previous results.
For simplicity, I do not report the first stage estimates, which are also similar.
Another consideration about identification is the exogeneity of the trend before
2002. The time invariant characteristics are absorbed in the individual fixed effects.
Moreover, after controlling for the Province×year fixed effects, the province-level time
varying shocks will not be a problem. Nevertheless, since the trend before 2002 is
not produced from an exogenous policy shock but from a technology diffusion process,
we should still take a cautious attitude to it. To address this problem, I use the
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variation from the 2002 law as the sole instrument and put the other two in the
control variables. To be specific, the variable proximityi ∗ (birthyearit− 1991) ∗P 2002it
is the only instrument now. Since the first stage equation is to regress the gender
composition to all instruments and controls, the results are totally the same as in
Table 3.4. The results in the second stage regression can be checked in Table 3.6.
Since the variation in the sole instrument arises from the 2002 law, it is certain to be
exogenous.
We find that if we use only the variation from the policy shock, most of the results
will not change significantly. Only the outcomes of women in response to the sex ratio
of children are insignificant, while the signs and the magnitudes are similar. In general,
when using the interaction between the proximity multiplier, the 2002 dummy and the
time trend as the only instrument which is free from an endogeneity concern, the results
are similar to those of our main regression, implying that the initial specification will
not lead to an endogeneity caveat.
3.5.3 Measurement of the Proximity
In the baseline regression, I define a variable proximityi as [max(distancei,1989) −
distancei,1989]/max(distancei,1989), where distancei,1989 is the distance between the
home and the nearest facility offering family planning services, max(distancei,1989)
is the greatest distance between any household within the same community and the
nearest family planning facility. I construct this variable to measure accessibility to the
technology of gender selection. I use its interaction with variables about the 2002 law
as the instruments to do the 2SLS estimation. In this subsection, I test the robustness
of using a different definition of the proximity.
Instead of using proximityi, a linear function of the distance between the home
and the nearest facility offering family planning services, I define an alternative mea-
surement proximity2i as a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the distance to
the nearest family planning facility is less than the average distance among the whole
community. I repeat the same practice as in the baseline regression and present the
2SLS results in Table 3.7. We can find from it that the magnitudes and the signifi-
cances of estimated coefficients are not affected much by this alternative measurement.
It adds to our confidence that the baseline results are not driven by the specific def-
inition of the measurement of the accessibility to the technology of gender selection.
For simplicity I do not report the first stage and the reduced form results, but they
are both similar to those in the baseline regressions.
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3.5.4 Reduced Form Evidence
In this part I present the reduced form results of the 2SLS strategy. The reduced form
evidence describes the relationship between the parents’ time allocation and the time
trend. The style of the reduced form regression is similar to a differences-in-differences
(DID) strategy. For a formal reduced form regression, I estimate the model:
Yit = pi1proximityi ∗ (birthyearit − 1991) + pi2proximityi ∗ (birthyearit − 1991) ∗ P 2002it
+ pi3proximityi ∗ P 2002it + αi + βt + θXit + ζtZi + νit (3.13)
The results are presented in Table 3.8.
We see from the results that the directions and magnitudes fit with the correspond-
ing 2SLS results, as predicted. Before 2002, the time spent on housework by parents
increased with time, while the market labour time for mothers largely went down and
the market labour time for fathers increased non-significantly. After 2002, such trends
all shifted in the reverse direction. Combining with the trend of sex ratio, the reduced
form evidence are consistent with the 2SLS results. It adds to the confidence of the
IV strategy.
3.5.5 Placebo Test
To explore the possible violation of the exclusion restriction, I estimate the effect
of the time trend on individuals’ time allocation with a “placebo” group. In this
group, the sample is consist of married adults who had no children. If the children’s
genders are not the only channels through which the instruments affect individuals’
time allocations in above the 2SLS model, but any other unobserved factors in the time
trend, then the placebo group would also exhibit spurious effects on their allocation
of time. Specifically, I estimate the same equation in the reduced form specification
3.13 on the placebo sample. The results are presented in Table 3.9.
We see that almost all the coefficients of time trends are never statistically sig-
nificantly different from zero, except for the one with a pre-2002 time trend on the
time spent on housework for the women’s placebo sample. Even the coefficient is in a
reverse direction to that of the main regressions, which in some ways strengthens the
conclusions. These findings can exclude the possibility that some unobserved factors
act as alternative channels to influence the time allocation outcomes.
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3.5.6 Length of Working Hours and Labour Force Participa-
tion
In the baseline results, I combine individuals working zero hours with those working
positive hours to do the estimation. In reality, the decisions about working in the
labour market can be separated to two parts. Individuals will decide whether to
participate in the labour force at first, and then decide how long they work in the
labour market. For simplicity, in the baseline estimations I do not take this difference
into account. In this subsection, I estimate the impacts at the intensive and extensive
margins. The results are listed at Table 3.10.
The first column estimates the impacts of children gender on working hours for
men being in work (with positive working hours). The second column estimates the
probability of participating in work for all men. We can see that the estimated coef-
ficients in the first column are similar to the baseline results, and the probability of
being in work for a man is not affected by whether the child is a boy or a girl. On
the contrary, for women, both the length of working hours conditional on being in
work and the probability of participating in work are both significantly reduced by an
increasing gender ratio at birth. The results are not surprising. Compared with men,
women are easier to quit their jobs and become housewives when needed. Having sons
instead of daughters will affect women’s decision on working both at the intensive and
extensive margins.
3.5.7 Men’s Housework Time
In the theoretical model, I assume that husbands are specialized in their labour market
work, so I did not test the response about men’s housework time to their children’s
gender composition in the baseline results. However, it is intuitive to think about
one case where it may be relevant. On the one hand, the time that men spend on
housework can make a similar contribution to that of women. On the other, the time
that they spend on their sons will provide intrinsic utility in itself. So it is reasonable
to regard it as playing a similar role to that of women’s housework, i.e. presented as
part of the husband’s utility function. The predictions from theory should also be the
same.
In this part I give the results of testing the theory in Table 3.11. The OLS and
2SLS results are quite similar to those for women, indicating that men will also take
more responsibility in households when they have sons and not daughters. The results
imply that sons will get more care than their sisters will, from both their father and
their mother.
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Although the results are significant and similar to those for women, they will
not undermine the conclusions drawn in the theoretical and empirical parts, and will
even strengthen some of the implications of these. On one hand, it is shown in the
descriptive statistics that the mean values of men’s housework time are much less than
those of women, suggesting that the role of wives in families is much more important
than the role of husbands. From this perspective, it is not unreasonable to exclude
husbands’ housework in the theoretical model for the sake of simplicity. On the other
hand, the speculation that an increase in men’s housework time when they have more
sons means a reduction in the time available for their leisure, as suggested in the
theoretical model, is more plausible, which indicates that their bargaining power is
further somewhat weakened.
3.5.8 Dividing Household Labour Time
It is easy to conceive that parents would directly devote most of the increased house-
work time to child care when facing shocks from children. But there can also be some
spill-over effects on the time devoted to other housework not directly related to child
care, in particular those which can produce positive externality to children. In order
to be sure of the main channel, here I divide it into two types of dependent variable,
child-care labour and non child-care labour. Table 3.12 presents the results. The table
shows that only the time directly devoted to child care by both husbands and wives is
affected significantly by the children’s gender composition. As for the non child-care
housework time, the coefficients are also positive, which is consistent with intuition,
but not significant.
3.5.9 Implications on Alternative Models
Above analysis is based on the bargaining model that treats the preference for sons
as some kind of premium in the father’s utility function, which I call the utility-based
preference. The results in the empirical part are consistent with the model, and may
shed light on other theories about family and son preference.
In a unitary model, husband and wife are treated as a unity with the same utility
function. But the model faces similar empirical difficulties as Haddad et al. (1997)
raised. It cannot explain the opposite direction of the outcomes to do with husbands’
and wives’ leisure. For example, Rose (2000) models the family behaviour by means of
a unitary model and a constraint-based preference assumption. It predicts that under
credit constraint both parents’ leisure time will shrink in response to a son instead of
a daughter, but when there is no credit constraint it will expand instead. However,
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as I have shown in the empirical part, the positive outcomes for women’s leisure and
the negative outcomes for men’s suggest that theoretical predictions from the unitary
model may not have good explanatory power for the difference in behavioral response
among family members.
This paper can also shed light on the essence of son preference. As discussed above,
there are two explanations for this. One is the utility-based preference I have modelled
in the theoretical part; the other is the constraint-based preference. It has been shown
that the empirical results are consistent with the model with the former explanation.
Now assuming that the preference term βg(R2) appears only in the parents’ budget
constraints, but not in the utility functions. One reason for doing this is the wage gap
between men and women. In developing countries: male members of the workforce
can play more roles in production than can females in most families that rely on
agriculture. Even in a non-agricultural labour market, women receive relatively low
wages with the same human capital. Even if men and women could earn at the same
level of income in the future, their duties to parents in the latters retirement are
always imbalanced. Sons and their wives are often required to take the responsibility
for looking after parents, mainly in the form of income transfer. Now we return to
the theoretical framework. Instead of appearing in parents’ utility functions, here I
assume that the children are a source of future income:
maxU(C1, C2, L1) + µV (C3, C4, L2) (3.14)
where C1 and C3 are their first period consumption, C2 and C4 are the second period
consumption, and L1 and L2 are their leisure in the first period. The inter-temporal
budget constraint for the family is:
C1 + ρC2 + C3 + ρC4 = W1(T − L1) +W2(T − L2 −R2) + ρβg(R2) (3.15)
The corresponding comparative static results are as follows:
∂L∗1
∂β
> 0 (3.16)
∂L∗2
∂β
> 0 (3.17)
∂R∗2
∂β
> 0 (3.18)
We can see from the comparative static results that both women’s and men’s leisure
will increase after a boy is born. As a boy will create a larger future income than a
girl, his parents can both enjoy more leisure. Such prediction is not consistent with
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the empirical results. In the empirical part it has been shown that women’s leisure
will increase and men’s leisure will decrease facing a son instead of a girl. Though we
cannot exclude this channel, it cannot explain the whole empirical results alone. So in
general, it is incautious to accept the constraint-based explanation as the only source
of the son preference. It suggests that the utility-based explanation, a more cultural
reason, must play a key role in the formation of the son preference.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between the gender composition of the chil-
dren in family’s and the allocation of their parents’ time. In the theoretical part, I take
the utility-based explanation for the preference for sons that sons will bring a premium
to the fathers’ utility function and incorporate it with a bargaining model. Through an
analysis of the comparative statics, I show that men’s time in market labour will rise.
The impact on the time spent by women earning outside the home and on housework
are ambiguous, depending on the relative marginal effect of a male-biased shock on
the wife’s bargaining power compared to that on the husband’s utility. To empirically
test the model, I used data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey in the period
1991 to 2009. What troubles the previous empirical papers is the possible endogeneity
of children’s gender due to the diffusion of technology for ultrasound-B and abortion.
I draw upon the “Law of Population and Family Planning”, which forbids the use of
ultrasound-B, as the source of a natural experiment, to explore the exogenous varia-
tion in children’s gender. The estimations on men’s responses to the larger proportion
of boys in their children are totally consistent with the theoretical model. As regards
women, the results show that they will spend more time on housework and less on the
labour market, which suggests that their increase in bargaining power after the birth
of a son may be dominated by the effects on the husbands’ utility. The results are
robust to additional empirical tests. Moreover, the same reduced-form specification
on the placebo group with no children yields small and insignificant results.
This paper can contribute to literature in many ways and its implications are
important for policy makers in developing countries. The above findings highlight
the significance of the intra-household decision-making process. The empirical results
support the utility-based explanation as the source of the son preference. Moreover,
the findings imply clear harm for women in developing countries, due to the long-
standing preference for sons. Since the theoretical and empirical results suggest that
parents both devote less time to daughters due to the father’s preference for sons,
it is reasonable to attribute the relatively low achievements of women in careers to
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some extent to the poor care they received in their childhood. The results can address
some puzzles about the ways in which culture affects the economic outcomes. Such
findings can also reveal many policy implications for developing countries with a strong
preference for sons, such as China and India. For example, economists have long argued
that an adult’s performance in the labour market is related to the resources received
in childhood. Therefore, gender discrimination in adulthood can be partly attributed
to the preference for sons. As a result, women’s lifelong value is yet further reduced
and produces worse discrimination and preference for sons, forming a miserable trap
for females. Such an imbalance can be alleviated more effectively not merely through
interventions on fairness in the adult labour market, but by advocating better care for
young girls and even transferring more resources to them.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Map of Survey Regions
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(a) Average Work Time in the Labour Market of Men with
One Child
(b) Average Work Time in the Labour Market of Women
with One Child
(c) Average Housework Time of Women with One Child
Figure 3.2: Time Allocation of Parents with One Child
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Figure 3.3: Time Trend of Average Sex Ratio at Birth
Figure 3.4: Distribution of Distance to Nearest Family Planning Facilities
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Figure 3.5: Time Trend of Average Sex Ratio at Birth for Two Subsamples
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Table 3.6: The 2nd Stage Results Using Variation from the 2002 Law as Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
VARIABLES worktime housetime worktime housetime
Panel A: Score as Independent Variable
score 7.011* 6.856*** -4.712** 5.893*
(4.185) (3.044) (2.579) (3.047)
Province×year FE Y Y Y Y
Individual FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 12,847 12,552 11,897 10,734
Panel B: Ratio as Independent Variable
ratio 38.814* 41.300*** -23.776 56.486
(22.668) (20.430) (45.521) (66.944)
Province×year FE Y Y Y Y
Individual and Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 12,847 12,552 11,897 10,734
† Notes: Standard errors are clustered on community level. *** denotes
significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Dependent variables are
work time and housework time in women and men sample. Key inde-
pendent variable is children’s gender composition, including the gender-
biased score (Panel A) and the sex ratio at birth (Panel B). The in-
struments are still Proximity×(birthyear-1991), Proximity×(birthyear-
1991)×Post-2002 dummy and Proximity×Post-2002 dummy.. Con-
trol variables include whether there are old parents in the family,
whether the individual reaches retiring age, the total number of chil-
dren, province×year fixed effects, interactive between time dummies
and education, urban/rural etc.
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Table 3.7: The 2nd Stage Results Using Alternative Definition of Proximity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
VARIABLES worktime housetime worktime housetime
Panel A: Score as Independent Variable
score 12.468*** 13.743* -7.694** 7.796*
(5.349) (7.044) (3.845) (4.132)
Province×year FE Y Y Y Y
Individual FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 12,847 12,552 11,897 10,734
Panel B: Ratio as Independent Variable
ratio 50.164*** 53.167 -39.115* 61.438*
(20.219) (39.793) (21.696) (32.948)
Province×year FE Y Y Y Y
Individual and Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 12,847 12,552 11,897 10,734
† Notes: Standard errors are clustered on community level. *** de-
notes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Dependent vari-
ables are work time and housework time in women and men sample.
Key independent variable is children’s gender composition, including
the gender-biased score (Panel A) and the sex ratio at birth (Panel
B). The instrument is Proximity×(birthyear-1991)×Post-2002 dummy
only. Control variables include whether there are old parents in the
family, whether the individual reaches retiring age, the total number
of children, province×year fixed effects, interactive between time dum-
mies and education, urban/rural etc. Proximity×(birthyear-1991) and
Proximity×Post-2002 dummy are also included as controls.
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Table 3.8: Reduced Form Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
VARIABLES worktime housetime worktime housetime
Proximity×(birthyear-1991) 0.147 0.251** -0.881* 0.221**
(0.551) (0.122) (0.492) (0.111)
Proximity×(birthyear-1991) -1.921* -1.429*** 2.083* -6.958***
×Post-2002 dummy (1.071) (0.484) (1.233) (0.769)
Proximity×Post-2002 dummy 6.004 17.259** 9.747 90.270***
(14.279) (6.813) (16.933) (10.552)
Province×year FE Y Y Y Y
Individual FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 13,130 12,714 12,546 11,419
R-squared 0.084 0.062 0.191 0.066
† Notes: Standard errors are clustered on community level. *** denotes
significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Dependent variable are
work time and housework time in both men and women sample. Key in-
dependent variables are Proximity×(birthyear-1991), Proximity×(birthyear-
1991)×Post-2002 dummy and Proximity×Post-2002 dummy. Control vari-
ables include whether there are old parents in the family, whether the indi-
vidual reaches retiring age, the total number of children, province×year fixed
effects, interactive between time dummies and education, urban/rural etc.
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Table 3.9: Placebo Test Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
VARIABLES worktime housetime worktime housetime
Proximity×(birthyear-1991) -0.470 -1.333 -0.802 -3.745*
(3.615) (1.438) (2.908) (2.269)
Proximity×(birthyear-1991) -2.737 7.041 -9.363 -2.196
×Post-2002 dummy (15.310) (6.083) (7.080) (5.519)
Proximity×Post-2002 dummy -35.212 -87.177 146.093 71.484
(256.168) (101.848) (100.186) (78.088)
Province×year FE Y Y Y Y
Individual FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,131 3,108 3,453 3,432
R-squared 0.086 0.067 0.129 0.129
† Notes: Standard errors are clustered on community level. *** denotes signifi-
cance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Dependent variable are work time and
housework time in both men and women sample without any children. Key in-
dependent variables are Proximity×(birthyear-1991), Proximity×(birthyear-
1991)×Post-2002 dummy and Proximity×Post-2002 dummy. Control vari-
ables include whether there are old parents in the family, whether the indi-
vidual reaches retiring age, the total number of children, province×year fixed
effects, interactive between time dummies and education, urban/rural etc.
138
Table 3.10: Impacts on Working Hours and Decision to Work
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
VARIABLES work hours 1(work hour>0) work hour 1(work hour>0)
Panel A: Score as Independent Variable
score 6.011*** 0.002 -4.168* -0.086***
(2.166) (0.059) (2.189) (0.034)
Province×year FE Y Y Y Y
Individual FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 9,194 12,847 6,619 11,897
Panel B: Ratio as Independent Variable
ratio 20.916* 0.019 -27.776* -0.301**
(11.565) (0.415) (15.164) (0.144)
Province×year FE Y Y Y Y
Individual and Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 9,194 12,847 6,619 11,897
† Notes: Standard errors are clustered on community level. *** denotes signifi-
cance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Dependent variable are length of work
hours for all economic active individuals and whether to participate in the labour
force. Key independent variable is children’s gender composition, including the
gender-biased score (Panel A) and the sex ratio at birth (Panel B). The instrumen-
t is Proximity×(birthyear-1991)×Post-2002 dummy, Proximity×(birthyear-1991) and
Proximity×Post-2002 dummy. Control variables include whether there are old parents
in the family, whether the individual reaches retiring age, the total number of chil-
dren, province×year fixed effects, interactive between time dummies and education,
urban/rural etc.
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Table 3.11: Impacts On Men’s Household labour Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
METHOD OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
VARIABLES housetime housetime housetime housetime
score -0.015 5.449***
(0.123) (2.068)
ratio -0.208 18.467**
(0.365) (7.942)
Province×year FE Y Y Y Y
Individual FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 17,033 12,552 17,033 12,552
† Notes: Standard errors are clustered on community level. ***
denotes significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Key
independent variable is children’s gender composition, including
the gender-biased score and the sex ratio at birth. The in-
struments are Proximity×(birthyear-1991), Proximity×(birthyear-
1991)×Post-2002 dummy and Proximity×Post-2002 dummy. Con-
trol variables include whether there are old parents in the family,
whether the individual reaches retiring age, the total number of chil-
dren, province×year fixed effects, interactive between time dummies
and education, urban/rural etc.
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Table 3.12: Impacts On Different types of Household labour Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women
VARIABLES non child-care child-care non child-care child-care
Panel A: Score as Independent Variable
score 1.341 4.310*** 0.601 3.745**
(1.378) (1.175) (1.677) (1.897)
Province×year FE Y Y Y Y
Individual FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 12,552 12,852 10,734 11,898
Panel B: Ratio as Independent Variable
ratio 5.266 16.265*** 0.978 13.137*
(5.242) (4.728) (4.889) (7.767)
Province×year FE Y Y Y Y
Individual FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 12,552 12,852 10,734 11,898
† Notes: Standard errors are clustered on community level. *** denotes
significance at 0.01, ** at 0.05, and * at 0.1. Dependent variables are
non child-care and child-care housework time respectively. Key inde-
pendent variable is children’s gender composition, including the gender-
biased score (Panel A) and the sex ratio at birth (Panel B). The instru-
ments are Proximity×(birthyear-1991), Proximity×(birthyear-1991)×Post-
2002 dummy and Proximity×Post-2002 dummy. Control variables include
whether there are old parents in the family, whether the individual reach-
es retiring age, the total number of children, province×year fixed effects,
interactive between time dummies and education, urban/rural etc.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Comparative Static Results of the Utility-based Model
To simplify, assume that both utility functions are additively separable and increasing
and concave in each argument (Ui > 0; Uii < 0,∀i; Uij < 0,∀i 6= j; similar for V ),
and that an interior solution exists. The first order conditions can easily be obtained.
Take the partial derivative with respect to β, and the formulae, including 6 comparative
static variables, can be written as follows:

U11 0 0 0 0 −1
0 µV11 0 0 0 −1
0 0 U22 0 0 −W1
0 0 0 µV22 0 −W2
0 0 0 0 pi(β)g′′ −W2
1 1 W1 W2 W2 0


∂C∗1
∂β
∂C∗2
∂β
∂L∗1
∂β
∂L∗2
∂β
∂R∗2
∂β
∂λ∗
∂β

=

0
−µ2a′2V1
0
−µ2a′2V2
−pi′(β)g′
0

(3.19)
Applying Cramer’s Rule, the following comparative statics results can be obtained:
∆ = µ2V11V22(pig
′′U22 +W 21 pig
′′U11 +W 22U11U22)
+ µpig′′U11U22(V22 +W 22 V11) > 0 (3.20)
∆3 = W1µU11(µ2a
′
2piV1g
′′V22 +W2µ2a′2V2pig
′′V11 +W1W2µpi′g′V11V22) > 0 (3.21)
∆4 = −µW 22 V11U11U22(µ2a′2V2 − pi′g′)− µµ2a′2pig′′V11(V2U22 +W 21U11) Q 0 (3.22)
∆5 = −µpi′g′W2V11U11U22(1− µ2a′2)− µV22U11U22(pi′g′ − µ2a′2V2)
− µ2pi′g′V11V22(U22 +W1U11) Q 0 (3.23)
−(∆4 + ∆5) = µV22U11U22(pi′g′ − µ2a′2V2) + µµ2a′2W 22 V11U11U22(V2 − pi′g′)
+ µ2pi′g′V11V22(U22 +W1U11) + µµ2a′2pig
′′V11(V2U22 +W 21U11) Q 0
(3.24)
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So that
∂L∗1
∂β
=
∆3
∆
< 0 (3.25)
∂L∗2
∂β
=
∆4
∆
Q 0 (3.26)
∂R∗2
∂β
=
∆5
∆
Q 0 (3.27)
which implies
∂H∗1
∂β
= −∆3
∆
> 0 (3.28)
∂H∗2
∂β
= −(∆4 + ∆5)
∆
Q 0 (3.29)
Now let us check the ambiguous effects on L2, R2 and H2 in detail. From the three
expressions above, it can be found that most of the terms in them take one direction:
most terms in ∂L∗2/∂β and ∂R
∗
2/∂β are positive, while for ∂H
∗
2/∂β they are negative
So it is straightforward to find conditions that will guarantee unambiguous results.
The key is the relative marginal effect on the wife’s bargaining power compared to
that on the husband’s utility. For example, one of the conditions which can cancel
out all the negative terms in ∂R∗2/∂β is µ2a
′
2 < 1 and µ2a
′
2V2 < pi
′g′, which intuitively
means that the increase in the wife’s bargaining power when she has more sons instead
of daughters is smaller than the increase in the husband’s utility due to his preference
for sons. Even if the conditions are not met, it is totally possible that the negative
terms can also be dominated by other positive terms. The same arguments apply to
∂L∗2/∂β and ∂H
∗
2/∂β, too.
3.7.2 Comparative Static Results of the Constraint-based Mod-
el
The basic assumptions for utility functions are similar. After obtaining the first order
conditions, take the partial derivative with respect to β; then the formulae including
eight comparative static variables can be written as follows:
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
U11 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1
0 U22 0 0 0 0 0 −ρ
0 0 U33 0 0 0 0 −W1
0 0 0 µV11 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 µV22 0 0 −ρ
0 0 0 0 0 µV33 0 −W2
0 0 0 0 0 0 ρβg′′ 0
1 ρ W1 1 ρ W2 0 0


∂C∗1
∂β
∂C∗2
∂β
∂L∗1
∂β
∂C∗3
∂β
∂C∗4
∂β
∂L∗2
∂β
∂R∗2
∂β
∂λ∗
∂β

=

0
0
0
0
−µ2a′2V1
−µ2a′2V2
−µ2a′2V3
−ρg′

(3.30)
Applying Cramer’s Rule, the following comparative statics results can be obtained:
∆ = µ3ρβg′′V11V22V33(U22U33 + ρ2U11U33 +W 21U11U22)
+ µ2ρβg′′U11U22U33(V22V33 + ρ2V11V33 +W 22 V11V22) > 0 (3.31)
∆3 = µ
2ρβg′′U11U22U33(µρgW1V1V22V33 + µ2ρW1a′2V2V11V33
+ g′V3V11V22) > 0 (3.32)
∆6 = −µ2µ2a′2ρβg′′V3V11V22(U22U33 + ρ2U11U33 +W 21U11U22)
+ µ2ρ2βg′′gW 22U11U22U33V11V22 > 0 (3.33)
∆7 = −µ2ρg′(W 22 V11V22U11U22U33 + ρ2V11V33U11U22U33 +W 21 V11V22V33U11U22
+ µV11V22V33U22U33 + µρ
2V11V22V33U11U33 + V22V33U11U22U33) > 0 (3.34)
∂L∗1
∂β
=
∆3
∆
> 0 (3.35)
∂L∗2
∂β
=
∆6
∆
> 0 (3.36)
∂R∗2
∂β
=
∆7
∆
> 0 (3.37)
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